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S The Implementation of Good Governance 
Practices in Service Provisions to the Citizens 
in Addis Ababa City Administration:  
The Case of Yeka Sub-City1
DABA MOTI2 – CHUOL KOMPUOK3
Addis Ababa city administration is known for its poor implementation of 
good governance to the public. The main objective of the study is to assess 
the implementation of good governance while rendering services to the 
ordinary citizens. The  research methodology employs both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches using data collection instruments with the 
IBM SPSS statistical packagxe vs.  21.  The findings indicate favourable 
results in meeting the needs of citizens. To that effect, a number of issues are 
discussed: good governance that is effective and efficient, transparent and 
open, accountable; participation, leadership direction and strategic vision; 
fairness and equity; governance that is consensus oriented, responsive in 
service provision; and governance that follows the rule of law. Although the 
implementation process has brought tangible results, it is not free from some 
challenges. In conclusion, both achievements and failures were observed. Thus, 
understanding customers’ expectations in service provisions, systematising 
customers’ feedback, and continuously raising the staff ’s awareness are the 
recommendations identified for future development.
Keywords: governance, elements of good governance, service provisions, 
citizens, Addis Ababa, Yeka Sub-City
1 First and foremost, we are profoundly indebted to our university, the Ethiopian Civil 
Service University (ECSU), which sponsored the whole cost of covering all the expenses 
that helped us accomplish the study . The authors are also grateful to all the service users 
of the institutions in giving their own responses in accordance with the data collection 
instruments .
2 Daba Moti Duguma, Director of Consultancy, Coordination Directorate, Ethiopian Civil 
Service University
3 Chuol R . Kompuok, PhD, African Institute of Governance and Development, Ethiopian 
Civil Service University, e-mail: ckompuok2014@gmail .com
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S Introduction – Background of the study
The good governance concept is incorporated in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) as the main component of the battle against poverty and for economic 
development . Good governance refers to the prevalence of government accountability, 
transparency in decision making, implementing the rule of law and regulations, 
early responsiveness to the demand of citizens, equity and inclusiveness among 
interest groups, effectiveness, and efficiency in resource utilisation in service delivery 
approach.4 Governance is also a complex management practice through which citizens 
and interest groups of the country articulate their expressions and exercise their 
rights in the decision-making process . Good governance strategy is representative of 
a successful public sector institutions reform program, its implementation process is 
complex .5 The concept of public or civil service sector reform and good governance 
has evolved from isolated occurrences and is now seen largely as a  global issue . 
The practice of governance associated with public sector reform programs has led 
to the formalisation of good governance .6 The Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines good 
governance as the service provider in relation to political, social, and economic 
public goods and services . Each of these contains sub-categories under which various 
indicators have been organised that provide quantifiable measures of the overarching 
dimensions of governance .7
The Ethiopian federal system of government that was adopted resulted in open, 
transparent, and democratic governance that respects the right of all citizens; the 
introduction of the decentralisation process gave power to regional governments to 
implement development policies and strategies and provided the opportunity for 
residents to participate in development programs .8 The Ethiopian government has 
begun implementing reform in good governance due to service delivery dissatisfaction 
of citizens of the country and growing consensus that it is the root cause of all-round 
crises in the public sector .9 The  civil service reforms taking place in Ethiopia are 
meant for building the capacity for the implementation of good governance in the 
4 S Dibaba, ‘Opportunities and Challenges for Good Governance in Ethiopia’, The Ethiopian Herald, 
October  8,  2015 . Available: https://allafrica .com/stories/201510091427 .html (20 . 03 . 2020)
5 M Worku, Assessment of the Prevalence of Good Governance in the Public Sector: the Case of 
Selected Public Institutions in the Addis Ababa City of Ethiopia, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
 2013 .
6 ‘Good Governance’, Wikipedia . Available: https://en .wikipedia .org/wiki/Good_governance 
(05 . 03 . 2020 .)
7 Z Umar, ‘Constructing the  2017 Ibrahihm Index of African Governance’, Index Report, Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation,  October 11,  2017 . Available: https://mo .ibrahim .foundation/news/2017/constructing-
2017-ibrahim-index-african-governance (12 . 07 . 2020 .)
8 K Yirga, Assessment of the Prevalence of Good Governance in the Public Sector: The Case of Public 
Institutions in Debre Birhan Town, MA Thesis: Mekelle University, Ethiopia,  2010 .
9 MC Amedie, The Significance and Practice of Good Governance in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Case 
of Bole Sub-city, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa: Indira Gandhi National Open University,  2014 .
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country .10 Yeka Sub-City, one of the Addis Ababa City Administrations spearheads the 
provision of services to its citizens . Ostensibly, Yeka administration and government 
appeared to have committed its resources to achieve political and socio-economic 
development through positive implementation of good governance .
1. Problem statement
Ethiopia has been faced with challenges in implementing good governance in the 
country . To address the challenges in building good governance, the government 
developed a multi-sectorial national capacity building strategy .11 Despite the fact that 
Ethiopia is endowed with resources that can help bring about economic miracles for 
the country, poor governance has contributed to the country’s lowest economic and 
social indicators .12 According to Alemu and Lemma, the inefficiencies and ineffective 
processes of organisational structure, management practices, outdated work processes 
and procedures affected the governance system of the public sectors in Ethiopia .13 Addis 
Ababa City Administration doubled as the city is the seat of the Africa Union (AU) with 
various international organisations, and the capital city of Ethiopia, that is providing 
services to its citizens . Addis Ababa city organised its Administration institutions’ 
levels in ten sub-cities, with Yeka Sub-City included . Although achievements of 
the good governance implementation process in the city administration have been 
observed, the institutions are not free from the challenges of bad governance .
According to Amedie, the performance of Addis Ababa City Administration 
indicated that there is poor accountability, lack of transparency, poor customer 
satisfaction, and ill commitment of leaders at all levels of the administration .14 The poor 
capacity and absence of skilled staff resulted in poor service delivery processes . 
The  magnitude of the challenges is more reflected at the district administration 
office level where services to citizens within the city are required . Because of these 
research facts, it requires more efforts to practice good governance in the government 
institutions to respond to the needs of the citizens . Therefore, this study attempts 
to identify the gaps of the prior research by examining the performance of the 
implementation of good governance and the root causes of these problems . The study 
will also make an important attempt in identifying the current trend and factors 
hindering the implementation of good governance in public service institutions of 
Addis Ababa City Administration . The variables that would be treated in the study 
10 ECSU, Institute of Leadership and Good Governance. Engendering Economic Governance. Addis 
Ababa: Addis Ababa University,  2017 .
11 A Bekele, The Challenges and Prospects of Good Governance in Africa: The Case of Kenya, MA 
Thesis, Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University,  2013 .
12 Dibaba, ‘Opportunities and Challenges’ .
13 T Alemu and M Lemma, ‘The Contribution of Service Delivery Reform to Promote Good 
Governance: A Case of Addis Ababa’, Ethiopian Journal of Public Management and Development  2, 
no  1 (2011) .
14 Amedie, The Significance and Practice .
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S include effectiveness and efficiency, transparency, accountability, participation, 
leadership direction, fairness and equity, responsiveness, and rule of law . Based on 
this background information, the study used the following basic research questions .
a) What are the practices of good governance in the studied area?
b) What are the implementation performances of the elements of good gover-
nance?
c) What challenges the institutions face in implementing the elements of good 
governance?
The main objective of the study is to assess the implementation of good governance 
practices while rendering services to the citizens . Public institutions of Addis Ababa 
city administration have been providing services at each bureau, sub-city and district 
administration office levels . Since it is difficult to investigate all the levels of the city 
administration, the study focused only on Yeka sub-city . From this sub-city, three 
district administration offices were selected for the study . Due to the unknown real 
number of customers / service users of the administration offices, the number of 
respondents was restricted to be selected randomly using the probability approach . 
The findings of the study will help decision-makers and members of the administration 
in improving good governance which can lead them to efficiency and effectiveness .
2. Conceptual frameworks of good governance
Good governance is defined in various international studies . It stresses the importance 
of participation of several actors in government affairs so that everyone be entitled to 
an international order in which the rights and freedoms can be fully realised .15 Good 
governance refers to the prevalence of government accountability, transparency in 
decision making, implementing the rule of law and regulations, early responsiveness to 
the demand of citizens, equity and inclusiveness among interest groups, effectiveness, 
and efficiency in resource utilisation in service delivery approach .16 Good governance 
has to address the interest of stakeholders in policy initiatives .17 Good governance is 
the mechanism through which citizens articulate their legal rights, responsibilities and 
meet their obligations . The voices of the poorest, disadvantaged class and the most 
vulnerable communities are heard in decision-making process over the allocation 
of resources and decisions passed . Good governance depends on the interaction 
among stakeholders and leaders and requires the exercise of legal frameworks that 
15 A Legas, Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Accountability. The Case of Caffee 
Oromia, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University,  2015 .
16 Dibaba, ‘Opportunities and Challenges’ .
17 R Dayanandan, ‘Good Governance Practice for Better Performance of Community 
Organizations – Myths and Realities!!’ Journal of Power, Politics & Governance  1, no  1 (2013), 
 10–26 .
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are enforced impartially to ensure equity among citizens . In  this regard, rules and 
regulations that are implied should be clear and friendly enough to the public .18
The implementation of good governance has eight major elements .19 These 
are accountability, transparency and openness, early responsive manner, equity 
and inclusiveness of the interest groups, effectiveness and efficient utilisation of 
resources, applying the rule of law, following participatory approach in the decision-
making process, and being consensus-oriented among interest groups . On the other 
hand, according to Khanna, the good governance framework consists of seven basic 
principles as shown in Figure  1 below .20 Even though different kinds of  literature 
describe a different number of elements of good governance, almost all of them have 
similar concepts . Thus, according to the ESCAP21 and Khanna,22 the following seven 
elements or principles and practices would become common tools for improving the 
service delivery and management strategy for achieving good governance as well as 


































































































































































































































































































Figure  1. Good governance framework. Source: Khanna, ‘A Conceptual Framework’.
18 Bekele, The Challenges and Prospects.
19 ESCAP Annual Report  2014, United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific . 
20 P Khanna, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Achieving Good Governance at Open and Distance 
Learning Institutions’, Open Learning: The Journal of Open, Distance, and e-Learning  32, no  1 
(2017),  21–35 .
21 ESCAP Annual Report  2014.
22 Khanna, ‘A Conceptual Framework’ .
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The study deals with the assessment of the implementation of good governance 
practices while rendering services to the citizens . This type of inquiry favours the 
use of an explanatory type of research . This study used two kinds of data collection 
methods, quantitative and qualitative, with closed and open-ended questionnaires, 
interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs) to capture in-depth and wider data 
for the analysis . Interviews provide data very different from observations . Thus, 
an unstructured interview was conducted with service providers . Focused group 
discussions and document reviews were also used to support the results obtained 
from the structured questionnaires . The  questionnaires were distributed for the 
respondents to be filled in with the help of data collectors .
Although the results of the research might highly be dependent on the primary 
data that were gathered through the questionnaires and discussions, document 
reviews were also important to clearly understand the concepts and results of the 
implementation . Instead of concentrating only on the responses of the structured 
questionnaires, the researchers triangulate the data gathered from different sources . 
Thus, the triangulation constitutes a  rigorous scientific approach to compensate 
for the weaknesses in the collection and analysis of the data, and make the research 
findings reliable .
Data quality was assured using appropriate data collection process techniques such 
as giving orientation to data collectors about the contents of the questionnaires and 
frequent supervisions; data collectors assisted the respondents in case of difficulties; 
reported problems were countered at the time of data collection immediately by 
the researchers; appropriate measures were taken . Questionnaires were checked 
for missing values and inconsistency . Those found to have many missing values and 
inconsistencies were excluded from the study and considered as non-respondents . 
Finally, data coding and entry were made by the principal investigators with the help 
of data entry professionals .
3.2 Population and sample size
The target population of this study was all customers receiving services from city 
administration offices . For the data collection, through purposive sampling, the Yeka 
sub-city was selected . This type of purposive selection was because of consistency, 
time, and cost for the study . From this sub-city, three district administration 
offices were selected . Finally, respondents were randomly chosen . To come up with 
The Implementation of Good Governance Practices in Service Provisions…
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conservative sample size, as cited by Sisay,23 Kothari24 advises researchers to take the 
value of p =  0 .5 where n would be the maximum and the sample would yield at least 
the desired precision . This would be the most conservative sample size assuming a  95 
per cent confidence level and P to be  50 per cent . In this regard, Cochran provided 
a simplified formula to calculate a sample size when information about the population 
is not available .25 Here, it is difficult to get information about the total population of 
the study area who is being served permanently from the institutions .
n = p q z2 / e2
where n = desired sample size;
p = population proportion (0 .5);
Z = confidence level (1 .96);
q = the value derived (0 .5);
e = acceptable error (0 .05) .
The sample size in this study is  384 respondents and has been calculated drawing 
on the above formula . To compensate for non-responses, additional (40 per cent) 
respondents were included in the study . Accordingly,  538 copies of the questionnaires 
were distributed to the respondents . The respondents focused on those customers of 
the institutions that have been served on the particular days of data collection . After 
collecting and cleaning the data,  520 questionnaires were used for the analysis .
3.3 Data collection instruments
Primary and secondary data were gathered using data collection instruments . 
Primary data were collected using data collection instruments that include structured 
and unstructured questionnaires, interviews, and questions for focused group 
discussions . The secondary data were collected from different related documents from 
the administration offices . In  the questionnaires, there were both close-ended and 
open-ended non-numerical questions . The  closed-ended quantitative method was 
organised using the Likert five scale format (considered on a  1–5 points scale, where  1 
represents the lowest level of satisfaction or high disagreement, whereas  5 represents 
the highest level of satisfaction or high agreement) . The points of scale indicate the 
degree of satisfaction or agreement level of the respondents . It is also used to increase 
the response rate and response quality along with reducing respondents’ frustration 
23 A Sisay, A Dvivedi and B Beshah: ‘Determinants of Job Satisfaction in Ethiopia: Evidence from the 
Leather Industry’, African Journal of Economic and Management Studies  9, no  4 (2018) .
24 CR Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Delhi: New Age International, 
 2004) .
25 W Cochran, Sampling Techniques,  3rd Ed . (New York: Wiley,  1977) .
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S level . The secondary data were gathered from the documents of the institutions and 
research findings of various scholars on the topic under investigation .
3.4 Data processing and analysis method
After the completion of data collection, coding and organising the data was used for 
data analysis . Data editing and entering happened while checking the consistency 
and validity of data collected with different tools . Both quantitative and qualitative 
data were used for the analysis . The IBM SPSS statistical package version  21 was used 
to make the quantitative analysis of data that was collected through questionnaires . 
The  SPSS statistical frequency was used for descriptive analysis . Qualitative 
analysis was employed for the data collected through interviews and focused group 
discussions (FGDs) . The qualitative analysis was done to supplement the quantitative 




In this chapter, details are given on the items of the assessment of implementation of 
good governance in service provisions to the citizens . Different items are used for the 
assessment . Thus, the study focused on the customers of the institutions . There has 
been extensive deliberation about the best way to quantify items of the assessment . 
As a result of the difficulty in defining measurement methodologies of assessment, 
different approaches have been emerged . Assessment of the implementation process 
includes perceptions of how well the results have been achieved . The  customers’ 
perception in the assessment process is used as an instrument for identifying the 
gap between the desired results and achieved results in the implementation process 
of good governance in the institutions . Thus, the study focused on structured 
questionnaires, focused group discussions and interviews .
The background information of the service providers is important regarding 
professional responses from the respondents . The information includes position, total 
work experience, educational background of service providers . Most of the service 
providers (83 .3 per cent) are experts and team leaders who are familiar with services 
provided for the customers of the institutions . In terms of educational background, 
most of them (97 .6 per cent) were first degree holders . The data also shows that most 
of the respondents (31 per cent) have service experience of above five years in their 
current institutions .
As indicated in the methodology section,  600 questionnaires were distributed to 
the respondents, out of which  520 were correctly filled and returned . In  addition 
to the structured questionnaire, three focused group discussions and interviews were 
The Implementation of Good Governance Practices in Service Provisions…
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conducted with the customers of the institutions . The data analysis, interpretation 
and results are described as follows .
4.2 Good governance is effective and efficient
Good governance requires all concerned institutions to be performed effectively 
and efficiently as per the functions, operations, roles, and responsibilities assigned . 
This implies that, the implementation of good governance at the institutions 
yield significant outcomes, impacted positively on the lives of stakeholders, 
while considering the efficient use of the available resources . As can be observed 
from Table  1, the respondents are indicated in the items related to efficiency and 
effectiveness . The  responses of the individual items in Table  1, however, reveal 
differences among respondents . Accordingly,  25 .7 per cent of the total respondents 
are below the moderate level, while  74 .3 per cent of them are on the moderate and 
above levels . The findings show that the institutions’ efficiency and effectiveness 
are good .
Table  1. Effective and efficient governance
No . Items Responses Total
Str . 
disagree 
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . 
agree
Q1 Do institutions 
work effectively 
as per the 
customers’ 
request? 
Frequency 44 214 162 80 20 520
Percentage 8 .5 41 .2 31 .2 15 .4 3 .8 100
Cumulative 
percentage
8 .5 49 .7 65 .1 96 .2 100




Frequency 171 124 147 33 45 520
Percentage 32 .9 23 .8 28 .3 6 .3 8 .7 100
Cumulative 
percentage
32 .9 56 .7 63 91 .3 100
Q3 Do institutions 
provide quality 
services to their 
customers?
Frequency 156 191 89 34 50 520
Percentage 30 36 .7 17 .1 6 .5 9 .6 100
Cumulative 
percentage
30 66 .7 83 .8 90 .4 100




Frequency 166 145 96 77 36 520
Percentage 31 .9 27 .9 18 .5 14 .8 6 .9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
31 .9 58 .9 77 .4 92 .2 100
Average percentage 25 .83 32 .40 23 .78 10 .75 7 100
Overall cumulative percentage 25 .83 58 .00 72 .33 93 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
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S According to Hailu,26 Meretu27 and Alemu,28 the inefficiencies and ineffective processes 
of organisational structure and management practices affected the governance system 
of the public sectors in Ethiopia . Dibaba said that despite the endowed resources 
of the country that can bring about economic miracles and development in the 
country, due to poor governance, the economic and social indicators of the country 
are among the lowest .29 Thus, the findings of this study support Dibaba’s analysis . 
The  institutions’ performance in effectiveness and efficiency is not better than 
acceptable . The  institutions do not work effectively as per the customers’ demand; 
use no public resources effectively; do not provide quality services to their customers 
and have a poor follow-up and supporting system . Though the performance shows 
favourable results, focused group discussions and interviews identified problems that 
include lack of infrastructures; low awareness in the system of resource utilisation; 
low commitment of service provisions; lack of service quality; and lack of basic 
necessary knowledge, skills, and attitude of service providers .
4.3 Good governance is transparent and open
Transparency indicates that public information should be accessible in an easily 
understandable system that should be freely available and directly accessible to 
stakeholders or citizens who will be affected by the policies, strategies and practices 
of the government . Openness as a leadership quality has many important things in it . 
The importance of transparency and openness in the organisation is the acceptance 
of the new ideas by the leadership . As  can be observed from Table  2, responses 
from the individual items in the table reveal different reactions among respondents . 
Accordingly,  68 .7 per cent of the total respondents indicated a  value below the 
moderate level, while  31 .8 per cent of them agree to a  moderate level and above . 
As prior findings, this also shows that the institutions have the governance system 
that is not transparent and open while providing services to the clients .
The institution should also evaluate the progress of the implementation made 
towards the targets and disclose information along with other relevant information 
as required by the citizens . The service providers in the concerned institution should 
be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take . According 
to Hailu30 and Legas,31 the institutions have not been found effective in transparency 
and openness . Ostensibly, this study found the same results . The findings indicate 
26 S Hailu, ‘Challenges and Prospects of Good Governance in Ethiopia: The Case of Kemisie Town, 
Ethiopia’, International Journal of Political Science and Development  6, no  4 (2018) .
27 TM Abuhay, ‘Assessing the Prevalence of Good Governance in Public Sectors in Gedeo Zone: 
Case of Yirga Cheffe Town Administration’, Journal for Studies in Management and Planning  1, no  8 
(2015),  37–49 .
28 Alemu and Lemma, ‘The Contribution’ .
29 Dibaba, ‘Opportunities and Challenges’ .
30 Hailu, ‘Challenges and Prospects’ .
31 Legas, Parliamentary Oversight .
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that institutions have policies and strategies, but failed to distribute all information 
openly and timely to the public . The participants of focus group discussion and key 
informants reflect the same outcomes as in the quantitative findings in Table  2 .
Table  2. Transparent and open governance
No . Items  Responses Total
Str . 
disagree 
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . 
agree
Q1 Do institutions 
have policies 
and strategies of 
service provisions? 
Frequency 198 160 94 36 32 520
Percentage 38 .1 30 .8 18 .1 6 .9 6 .2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
38 .1 68 .9 87 93 .9 100




Frequency 146 201 86 63 24 520
Percentage 28 .1 38 .7 16 .5 12 .1 4 .6 100
Cumulative 
percentage
28 .1 66 .8 83 .3 95 .4 100




Frequency 189 192 88 35 16 520
Percentage 36 .3 36 .9 16 .9 6 .7 3 .1 100
Cumulative 
percentage
36 .3 73 .2 90 .1 96 .8 100




to the customers 
timely?
Frequency 186 157 87 68 22 520
Percentage 35 .8 30 .2 16 .7 13 .1 4 .2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
35 .8 66 82 .7 95 .8 100
Average percentage 34 .58 34 .15 17 .05 9 .70 4 .52 100
Overall cumulative percentage 34 .58 68 .73 85 .78 95 .48 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
4.4 Good governance is accountable
Accountability is a  fundamental requirement of good governance . An institution 
should report, explain, and be answerable for the consequences of decisions it has 
made on behalf of the community it serves . As can be observed from Table  3, the 
respondents responded to the items related to accountability . The responses to the 
individual items in the table were different . Accordingly,  68 .45 per cent of the total 
respondents indicated a value below the moderate level, while  31 .55 per cent indicated 
a value at moderate level and above . The findings indicate that institutions have not 
been practicing accountability .
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S Government institutions are accountable to the applicable rules of law . According 
to Legas,32 accountability is an important quality for effective leadership . Though 
the implementation of accountability is representative of a successful public sector 
institutional reform program, its implementation process is complex .33 According 
to Bekele,34 the autocratic or patron–client relations in the political process, the 
involvement of public servants in private business, poor service conditions, a decline 
of professionalism, and ethnicity contributed to the deterioration of the accountability 
in Ethiopia . Thus” this study reveals similar results . The findings of the study indicate 
unfavourable results in terms of accountability . Therefore, informants and focused 
group discussions identified weak accountability in decision-making processes; high 
level of corruption and discrimination .
Table  3. Governance that is accountable
No . Items  Responses Total
Str . 
disagree 
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . 
agree
Q1 Do institutions 
pass decisions 
timely and are 
accessible to 
customers? 
Frequency 195 172 104 21 28 520
Percentage 37 .5 33 .1 20 4 5 .4 100
Cumulative 
percentage
37 .5 70 .5 90 .5 94 .5 100




Frequency 196 141 89 68 28 520
Percentage 37 .7 27 .1 17 .1 13 5 100
Cumulative 
percentage
37 .7 64 .8 81 .9 94 .9 100
Q3 Do institutions 
understand 




Frequency 199 181 78 35 28 520
Percentage 38 .3 34 .8 15 6 .7 5 .2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
38 .3 73 .1 88 .1 94 .8 100
Q4 Do institutions 
understand 
their rights and 
duties?
Frequency 205 135 82 83 15 520
Percentage 39 .4 26 15 .8 16 2 .9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
39 .4 65 .4 81 .2 97 .2 100
Average percentage 38 .23 30 .25 16 .98 9 .93 5 100
Overall cumulative percentage 38 .23 68 .45 85 .43 95 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
32 Legas, Parliamentary Oversight .
33 Worku, Assessment .
34 Bekele, The Challenges and Prospects .
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4.5 Good governance is participatory
Participation refers to a  process whereby leaders invite citizens or stakeholders on 
their issues . Citizens have to have access to information, ask for their opinion, give 
the  opportunity to make recommendations and be part of the decision-making 
process . This will improve the overall development of the country . In  other words, 
everyone concerned would have an opportunity to participate freely in the governance 
of the institution . As a result, such goodK participation would help the administrative 
management in creating an environment of good governance .35 Participation by both 
men and women in their concerns, either directly or through legitimate representatives, is 
a key cornerstone of good governance . As observed in Table  4, the respondents responded 
to the items related to participation . The observation of the individual items in the table, 
however, reveals different responses among respondents . Accordingly,  70 .05 per cent of 
the total respondents indicated a value below the moderate level, while  29 .95 per cent 
indicated a value at moderate level and above . The data shows that the institutions have 
not been implementing the participatory approach while making public decisions .
Table  4. Participatory governance
No . Items  Responses Total
Str . 
disagree 
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . 
agree





Frequency 224 169 88 22 17 520
Percentage 43 .1 32 .5 16 .9 4 .2 3 .3 100
Cumulative 
percentage
43 .1 75 .6 92 .5 96 .7 100
Q2 Do institutions 
listen to the voice 
of customers?
Frequency 231 125 95 56 13 520
Percentage 44 .4 24 18 .3 10 .8 2 .5 100
Cumulative 
percentage
44 .4 68 .4 86 .7 97 .5 100
Q3 Do institutions 
provide customers 
their rights?
Frequency 209 167 80 43 21 520
Percentage 40 .2 32 .1 15 .4 8 .3 4 100
Cumulative 
percentage
40 .2 72 .3 87 .7 96 100
Q4 Do institutions 
provide customers 
their rights to 
express their ideas 
freely?
Frequency 197 117 106 77 23 520
Percentage 37 .9 26 15 .8 16 2 .9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
37 .9 63 .9 79 .7 95 .7 100
Average percentage 41 .4 26 .65 16 .6 9 .83 3 .18 100
Overall cumulative percentage 41 .4 70 .05 86 .65 96 .48 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
35 Khanna, ‘A Conceptual Framework’ .
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S Hailu36 and Legas37 found that societal participation is in progress but the participants 
of women and youth are constrained by harmful traditional practices . Thus, the findings 
of the study indicate unfavourable results in terms of participation . The institutions 
do not involve all customers while making core decisions; do not listen to the voice 
or ideas of the customers and the customers do not have the practical right to express 
their ideas freely . Therefore, weak accountability in decision-making processes and 
unfair opportunities in participation were the major problems identified .
4.6 Leadership direction and strategic vision
Leadership is about setting the directions, developing the culture of the organisation, 
determining its principles and values, and motivating the people in the organisation 
to commit themselves to those principles and values . The respondents responded to 
the items related to leadership direction and strategic vision . The responses on service 
providers, which encompasses commitment, leadership skills, institutional vision, 
and equal treatment of customers, were different . Accordingly,  66 .58 per cent of the 
total respondents indicated a value below the moderate level, while  33 .42 per cent 
indicated a value at moderate level and above . The result shows that the institutions’ 
practice in leadership direction and strategic vision is not being practiced as well .
Leaders are expected to plan and direct an appropriate strategy . They are also 
expected to make effective arrangements to ensure that a good management system, 
including a  decision-making system, is in place for the satisfactory operation and 
management of the institution .38 According to Amedie,39 the performance of Addis 
Ababa city administration indicated that there is an ill commitment of leaders at all 
levels of the administration . The poor capacity and absence of skilled staff resulted in 
poor service delivery processes . The magnitude of the challenges is more characteristic 
of the woreda administration office level where more services are required by the 
citizens in the city . Lack of effective leadership is the main cause of Africa’s lagging from 
the rest of the world .40 The findings of the study indicate favourable results in terms 
of leadership style with some limitations . The institutions have work commitment; 
have leadership skills; have an institutional vision, and treat all customers equally . 
The problems identified were lack of leaders’ administrative skill and knowledge; lack 
of implementing policies directed from the regional government; weak interaction 
and relationship between people and leaders; low awareness in understanding the 
vision of the institutions; and lack of strategic planning for the implementation 
processes .
36 Hailu, ‘Challenges and Prospects’ .
37 Legas, Parliamentary Oversight .
38 MO Onolememen, The Impact of Leadership on the Governance of Infrastructure Development in 
Nigeria, PhD Dissertation, Walden University, Nigeria,  2015 .
39 Amedie, The Significance and Practice .
40 Bekele, The Challenges and Prospects .
The Implementation of Good Governance Practices in Service Provisions…
ACTA HUMANA • 1 (2021) 21
Table  5. Direction and strategic vision of leadership
No . Items Responses Total
Str . 
disagree
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . 
agree
Q1 Do leaders set 
direction & 
strategic vision? 
Frequency 185 205 100 20 10 520
Percentage 35 .5 39 .4 19 .2 3 .8 2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
35 .5 74 .9 94 .1 98 100
Q2 Do leaders treat 
customers with 
care?
Frequency 170 165 98 40 47 520
Percentage 32 .5 31 .7 18 .9 7 .7 9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
32 .5 64 .2 83 .1 90 .8 100
Q3 Do leaders have 
skills to direct 
organisations?
Frequency 150 201 89 50 30 520
Percentage 28 .9 38 .7 17 .1 9 .6 5 .7 100
Cumulative 
percentage
28 .9 67 .6 84 .7 94 .3 100
Q4 Do leaders 
motivate 
employees at the 
organisations?
Frequency 165 145 96 100 14 520
Percentage 31 .7 27 .9 18 .5 19 .2 2 .6 100
Cumulative 
percentage
31 .7 59 .6 78 .1 97 .3 100
Average percentage 32 .15 34 .43 18 .05 10 .08 4 .83 100
Overall cumulative percentage 32 .15 66 .58 85 95 .10 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
4.7 Fairness and equity
The institutional framework that prescribes the procedures and policies of the concerned 
organisation would be fair and enforced effectively to create an environment of good 
governance, whereas equity implies being fair and just to all concerned . As observed 
in Table  6, the respondents responded to the items related to governance fairness and 
equity . The observation of the individual items in the table, however, reveals different 
responses among respondents . Accordingly,  72 .65 per cent of the total respondents 
indicated a  value below the moderate level, while  27 .35 per cent indicated a  value 
below at moderate level and above . The findings describe that the institutions have not 
been practicing the fairness and equity considerations as well .
According to Worku,41 public sector institutions were poor in considering gender 
equality while providing services . Therefore, the performance results indicate that 
the institutions have not been practicing fairness and equity considerations . On the 
other hand, the interview and focus group discussions supported the quantitative 
41 Worku, Assessment .
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S data findings . Based on focused group discussions and interviews, lack of equal 
opportunity and fair treatment and discrimination between rich and poor were the 
major problems pinpointed .
Table  6. Governance with fairness and equity
No . Items  Responses Total
Str . 
disagree 
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . agree





Frequency 190 200 76 27 27 520
Percentage 36 .5 38 .5 14 .6 5 .2 5 .2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
36 .5 75 89 . .6 94 .8 100





Frequency 161 206 76 59 18 520
Percentage 31 39 .6 14 .6 11 .3 3 .5 100
Cumulative 
percentage
31 70 .6 85 .2 96 .5 100




Frequency 232 145 70 52 21 520
Percentage 44 .6 27 .9 13 .5 10 4 100
Cumulative 
percentage
44 .6 72 .5 86 96 100




Frequency 180 197 64 62 17 520
Percentage 34 .6 37 .9 12 .3 11 .9 3 .3 100
Cumulative 
percentage
34 .6 72 .5 84 .8 96 .7 100
Average percentage 36 .68 35 .98 13 .75 9 .60 4 100
Overall cumulative percentage 36 .68 72 .65 86 .40 96 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
4.8 Good governance is responsive in service provisions
Responsiveness is the quality of being responsive and reacting quickly with quality service 
provisions . The respondents responded to the three items related to the institutions’ 
responsiveness in service provisions . The observation of the three items – the provision 
of an early response to the questions of the customers; provision of quality services 
timely with the fair cost; and having knowledge, skills, and a positive attitude to serve 
the customers – reveal different responses among respondents . Accordingly,  74 .03 per 
cent of the total respondents indicated a value below the moderate level, while  25 .97 per 
cent responded to a moderate level and above . The findings show that the institutions 
have not been implementing timely responsiveness .
The Implementation of Good Governance Practices in Service Provisions…
ACTA HUMANA • 1 (2021) 23
Table  7. Responsive governance in service provisions
No . Items Responses Total
Str . 
disagree
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . agree




Frequency 199 220 55 40 6 520
Percentage 38 .3 42 .3 10 .6 7 .7 1 .2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
38 .3 80 .6 91 .2 98 .8 100





Frequency 170 210 80 28 32 520
Percentage 32 .7 40 .4 15 .4 5 .4 6 .2 100
Cumulative 
percentage
32 .7 73 .1 88 .5 93 .9 100
Q3 Do institutions 
have knowledge 
of the cost 
customers’ 
incur?
Frequency 250 140 99 21 10 520
Percentage 48 .1 26 .9 19 4 1 .9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
48 .1 75 94 98 100





Frequency 165 188 90 47 30 520
Percentage 31 .2 36 .2 17 .3 9 5 .8 100
Cumulative 
percentage
31 .2 67 .4 84 .7 93 .7 100
Average percentage 37 .58 36 .45 15 .58 6 .53 3 .78 100
Overall cumulative percentage 37 .58 74 .03 89 .6 96 .10 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
According to Dayanandan,42 good governance ensures a proper and prompt response 
from both sides, that is, service providers to service users . These guarantees effective 
and efficient utilisation of available resources and reduces or helps to avoid conflict . 
However, public institutions’ results indicated slow and very slow speed in response 
to customers . The authors’ study results indicated the existence of poor governance 
in the responsiveness . The findings of this study based on the open-ended questions, 
focus group discussions and interviews also prove the existence of poor governance 
in the responsiveness .
42 Dayanandan, ‘Good Governance Practice’ .
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S 4.9 Good governance follows the rule of law
Table  8. Governance that follows the rule of law
No . Items Responses Total
Str . 
disagree
Disagree Moderate Agree Str . 
agree
Q1 Do institutions 
make decisions 
in accordance 
with the rule of 
law? 
Frequency 215 130 79 66 30 520
Percentage 41 .4 25 15 .2 12 .7 5 .8 100
Cumulative 
percentage
41 .4 66 .4 81 .6 94 .3 100








Frequency 160 195 120 30 15 520
Percentage 30 .8 37 .5 24 5 .8 2 .9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
30 .8 68 .3 92 .3 98 .1 100






Frequency 200 148 105 55 12 520
Percentage 38 .5 28 .5 20 .2 10 .6 2 .3 100
Cumulative 
percentage
38 .5 67 87 .2 97 .8 100
Q4 Do institutions 
respect the 
code of conduct 
and enforced 
impartiality?
Frequency 176 197 96 31 20 520
Percentage 33 .9 37 .9 18 .5 6 3 .9 100
Cumulative 
percentage
33 .9 71 .8 90 .3 96 .3 100
Average percentage 36 .15 32 .23 19 .48 8 .78 3 .72 100
Overall cumulative percentage 36 .15 68 .38 87 .85 96 .63 100
Source: Survey by the authors,  2019.
Rule of law means that the decisions are consistent with the legislation . Good gover nance 
requires government institutions to process design and implement the service delivery 
approach to serve the best interests of stakeholders within a  reasonable quality and 
timeframe . The consistency of decisions made in accordance with the rule of law and the 
legal competence of decision-making government bodies and individual functionaries 
are the important factors for the legitimacy of the decisions and therefore for the 
assurance of good governance . Laws, regulations, and codes of conduct should be fair and 
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enforced impartially . The respondents responded to the items related to the following: 
the governance follows the rule of law issues that include understanding the rules and 
regulations of service provisions; provision of services according to rules and regulations 
of the institutions; and having compliant handling systems . The  observation of the 
individual items reveals different responses among respondents . Accordingly,  68 .38 per 
cent of the total respondents indicated a value below the moderate level, while  31 .62 per 
cent indicated a value at moderate level and above . The results show that the institutions 
have not been considering the rule of law as well .
The institutional framework that prescribes the procedures and policies of the 
public institutions are expected to be fair and are enforced to effectively create an 
environment of good governance . Thereby compliance with legal requirements that 
involve equal opportunities, consensus, and anti-discrimination would be achieved . 
The  consistency of decisions made in accordance with the rule of law is the legal 
competence of decision making government bodies .43 However, Legas44 found that 
public institutions are characterized by poor performance in practicing the rule of 
law . On the other hand, the findings of this study indicate unfavourable results in 
terms of the rule of law . The institutions do not provide fair decisions according to 
rules and regulations of the institutions . The findings from previous research and this 
study reveal similar results in the implementation of the elements of good governance . 
Therefore, at interviews and focused group discussions, lack of continuity in applying 
the rule and law of the institutions were pinpointed as problems .
Conclusion and recommendations
The overall practices of good governance in the study area show that the institutions 
have not been found perfectly effective or failed in light of the elements of good 
governance: effectiveness and efficiency, transparency and openness, accountability, 
participation, leadership direction, fairness and equity, responsiveness and rule 
of law . Instead, the practices were found effective in some of the elements and 
ineffective in some others . The quantitative performance in the implementation of 
all the elements of good governance is acceptable . However, the interviews and focus 
group discussions showed both positive results and limitations . The positive practices 
dominate the limitations . Although implementation practices of the principles of good 
governance have brought about tangible results, it is not free from some limitations: 
lack of infrastructures; low awareness in the system of resources utilisation; low 
commitment in service provisions; lack of service quality; weak accountability in 
decision-making processes; high level of corruption and discrimination; unfair 
opportunities in participation; lack of service provision on skill and knowledge 
of staffs; Low awareness in understanding the vision of the institutions; and lack of 
continuity in applying the rule of law were the challenges pinpointed .
43 Amedie, The Significance and Practice .
44 Legas, Parliamentary Oversight .
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S Therefore, the institutions should highlight success parts of the implementation 
process that should be developed and limitations that should deserve the attention 
of concerned bodies of the institutions to take corrective measures . Based on the 
findings and conclusion made, we have come up with the following recommendations .
 • To bring effective and efficient performance, the institutions should use 
resources with commitment and evidence-based strategies for improvement in 
producing favourable results that meet the needs of the citizens . The institutions 
should improve efficient and effective service provisions by creating greater 
transparency, accountability, and applying resource maximisation principles . 
The institutions’ staff should respect the rules and regulations of the institutions 
without any preconditions . Citizens have to proactively participate in all 
aspects of the governance process . Participation needs to be informed and 
organised, including freedom of expression and concern for the best interests 
of the stakeholders . Public institutions should allocate the citizens’ resources 
fairly and reasonably to all without discrimination based on ethnic, gender, 
economic level, and political view .
 • To practice transparency and openness, the institutions should build on the free 
flow of information . The institutions should be obliged to the rights and duties 
of the governance . The  customers should be served with decisions that are 
consistent with the rules and regulations of the government . The institutions 
developed the goal that promote harmony among the multicultural customers 
and mitigated the objections of the minority to reach a broad consensus of what 
is in the best interest of the citizens . The  customers should be responsively 
provided with their basic needs .
 • To promote the participation of stakeholders, the institutions should practice 
community-based organisations . The institutions should have customers’ feedback 
systems . The  institutions should listen to customers, collect information, and 
analyse the data to see any trends in customers’ expectations . The stakeholders 
who directly represent the society can strongly contribute to building good 
governance in the institutions .
 • To provide early and timely responses to citizens, the institutions should 
automate the organisational structure at a one-stop shopping system . 
Institutions have to be proactive and quick in giving solutions for complaints of 
the customer . According to the rule of law of the public institutions, all service 
providers should be under the law . Government institutions should be abided 
by the laws of the city administration .
 • To upgrade the knowledge,  skills, and attitude of employees, institutions 
should provide continuous capacity building training in the area of good 
governance to the leaders and staff . Institutions in any of their activities are 
expected to be active . Institutions should correct delaying and long processes 
while serving the society .
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S Tribal Conflict over Natural Resources  
on the Sudan – South Sudan Border:  
The Case of the Abyei Territory
GETACHEW ZERU GEBREKIDAN1
This paper explores the major causes, processes and consequences of natural 
resource conflicts between tribes across the Sudan  –  South Sudan border 
region, with the main emphasis on the Abyei territory. Data for the study 
have been gathered from primary and secondary sources. The  research 
revealed that the conflict over ownership of Abyei’s renewable and non-
renewable resources has evolved as a contentious issue between Sudan and 
South Sudan. The situation was complicated by the relationship of the Humr 
Misseriya and Ngok Dinka and their governments, respectively. Moreover, 
lack of agreement about who should be considered a  resident of Abyei 
derailed a  referendum on the territory’s status. The  government of Sudan 
and Humr Misseriya have not yet accepted all proposals and agreements 
for resolving the conflict. Despite the fact that there are new and positive 
political developments between the two countries, mainly in  2019–2020, 
these have not been extended to the settlement of the final status of Abyei. For 
a durable peace in the Abyei region and its environment, both governments 
need to work toward realising mutual benefits based on the agreed principles 
and proposals stipulated in the Abyei Protocol of  2004–2005 and the African 
Union High-Level Implementation Panel of  2012.
Keywords: tribal conflict, natural resources, Abyei, Humr Misseriya, 
Ngok Dinka
Introduction
The  2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was the conclusion of more 
than twenty years of civil war between the governments of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) . Disputes over borders, 
resources and unsettled territories, such as the resource-rich Abyei, continue to 
plague the relationship between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan, South 
1 Getachew Zeru Gebrekidan, PhD, Assistant Professor, Peace and Security Studies, African 
Institute of Governance and Development, Ethiopian Civil Service University, e-mail: 
getachewzeru@yahoo .com
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S Sudan achieving its independence from the Republic of Sudan on  9 July  2011 . Abyei 
is considered by the Ngok Dinka community their permanent territory . The  Ngok 
Dinka community is a sub-sect of a predominantly agrarian Christian ethnic group 
ancestrally domiciled in South Sudan . Seasonally, the Abyei area is often used by the 
Humr Misseriya pastoralists, which belong to a large Arab Muslim population in the 
Sudan, named Al Baggara .2 The Humr Misseriya and Ngok Dinka have lived together 
in the Abyei area for centuries, with the nomadic Misseriya spending part of the year 
in Abyei for grazing and access to water . However, after the Sudanese independence 
from colonialism, their relationship became tense and confrontational as many Ngok 
Dinka became part of the rebel movements in South Sudan and the Humr Misseriya 
were increasingly recruited into government militias .
Moreover, Abyei is one of the core issues in the CPA . Hence, the unresolved 
impasse between the two governments over a  failure to execute the CPA’s Abyei 
Protocol adversely affects the relative peace in both countries and threatens to 
possibly spark off renewed conflict between them, despite a  fruitful referendum in 
January  2011 that endorsed the secession of South Sudan . Even after the removal of 
President Omar  Al-Bashir from power in Sudan in  2019 and the new peace deal for 
a union government in South Sudan in  2020, the attention given for the Abyei issue 
is too obscure .
1. Conceptual issues
Several scholars and policy makers argue that natural resources can cause conflicts, 
or even escalate, but are not the only goal of the fighting .3 For example, Porto argued 
that natural resources that include minerals, oil, timber, productive pastures and 
farming land can cause armed conflicts, or escalate existing tensions .4 Le Billon 
also argued that ‘resources have specific historic, geographic, and social qualities 
participating in shaping the patterns of conflict and violence . The  discursive 
construction and materiality of oil and diamonds, for example, entail distinct social 
practices, stakes, and potential conflicts associated with their territorial control, 
exploitation, commercialization, and consumption’ .5 In  this regard of strategic 
importance to foreign and domestic economic and political concerns, resource access 
and exploitation can become highly contested issues and their territorialisation can 
generate more territorial stakes than many other economic sectors . This situation 
2 Zeru Getachew, ‘Conflict Mapping and Conflict Resolution Strategy: The North and South Sudan 
Conflict on Abyei’, Journal of International Business and Leadership  1, no  1 (2012),  24–47 .
3 Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa’, Journal of Africa 
Economics  9, no  3 (2000),  270–294 .
4 Joao Gomes Porto, ‘Contempotary Conflict Analysis in Perspective’, in Scarsity and Surfeit. 
The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts, ed . by Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies,  2002),  1–50 .
5 Le Billon, Philippe: ‘The Geopolitical Economy of ‘Resource Wars’,’ in The Geopolitics of Resource 
Wars, ed . by Philippe Le Billon (London: Routledge,  2007),  2 .
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has often appeared in excessive resource dependent and conflict-ridden developing 
countries . Moreover, history and political culture, institutions, the individual 
personality of leaders and the availability of weapons intervene in these conflicts at 
least as much as the role of political economy of natural resource and their violent 
escalation, but the security and exploitation of nature represents a source of power 
and conflicts that should not be overlooked .6
According to Morelli, the likelihood of violent conflict is strong when the presence 
of a local ethnic group coincides with natural resource abundance found in its region 
which is hardly available in the regions of other ethnic groups .7 In contrast, if there 
are no natural resources in the region or if they are evenly distributed in neighbouring 
areas, there are no reasons for conflict . In other words, it is unlikely to maintain peace 
when the natural resources of a given area are more valuable (for example diamonds, 
oil and coca) . This idea is supported by Le Billon who argued that ‘contrary to the 
widely held belief that abundant resources aid economic growth and are thus positive 
for political stability, most empirical evidence suggests that countries economically 
dependent on the export of primary commodities are at a  higher risk of political 
instability and armed conflict’ .8 However, ‘the availability in nature of any resource is 
thus not in itself a predictive indicator of conflict . Rather, the desires sparked by this 
availability, as well as people’s needs, and the practices shaping the political economy 
of any resource can prove conflictual’ .9
From a political ecology perspective, there are two points that deal with causes 
of conflicts commonly known as resource scarcity (renewable resources) and 
resource abundance (non-renewable resources) . Advocates of the scarce resource 
wars hypothesis argued that people or nations may fight each other to get access 
to the resources essential for their existence . This reflects the statement: the scarcer 
the resource, the bitterer the fight . On the other hand, advocates of the abundant 
resource wars emphasised that primary commodities are easily and heavily taxable, 
and are hence attractive to both conflicting parties . Thus, the availability of abundant 
resources would therefore increase the risk of armed conflicts as states struggle 
for territorial control . Yet, ‘low levels of renewable resources endowment are not 
associated with the risk of armed conflict; while abundant renewable resource in 
otherwise poor countries and non-renewable resources in all countries increases the 
likelihood of armed conflict’ .10
6 Ibid .
7 Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner, ‘Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil 
War’ . Households in Conflict Network (HICN) Working Paper  80 . Falmer, Brighton: University of 
Sussex, the Institute of Development Studies,  2010 .
8 Philippe Le Billon, ‘The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts’, Political 
Geography  20, no  1 (2001),  562–563 .
9 Ibid .  563 .
10 Ibid .  565 .
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S 2. The dynamics of the Abyei conflict
The CPA was signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLA/M in Nairobi 
on  9 January  2005 . Among others, the CPA included the Protocol on the resolution of 
conflict in Abyei, which was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on  26 May  2004 .11
The Abyei Protocol defined the territory of Abyei as the area of the nine Ngok 
Dinka Chiefdoms transferred from Bahr el Ghazal to Kordofan by the Anglo–Egyptian 
Condominium rule in  1905 for administrative and security reasons .12 The colonial 
administration transferred the area to treat victims and perpetrators under the same 
provincial administration and to address concerns of slave raiding .13 However, the 
transfer took place without consulting the predominantly Ngok Dinka population of 
Abyei .14
The Abyei Protocol also confirms that the Humr Misseriya and other nomadic 
peoples should keep their traditional rights for grazing cattle .15 Moreover, it specifies 
that during the interim period, Abyei should be administered by a  local executive 
council elected by the residents of Abyei, which was a special administrative status . 
It was also stipulated that net oil revenues from Abyei should be divided among six 
parties during the interim period .16
As boldly written in the protocol, the residents of Abyei would cast a  separate 
ballot, simultaneously with the referendum in South Sudan, to decide whether Abyei 
is to remain in the South Kordofan state of Sudan or join the Bahr el Ghazal state in 
South Sudan .17 This type of decision is not new for the Abyei people . For example, in 
11 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army . s . a .
12 Abyei Protocol,  9 January  2005 . Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, Chapter IV of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, Kenya .
13 Some sections of Humr Misseriya continued raiding the Ngok Dinka as slaves; and this situation 
led the Anglo–Egyptian Condominium Government to transfer the territory of the Ngok Dinka 
from Bahr al Ghazal to Kordofan province in  1905 . (Joshua Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground: 
Conflict Dynamics in Abyei . Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies,  2011) Similarly, the Humr Misseriya tribe was suffering from the Ngok Dinka 
cattle rustling . (Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, ‘Abyei: From a Shared Past to a Contested Future’, 
Accord no  7 [2011],  1–8)
14 Sansculotte-Greenidge, ‘Abyei’ .
15 Abyei Protocol,  9 January  2005 . Resolution of the Abyei Conflict: Chapter IV of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, Kenya .
16 The National Government:  50 per cent, the Government of South Sudan:  42 per cent, Bahr el 
Ghazal region:  2 per cent, Western Kordofan:  2 per cent), locally with the Ngok Dinka:  2 per cent 
and locally with the Misseriya people:  2 per cent . See Abyei Protocol,  9 January  2005 . Resolution of 
the Abyei Conflict: Chapter IV of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army, Nairobi, Kenya .
17 UN Mission in Sudan/UNMIS, Principles of Agreement on Abyei in General: Abyei Protocal, fact 
sheet,  2009 .
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 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed, which ended the first North–South 
Sudan war . According to the agreement, the Abyei community, the Ngok Dinka were 
given the opportunity to vote in a referendum on whether to remain in the North or 
to be integrated into the newly formed Southern Sudan Region .18 During this time, 
Abyei was given a  special administrative status under the office of the President . 
Later, the GoS, however, unilaterally abrogated the Agreement, including the Abyei 
referendum clause because of resource and political motives, which set the scene for 
renewal of another war in the South .19
To define and demarcate the boundary of Abyei, the Abyei Boundaries Commission 
(ABC) was established, which has a reflection where to lay the resources of Abyei . 
In  terms of Abyei’s security structure, it was decided to be the inclusive security 
forces from the GoS, SPLA and the UNMIS .20
On  14 July  2005, the ABC report was presented to the presidency and set the 
boundary of the Abyei area  87 km north of Abyei town, which included the Heglig, 
Diffra and Bamboo oil fields . All villages recently settled by Ngok Dinka, as well as the 
areas from which the Ngok Dinka had been forcefully evacuated and occupied by the 
Humr Misseriya were placed in a zone of shared rights .21 Both the GoS and the Humr 
Misseriya voted against the report but for different reasons .
The reason for the GoS’s rejection was that the ABC had found that the Heglig, 
Diffra and Bamboo oil fields were located within the Abyei area . On the other hand, 
the Humr Misseriya declined to recognise the ABC, because of the resentment that 
they were not consulted and the concern that they would lose the renewable resource 
in Abyei forever .22 On the contrary, the Ngok Dinka and the Government of South 
Sudan (GoSS) considered the ABC decision fair which should be recognised and 
implemented by all the signatories .23
18 The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan,  27 February  1972 .
19 Apart from the pressure from the Humr Misseriya, the abrogation of the agreement was directly 
associated with the discovery of oil within and around the Abyei area in  1979 . In this case, the 
Humr Misseriya militias were used by the government in the north of the Abyei territory to remove 
Ngok Dinka inhabitants and open up a path to the exploitation of oil reserves . Besides, apart from 
securing the oil fields from possible guerrilla attack, the GoS also used the Misseriya militias as part 
of its national policy of Arabisation in Sudan . (Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground) The failure to 
implement the referendum clause in the Addis Ababa Agreement and the GoS’s strong support to 
the acts of the Humr Misseriya were determinant factors that led to some Ngok Dinka to form the 
‘Anyanya  2’ guerrilla group and were instrumental in the formation of the SPLA in  1983 . (Douglas 
H Johnson, ‘Why Abyei Matters, the Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement?’, 
African Affairs  107, no  426 [2008],  1–19)
20 Abyei Protocol, January  9,  2005 . Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, Chapter IV of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, Kenya .
21 Sansculotte-Greenidge, ‘Abyei’ .
22 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
23 Abdalla A Muna, Situation Report: Abyei Natural Resources Conflict (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies,  2010) .
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S The ABC report was rejected by the GoS and Humr Misseriya . Following this, 
Abyei was the cause of direct confrontations between the Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF) and the Humr Misseriya militia on the one side and the SPLA and Ngok Dinka 
on the other . The dispute exploded into violence in May  2008, which led to the razing 
of Abyei town and the displacement of over  60,000 people .24 Moreover, in January 
 2020, the militia killed more than  30 civilians including children in the village of 
Kolom in the Abyei area .25 Such type of violence was frequent, particularly following 
the Sudanese independence, where the first Sudanese civil war (1955–72) had created 
a deeper rift between the Humr Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka, as the latter were 
increasingly recruited into the Anyanya first rebel movement and the former joined 
the government militias . This rift aggravated in  1965, when  72 Ngok Dinka civilians 
were burned alive in Babanusa .26 After a year of the Babanusa massacre, for the first 
time, the Humr Misseriya claimed parts of Abyei up to the river Ngol entirely for 
themselves27 and some among them started permanently to settle in the area .28
To address the June  2008 deadly violence, the GoS and GoSS came up with 
the Abyei Roadmap document, which refers the case to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague for a final and binding decision .29 In the ruling of the 
PCA, the GoS and GoSS were the only two parties officially represented while Humr 
Misseriya were not adequately represented in the proceedings .30
In  2009, the PCA declared its final decision, which reduced the size of the Abyei 
area set forth by the ABC . The decision placed the Diffra oil field31 in the Abyei area 
while the other two oil fields (Heglig and Bamboo) became parts of South Kordofan 
(that is, the Sudan) .32
Similarly to the ABC report, the PCA decision accorded Humr Misseriya the 
right to use the Abyei area to graze cattle . However, Humr Misseriya and the GoS 
declined to accept the PCA ruling and declared to halt the physical demarcation of 
the boundary on the ground unless Humr Misseriya was permitted to vote in the 
referendum . Contrary to this, the Ngok Dinka and the GoSS declared their acceptance 
of the PCA ruling and opposed the idea of Humr Misseriya voting in the referendum .33 
24 Sansculotte-Greenidge, ‘Abyei’ .
25 United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Abyei,  29 January  2020 .
26 Francis M Deng, War of Visions: Conflict and Identities in the Sudan (Washington, D .C .: Brookings 
Institution Press,  1995) .
27 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
28 Concordis International Sudan Report, More than a line: Sudan’s North–South Border (United 
States Institute of Peace,  2010) .
29 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
30 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei (Geneva: Human Security Baseline Assessment [HSBA],  1 
March  2013) .
31 Since the PCA decision in  2009, Diffra is the only oilfield in Abyei . See Angelina Sanders, ‘Sudan 
and South Sudan’s Oil Industries: Growing Political Tensions’,  2012 .
32 Roberto Belloni, ‘The Birth of South Sudan and the Challenges of Statebuilding’ . Ethnopolitics  10, 
no  3–4 (2011),  411–429 .
33 Concordis International Sudan Report, More than a line .
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Still, the GoS and Humr Misseriya have never given up that Abyei is an integral part 
of South Sudan .34
Contrary to the PCA decision, in May  2011, SAF and Humr Misseriya militia 
invaded Abyei and caused the displacement of more than  110,000 civilians into 
Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Unity States .35 They also killed more than 
 1,500 people .36 Recently, the United Nations Security Council condemned the tribal 
attacks by Humr Misseriya militia on a Ngok Dinka village in Kolom in January  2020, 
which claimed the lives of  33 Ngok Dinka,  18 were wounded, including  15 children 
missing and  19 houses burned .37
There was no military response from the GoSS because of the fact that the party’s 
focus was on South Sudan’s formal declaration of independence on  9 July  2011 . Later, 
on  20 June  2011, the GoS and GoSS signed an agreement in Addis Ababa, which 
committed both sides to the total withdrawal of their military forces from the area 
and the reestablishment of a local administration . In support to this agreement, the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution  1990 on  27 June  2011, which authorised the 
establishment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) .38 
The resolution authorised the deployment of  4,200 Ethiopian UN peacekeeping forces 
to the Abyei area after leaders from the two Sudans signed an agreement in Addis 
Ababa brokered by the African Union .39 The UNISFA is the only UN force responsible 
for providing security in Abyei and authorised to precede a full military withdrawal 
by SAF and SPLA in order to enable the Ngok Dinka to return to their territory .40 
Since September  2019, the UNISFA military component stood at  4,150  personnel 
(3,871 troops,  140 military observers and  130 staff officers) .41
The former South African President Thabo Mbeki was assigned by the African 
Union to chair the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in 
mediating on Abyei and other post-referendum issues . In doing so, the AUHIP put 
forward a number of compromise proposals to end the crisis in Abyei .42 For example, 
on  21 September  2012, it proposed that Abyei’s referendum should be voted on 
by members of the Ngok Dinka community, and “other Sudanese residents” of the 
34 United Nations Security Council, Adding Civilian Component to Abyei Interim Force Essential 
for Matching ‘Reality on the Ground’, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council .  8519th meeting, 
SC/13796,  30 April  2019 .
35 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan Humanitarian 
Bulletin,  27 August –  2 September  2012 . OCHA .
36 UNSC Report: Monthly Forecast, July  2011 .
37 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan Situation Report  2020 .
38 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei .
39 Tesfa-Alem Tekle, ‘Ethiopian Peace Force to Abyei Begins Operation Next Week’ . Sudan Tribune, 
July  23,  2011 .
40 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei . 
S/2018/293,  3 April  2018; Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei .
41 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei . 
S/2018/293,  3 April  2018 .
42 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
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S territory in Abyei in October  2013 . But, unlike the CPA, it defines these residents as 
those “having a permanent abode within the Abyei Area” . It also proposes that the 
referendum commission should include two representatives from the two countries, 
and a  chairperson appointed by the AU . Besides, it proposed to set up the Abyei 
Referendum Facilitation Panel (ARFP), to be composed of three “individuals of 
international stature”, to mediate any disagreement in the referendum commission, 
as well as to deliver advisory services .43
The proposal decided to create a Common Economic Development Zone (CEDZ) 
to transform the existing conflict between the adversaries of the two Sudans . Moreover, 
regardless of the outcome of the referendum, it guarantees Humr Missiriya’s migratory 
rights in the area .44 Consequently, the AUHIP’s proposal was endorsed by the African 
Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in October  2012, and appreciated it as a fair 
and feasible one to the conflict . Then, the AU requested the two countries to further 
negotiate over a six-week period on the basis of the proposal .45 But, the progress so 
far is not as remarkable as to say that the potential oil reserve of Abyei would go to 
South Sudan .
At its  750th meeting held on  6 February  2018, the African Union PSC stated the 
activities of the AUHIP for Sudan and South Sudan . The council disclosed that no 
progress had been made in resolving the final status of Abyei . As a result, the council 
requested the leaders of both Sudans to continue their discussion on the final status of 
Abyei . It further noted that the discussion should be based on the AUHIP’s Proposal 
on the Final Status of Abyei Area adopted in  2012 . However, the final status of the 
Abyei area is not yet determined as can be read from the Sudan situation report of 
February  2020 .46
3. Observable challenges
Even though there  have  been  multiple efforts by the conflicting parties and other 
regional and international stakeholders, multifaceted challenges in Abyei and its 
environment are making worst the works to improve the situation on the ground 
and ways to find sustainable solutions . In  this part, some of the major challenges 
associated with the Abyei crisis are discussed .
3.1 State–society relations
The bondage between the Humr Misseriya and the GoS is not always consistent; 
rather it is one of the most dynamic political games in Sudan . To mention a  few, 
43 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei,  7 .
44 Ibid .  8 . For more information see https://enoughproject .org (17 . 01 . 2013 .)
45 Renata Rendón and Amanda Hsiao, Resolving the Abyei Crisis (Washington, D .C .: Enough Project, 
 2013) .
46 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan Situation Report  2020 .
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the Humr Misseriya believed that they were betrayed by the NCP-led government 
they fought for during the second Sudanese civil war and felt that the end of the war 
did not result in any visible improvement in their life .47 Rather, they felt that the CPA 
was negotiated against their interests and that they are politically and economically 
marginalised . As a result, some unhappy former fighters built alliances with the Justice 
and Equality Movement against the GoS .48 To mitigate the observed resentment, 
the GoS developed a strategy to work with and use Humr and other sections of the 
Misseriya tribe to ensure control of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states .
Moreover, retaining the loyalty of the Misseriya is ben eficial to the GoS because 
of the impor tance of the Misseriya constituency to the ruling National Congress 
Party . For these reasons, any move by the GoS to execute the PCA borders would 
produce a  hostile relationship with the Humr Misseriya . In  other words, the GoS 
fears losing their support if it makes any concessions on the political future of Abyei 
that would make the Humr Misseriya feel their grazing resource was in danger . 
Between  1988 and  1989, President Al Bashir was assigned in Muglad as officer in 
charge with the rank of brigadier general, which enabled him to directly supervise the 
Humr Misseriya militias on how to offensively attack SPLA and its supporters . After 
Bashir seized power in a coup in  1989, he promulgated the Popular Defense Forces 
Act that includes Humr Misseriya militias .49 Since this time, President Al Bashir and 
his party have been telling the Humr Misseriya that Abyei belongs to them .50 In this 
respect, the GoS encouraged the Humr Misseriya to look to Abyei as “their” area, for 
grazing cattle and other development projects . Within this context, any move which 
would denounce the likelihood of Abyei becoming “their” area must have seemed like 
another infidelity .51
Similarly, because of strong historical connections between the SPLA and the 
Ngok Dinka, it is unlikely for the GoSS to be reluctant on the Abyei issue . This is 
one of the principal reasons why the South Sudan Government may not accept any 
proposal that makes Abyei and its resources remain in the Southern Kordofan of 
Sudan . Thus, the GoSS has often been very active in working both with internal and 
external stakeholders to make sure that Abyei would join South Sudan .
47 Tim Flatman, ‘Abyei: Predicting the future’, Sudan Tribune, May  9,  2011 .
48 Since the launch of the CPA, JEM has been increasingly active in recruiting from among the Humr 
Misseriya tribe . Some from this tribe are serving in the leadership position of the movement 
such as a Humr Misseriya man who led JEM’s delegation to the peace talks in Doha in February 
 2010 . (Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground)
49 Under Sudan’s current government, the Humr Misseriya militias and other similar groups were 
formally integrated into the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) in  1989, which had a legal entity to 
serve as a de facto reserve for the national army . This action further polarised the dispute between 
Ngok Dinka and Humr Misseriya as the government was redistributing the land of the Ngok Dinka 
to Humr Misseriya and other groups . (International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement: Beyond the Crisis. Africa Briefing N°50 . Nairobi–Brussels,  13 March  2008)
50 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
51 Flatman, ‘Abyei: Predicting the future’ .
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S Recently, however, there are new relationship developments between the Ngok 
Dinka and Humr Misseriya communities . For example, Akonon Ajuanja, a Ngok Dinka 
chief in Abyei said “our communities have accepted to live together here” . “We have 
no problem with the Misseriya . Our problem is with the Sudanese government .” 
Doelbit Ali, a Misseriya nomad, on his part said: “Each person says this land is theirs, 
but we don’t want to get involved with the politics .” He further said they do not have 
a problem with Ngok Dinka and want the politicians to “stay away” . In spite of this new 
development, the final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined as there is no 
concrete agreement on the ground between the two governments .52
3.2 Disagreement on issues of referendum and settlement
Both governments (the GoS and the GoSS) have disagreed on the demarcation of 
Abyei’s territorial boundary and the criteria that determine voters’ eligibility in the 
area . This ultimately derailed the referendum on the Abyei’s future status .
As highlighted above, the residents of Abyei have the right to participate in the Abyei 
referendum . However, the problem is that there is no agreement on who should be 
considered a resident of Abyei . According to the Protocol, the Abyei Referendum Act, 
which passed into law in December  2009, has not been able to form the indisputable 
Abyei Referendum Commission (ARC) to be responsible in defining the criteria for 
residence because of the disagreement on the composition of the commission .
The GoS argued that there should not be a  referendum in Abyei without the 
participation of Humr Misseriya .53 Humr Misseriya also claim that they have the right 
to participate in the future referendum in order to enjoy not only an equitable share of 
the natural water and grazing pasture resources of the area, but also to gain the right 
to domicile, possess property, as well as invest in the Abyei area and its environment, 
in which they have inhabited with the Ngok Dinka for more than  30 decades .54 Still, 
the GoS has the same stand that Humr Misseriya should be permitted to participate 
in the referendum .55
Despite the fact that an average of  25,000 Humr Misseriya nomads have often 
spent six to seven months in a year in the Abyei area for grazing, the GoS claims 
that an estimated maximum number of  400,000 Misseriya must be endorsed to vote 
if the referendum is to go ahead . The  reasoning behind this is that if the  400,000 
Misseriya as a tribe are allowed to vote in the Abyei referendum, then their numbers 
will swamp the estimated  70,000 Ngok Dinka, thereby securing the territory for the 
52 Sam Mednick, ‘Conflict in Abyei Could Reignite South Sudan’s Civil War’, Foreign Policy, June  6, 
 2018 .
53 Douglas H Johnson, ‘The Road Back from Abyei’, January  14,  2011 .
54 Abdalbasit Saeed, ‘Peace in Sudan: so near … so far?’, in Proceedings of the National Civic Forum 
Dialogue Sessions  2007–2008, ed . by H A Ati and G E Tayeb (Khartoum: National Civic Forum and 
EDGE for Consultancy and Research,  2009),  104 .
55 Sudan Tribune, ‘Ngok Dinka and Misseriya discuss peaceful coexistence in Abyei’, March  29,  2019 .
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Sudan .56 But, in  2019, the migration season began in October, with  37,000 seasonal 
Misseriya herdsmen having entered the Area .57 In response to this, officials of the 
GoSS claim that the Humr Misseriya have historically held their permanent residents 
in South Kordofan of Sudan and could not be considered permanent residents in two 
areas simultaneously . From this discrepancy, it can be inferred that it was logically 
inconsistent for the CPA to guarantee the grazing rights of the Humr Missiriya in 
Abyei if they are not to be counted as permanent residents . The GoSS also argued 
that the claims by the GoS on the Humr Misseriya being given the right to vote is also 
inconsistent with the precedent of the South Sudan referendum in which seasonal 
migrants did not get the right to vote . Moreover, the GoSS and the Ngok Dinka have 
overruled this due to the fact that they have a well-grounded concern that if the Humr 
Misseriya pastoralists are allowed to vote in the referendum, the GoS will strongly 
continue flooding the north of the territory with pro-government Humr Misseriya in 
order to make the referendum in favour of Humr Misseriya .58
The Humr Misseriya leaders expressed that they would continue to prevent the 
demarcation of the Abyei area on the ground and precede their plan of settlements 
in the area . In  this regard, the SPLM spokesman in Abyei reportedly alleged that 
 2,000 Popular Defense Forces (PDF) had been mobilised from outside Abyei to settle 
in the north of the area to facilitate the settlement in the northern part of the Abyei 
region .59 Several reports also revealed that the GoS had been settling Humr Misseriya 
in the northern part of Abyei for permanent settlement beyond the seasonal migration 
period . For example, the UNSC reported that in October  2019, the number of 
Misseriya settlers had reached more than  35,000 .60 In fact the settlement in the north 
of Abyei started earlier in August  2010, which was approximately  25,000 Misseriya 
settlers .61 This practice has continued to worsen the situation in the Abyei Area .
In October  2013, while the GoS and Humr Misseriya leaders have expressed their 
rejection of the AUHIP’s proposal for a referendum, the GoSS and the Ngok Dinka 
accepted it without any question . Following this, several Humr Misseriya leaders have 
announced their intention to settle in Abyei, creating permanent abodes, so as to 
ensure full participation in the referendum .62 The GoS argued that the AUHIP did 
not consider the lifestyle of the Humr Misseriya, which “is inimical to the concept of 
permanent abode” .63 Because of this stand, both countries were not able to conduct 
a referendum to decide the future of the Abyei region as they have to agree first on 
56 Sansculotte-Greenidge, ‘Abyei’ .
57 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei . 
S/2018/293,  3 April  2018 .
58 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
59 Concordis International Sudan Report, More than a line .
60 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei . 
S/2018/293,  3 April  2018 .
61 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
62 Rendón and Hsiao, Resolving the Abyei Crisis .
63 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei .
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S who can participate in the vote .64 This is one of the major challenges that impede the 
progress in Abyei until this day .
3.3 Humr Misseriya’s past experience-based fear
Despite assertions in the CPA, the Abyei Protocol and PCA Report, the Humr Misseriya 
continue to feel uncomfortable about the loss of their grazing and water access rights 
if the CPA is effectively applied .65 Their fears are based on past experiences, more 
precisely, the fact that it is difficult to separate ‘traditional rights’ from national 
politics . For example, after the Addis Ababa Accord, clashes were frequent between 
the then southern police forces and the Humr Misseriya tribe . Similarly, following the 
CPA, the Humr Misseriya has been blaming SPLA/M activities such as grazing time 
restrictions, requirements to disarm and taxes, which have often led to confrontations 
with it at the Unity and Warrap State borders .66
In some border areas, Humr Misseriya pastoralists were asked to pay the SPLA 
SDG  15,000 (USD  6,300) . Apart from money in  2007, they were also obliged to pay 
SPLA soldiers one to two calves per herd to access the Southern provinces for grazing 
cattle . Moreover, in  2008 the majority of the Humr Missiriya’s cattle stayed and 
suffered a shortage of both grazing and water .67 In a meeting held on  14 December 
 2012, Dinka chiefs and other local authorities agreed to block Humr Misseriya entry 
to the Abyei region as there were insufficient water resources and security threats 
from the Humr Misseriya militias .68
3.4 The issue of oil
In spite of the fact that the PCA placed most of the contested oilfields (Heglig and 
Bamboo) outside of Abyei (that is, in the north of the Kiir North), the GoS still wants 
to get access to current and future oil revenues in the Abyei region .69 Mirroring the 
same idea, Craze argues that apart from the stated political and economic factors, the 
GoS and GoSS have strong interest on the existing and potential lucrative oil resources 
in the Abyei area .70 As a strategy, for example, the Humr Misseriya militias have been 
used by the GoS in the northern part of the territory to displace the Ngok Dinka 
inhabitants so as to exploit the oil reserves without any problem . Thus, regardless of 
any political or legal questions, and given the NCP’s behaviour of using proxy militias 
64 Sudan Tribune, ‘Ngok Dinka and Misseriya discuss’ . 
65 Vanessa J Jiménez, Seeking Solutions to the Crisis in Abyei, Sudan (Washington, D .C .: Public 
International Law & Policy Group [PILPG],  2010) .
66 Concordis International Sudan Report, More than a line .
67 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground . 
68 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei .
69 Belloni, ‘The Birth of South Sudan’ .
70 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground .
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in the area, one can argue that the GoS may not tolerate any decision that endangers 
its future access to oil .71
3.5 Continuous recruitment of militias
From the Ngok Dinka vantage point, the primary threat to peace is providing 
arms to the Misseriya pastoralists by the GoS .72 As  a  tactic to prevent the PCA’s 
implementation program, the GoS officials have been actively recruiting militia 
among the Humr Misseriya, especially since mid-2010 .  In fact, since  2005, more 
than twelve militia training camps have been established along Abyei’s northern 
border, with new recruits reportedly receiving around SDG  50 (USD  21) per month .73 
Apart from handing out some financial incentive, the GoS had been motivating the 
new recruits by indoctrinating them that Abyei is a territory that belongs to Humr 
Misseriya .74 Moreover, the GoSS officials claimed that after the  2005 CPA, ‘the PDF 
has been reorganised and equipped with trucks, motorcycles,  12 .7  mm machine 
guns,  82 mm mortars, RPGs, anti-tank weapons and small arms . The Humr Misseriya 
militias are receiving such weapons from the SAF .’ All this help from the GoS enabled 
them to destroy much of Abyei town and the surrounding villages mainly Todac, 
Tajalei, Maker, Wungok and Dungop .75 This situation contributed to the January  2020 
attacks by armed Humr Misseriya militias on a Ngok Dinka village in Kolom, which 
left  33 local civilians killed,  18 wounded,  15 children missing and  19 houses burned .76
3.6 The question of identity
The issues of identity, mainly in attachments to the land are essential in explaining the 
way the Humr Misseriya and Ngok Dinka have expressed their territorial identities 
and institutional allegiances . Both have lived and worked on this land for many 
years and both have a strong moral claim to it . Abyei also has a strong sentimental 
attachment due to religious and cultural significance that shaped and strengthened 
their ways of life for generations, as well as covers a significant part of their history, 
legends, values and traditions . However, because of multifaceted historical and 
contemporary factors, these identities and attachments have resulted in an adverse 
impact on the relationship between the two peoples, as each group claims Abyei as 
71 Ibid .
72 Abdalbasit Saeed, Challenges Facing Sudan after Referendum Day  2011: Persistent and Emerging 
Conflict in the North–South Borderline States (Chr . Michelsen Institute [CMI]: Sudan Report SR 
 2010) .
73 Small Arms Survey, Armed Entities around Abyei (Geneva: Human Security Baseline Assessment 
[HSBA], December  2010) .
74 Ibid .
75 Craze, Creating Facts on the Ground,  48 .
76 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Sudan Situation Report  2020 .
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S its exclusive territory .77 This perception has contributed to the collapse of multiple 
proposals to deal with the Abyei issue . However, with the help of UNISFA, the two 
communities have made regular conferences to strengthen peaceful coexistence and 
peaceful resolution of conflicts at grass root level .78
3.7 Negligence of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms
The Humr Misseriya shared the land in Abyei and its environment with the Ngok 
Dinka for more than three centuries and settled most of the disputes on the basis of 
custom and tradition . Since the signing of the CPA, Humr Misseriya and Ngok Dinka 
traditional leaders have been attempting at the local level to find ways for peace and 
prevent a worse conflict . However, these efforts are not well recognised and supported 
by the international community, including by both governments .79 For example, the 
GoS and the GoSS were the only two parties officially represented at the ABC, PCA, 
as well as AUHIP and this created a feeling of marginalisation, especially among the 
Humr Misseriya .80 However, amid efforts by the Ngok Dinka and Humr Misseriya 
communities to make dialogue for peace, governments of Sudan and South Sudan 
have made no progress on the issue of Abyei .81
3.8 The state officials’ political rhetoric
Political rhetoric on Abyei by officials on both sides has also created a tense relation 
between both governments . Sudan’s former President Omar al-Bashir said that 
the problem of Abyei cannot be solved without the participation of Arab Humr 
Misseriya nomads in a referendum: ‘We are saying, loud and clear, that there will be 
no referendum on Abyei without the Misseriya .’82 President of South Sudan, Salva 
Kiir Mayardit, in turn said that the North-aligned Humr Misseriya do not have any 
territorial right in the area except access to water and pasture for their cattle; rather 
Abyei belongs to the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms . ‘The truth is here with us, Abyei 
belongs to us . Whether Omar al-Bashir likes it or not, one day Abyei will rejoin the 
South .’83 From this narrative, it is apparent that state officials’ statements have been 
exacerbating the situation on the ground .
77 Muna, Situation Report .
78 Sudan Tribune, ‘Ngok Dinka and Misseriya discuss’ .
79 International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement .
80 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei .
81 United Nations Security Council, Adding Civilian Component to Abyei Interim Force Essential 
for Matching ‘Reality on the Ground’, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council .  8519th meeting, 
SC/13796,  30 April  2019 .
82 News24, ‘Bashir: No Abyei vote without Misseriya’, March  31,  2011 .
83 Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan’s Kiir talks tough on oil, Abyei’, July  19,  2011 .
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4. The prospect for peace
Following the PCA decision, the GoS negotiating position looks likely to remain that 
the Humr Misseriya must play a full part in the Abyei referendum . This position is 
entirely contrary to the Abyei protocol ruling (that is, the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms 
and other permanent residents being eligible to participate in the Abyei referendum), 
the referendum experience by the GoSS, and the interest of the international 
community . Given these views, the prospect for the Humr Misseriya as a tribe to be 
part of the referendum will not be practically attainable . Therefore, there is a need for 
a serious negotiated agreement between the two governments regarding the question 
of referendum . There is no doubt that if an agreement is not supported by age-old 
customary norms and traditions of the Humr Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities, 
the prospect for sustainable peace in and around the area will not be feasible . Indeed, 
the good efforts by the Ngok Dinka and Humr Misseriya communities to achieve 
peace through dialogue should be encouraged and supported by all the stakeholders . 
Moreover, building upon the recent positive developments of bilateral relations 
between the two governments need to resume direct talks to resolve provisions of 
their agreements in relation to the final status of Abyei .
Based on the CPA and the PCA rulings, the Humr Misseriya have unconditional 
land usage rights in the Abyei area before and after the referendum . However, if the 
Humr Misseriya continues to be prevented to access grazing land and water in South 
Sudan by the GoSS’ military wing and some traditional leaders of the Ngok Dinka, 
this will put further strain on grazing resources in Abyei . Above all, given the practice 
on the ground, the Humr Misseriya may enter into a violent conflict with the Ngok 
Dinka and SPLA if Abyei goes to South Sudan . Conversely, if the GoS and the Humr 
Misseriya did not drop the intent of land ownership rather than land-use rights in 
Abyei, the prospect for sustainable peace in and around the area will be unattainable .
Unless the two Sudans sign up to a demilitarised zone or soft border that would 
allow trans-human groups to cross freely, which relies on the good faith of the two 
governments not to send proxy militias across the Abyei area, it will be hard to achieve 
sustainable peace between the conflicting parties . The  GoSS should also prove its 
commitment to the Humr Misseriya right to access grazing lands and water in the 
border areas of South Sudan including the Abyei region through political decisions, 
such as promulgation of state legislation .84
Despite the fact that the AUHIP proposal attempted to give a workable solution 
for the referendum impasse, the two governments have not yet agreed on the Abyei 
referendum . In fact, this proposal seems in favour of the GoSS and the Ngok Dinka due 
to the fact that it indicates that the Humr Misseriya pastoralist are not full residents 
of Abyei, and thus not eligible to vote . If this persists, especially the failure to agree 
on the AUHIP’s final proposal, the PSC announced it would endorse the Proposal as 
84 Hsiao, Amanda: ‘Sudan–South Sudan Negotiaitions: Can They Meet the Deadline?’, September  6, 
 2012 .
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S final and binding, and would request an endorsement by the UN Security Council .85 
If this happens, the AU and UN Security Council may take some actions against the 
GoS to force it to review its stand towards the proposal . From this scenario, it is easy 
to understand that the proposal reveals that Abyei has the prospect to go to South 
Sudan in a popular vote . Indisputably, this may satisfy the GoSS and Ngok Dinka; still, 
the implementation process can only be smoothly conducted when the other side will 
be convinced by and will accept the proposal .
As argued above, following the CPA, some pro-government Humr Misseriya 
groups have already permanently settled in the northern part of the Abyei area as 
a strategy to participate in the referendum, thereby altering the demographic make-
up of the area . To prevent such manipulation, it is essential to check the registration 
of voters in those South Kordofan localities that were considered part of Abyei in 
the  2008 census . This may help to identify who should be included on the basis of 
their  2008 self-identification to move to the next step .86
In order to attain sustainable peace and security in the Abyei area, the two 
governments should permit and support the Ngok Dinka and Humr Misseriya 
communities and religious leaders as well as representatives of peace building civil 
society organisations to meet and discuss the security situation in the Abyei area and 
its environment . This can help communities to address problems that were a direct 
legacy of the conflict, between Ngok Dinka and Humr Misseriya . Moreover, it may 
add a value to the overall efforts done by the African Union and other stakeholders 
as they attempted to address a number of core issues in the conflict such as natural 
resource, migration and cross boundary security related concerns . In  fact, there is 
a good deal of work going on recently by the two communities to prevent violent 
conflicts and insecurities in the area, which are not recognised by both governments .
Conclusion
Under the  2005 CPA, members of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms and other residents 
of Abyei are entitled to a referendum in which they will vote on whether the territory 
should be part of Sudan or South Sudan . But, the referendum has not yet been held 
because of the disagreement between the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan . 
In breaking this impasse, despite the fact that there have been several efforts by the 
conflicting parties and other stakeholders, multifaceted challenges on the ground 
tend to complicate the prospect of finding a  sustainable solution . Among others, 
strong reciprocal relationship between the GoS and Humr Misseriya on one side and 
the SPLM/A and Ngok Dinka on the other side; disagreement to define the criteria 
determining voters’ eligibility; Humr Misseriya’s Settlement controversy; crave for 
current and potential lucrative oil; negligence to Traditional Conflict Resolution 
85 Small Arms Survey, The Crisis in Abyei .
86 Aly Verjee, ‘Race against time: the countdown to the referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei’, 
November  1,  2010 .
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Mechanisms; and state officials’ political rhetoric are some of the intricate challenges 
that make the peace process inexorably gloomy .
Moreover, because of the past experiences of intimidation by the SPLA of the 
South Sudan, the Humr Misseriya pastoralists are not yet sure to get guarantees 
for their grazing and water access rights if the CPA is fully implemented . Needless 
to say, the proposal presented by the AUHIP in September  2012 has put forward 
a compromising solution to end the overall crisis in Abyei, which required the two 
countries to make further negotiation . Recently, there are new changes in both 
countries and paid reciprocal head of government visit in Khartoum and Juba . 
Nonetheless, the Abyei progress so far has not been impressive .
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S Examining Minority Rights Protection 
under the Ethiopian Federal System
MAREW ABEBE SALEMOT1
This research investigates minority rights protection under the Ethiopian 
federal state structure, its legal instruments and institutional setups. 
Ethiopia is a land of a diverse society having more than eighty distinct ethnic 
groups, but the federal system conferred only seven ethnic groups, their own 
regions subsuming the rest within them. The territorial autonomy of ethno-
national groups in Ethiopian federal context  –  in which the constituent 
units themselves are diverse  –  imposes a  rigid conception of territory. 
The constituent unit that empowers autonomy for a particular group – the 
titular ethno-national group  –  claims exclusive control over territory and 
dominance within the constituent unit. Thus, the interests of minorities 
who are lumped with relatively dominant ethnic groups are not addressed 
and these minorities have neither been given self-determination nor are 
recognised as distinct nationalities of the country.
Keywords: minority, rights, Ethiopia, federalism, Constitution
Introduction
The concept ‘minority’ is a very broad and complex term . It is complex in the 
sense that no consensus has been reached as to what it pertains to, and is broad 
for it incorporates diverse groups which have ethnic, religious or linguistic 
features .2
As far as the protection of minorities is concerned, apart from the various UN 
conventions in many countries including Ethiopia,3 constitutional provisions 
1 Marew Abebe Salemot, Lecturer, Debark University, e-mail: marewobu@gmail .com
2 W Kymlicka, ‘Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are They Relevant for 
Africa?’ in Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, ed . by 
D Turton (Oxford: James Currey,  2006),  54–55 .
3 The following conventions are relevant legal frameworks for minorities in which Ethiopia 
is a state party: International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) . More importantly, the Ethiopian Constitution under 
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S have been laid which are directly or indirectly designed to protect and meet the needs 
of minorities .4 These constitutions, in addition to ensuring the equal treatment of 
minorities with other nationalities, provide special guarantee to specified linguistic or 
other minority groups within the states regarding their right to existence, to education, 
language, self-determination and representation .5
Ethiopia being a  home of various nations, nationalities and peoples, its federal 
constitution has laid important guarantees for the protection of a sort of minority 
called ‘minority nationalities’ together with other nationality groups .6 It is, however, 
sad to say that the past ruling classes had considered this unique and diverse culture 
of the different nations and nationalities the source of all troubles .7 Instead of 
making concerned efforts to develop their indigenous culture and preserve what was 
inherited from their ancestors, the past regimes did not give due attention to their 
very existence and protection .
Following many devastating civil wars to overthrow both the monarchical and 
dictatorship regimes, Ethiopia adopted a constitution at the end of the cold war in 
 1995 . After the promulgation of the Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopian (FDRE 
hereafter) Constitution in  1995, Ethiopia has implemented a federal state structure 
with ethno-linguistic political-legal arrangements . Contradicting the multiculturalism 
nature of Ethiopia, the Constitution8 under Art .  47 has unequivocally declared Ethiopia 
as the federation of ten ethno-linguistically demarcated regional states (including 
the recently added Sidama Regional State) .9 The  demarcation of Ethiopia  –  which 
has more than eighty-five diversified ethnic groups in only ten territories based on 
linguistic criteria – created the subordination of national minorities of any kind to 
the will of the majorities .10 In the Ethiopian federation, populations are in practice 
rarely distributed into neat watertight regions . The existences of intra-unit minorities 
Art .  9 states that all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law 
of the land, and Art .  13 further elaborates that fundamental rights and freedoms specified in the 
constitution are to be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the international 
instruments adopted by Ethiopia . See the link of the UN Treaty Body Database below for 
Ethiopian status . Available: https://tbinternet .ohchr .org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty .
aspx?CountryID=59&Lang=EN (20 . 06 . 2020 .)
4 RL Watts, Comparing Federal Systems,  3rd ed . (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press,  2008), 
 44–46 .
5 N Steytler, ‘Enhancement of Democracy through Empowerment of Disadvantaged Groups’, in 
Unity in Diversity: Learning from Each Other. Vol.  4: Local Government in Federal Systems, ed . by J 
Kincaid and R Chattopadhyay (New Delhi: Viva Books,  2008),  20–35 .
6 F Assefa, ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment in Accommodating Diversity:  20 Years’ Balance Sheet’, Regional & 
Federal Studies  22, no  4 (2012),  435–473 .
7 D Aberra, The Scope of Rights of National Minorities under the Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University,  2008),  23–47 .
8 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia .
9 GS Alemante, ‘Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa’, The Yale Journal of 
International Law  28, no  1 (2003),  51–107 .
10 T Kjetil, Ethiopia: A New Start? Minority Rights Group International – Report (London: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers,  2000),  22 .
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within the regional units have been unavoidable . Territorial demarcation of ethnic 
groups in Ethiopia hardly applies to minority groups which had been amalgamated 
with relatively dominant groups . This perspective fails to address adequately the 
problem of minorities within the different regional administrations and cities that are 
often inhabited by ethnically intermixed individuals .11
The UN special Rapporteur’s report12 on minority mission to Ethiopia confirmed 
the plight of minorities when making an evaluation of the situation of minorities in 
the country based on the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and other relevant international 
standards, and identified four broad areas of concern regarding minorities . These are: 
(a) protecting the existence of a minority, including through protection of the physical 
integrity of its people and the prevention of genocide; (b) protecting and promoting 
cultural and social identity, and the right of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic 
groups to affirm and protect their collective identity and to reject forced assimilation; 
(c) ensuring effective non-discrimination and equality, including ending structural 
or systemic discrimination; and (d) ensuring effective participation of members of 
minorities in public life, especially with regard to decisions that affect them .
As far as numerical dominance is concerned, no nation constitutes half of the total 
population of Ethiopia but the constitution creates majority–minority divides .13 From 
the three decades of federal experience, one major challenge the Ethiopian federal 
system is facing relates to the issue of local tyranny at constituent unit level . This 
research investigates the legal norms and institutional setups of Ethiopian federation 
to address and safeguard minority rights protection in the country .
1. The scope of minority rights under the Ethiopian Constitution
1.1 The right to existence and recognition
Recognition of minorities facilitates the protection of other minority rights . It  is 
the recognition of ethnic groups that gives rise to other rights . Recognition of 
minority groups by the state helps minority for claiming other rights . ‘The existence 
of minorities is a matter of fact, rather than a matter of law . According to the UN 
Human Rights Committee, such existence ‘does not depend upon a decision by that 
state party but [must] be established by objective criteria’ .’14 Of course, ‘the linchpin 
of minorities’ protection is the right of minorities to be recognized as minorities’ .15 
11 Assefa, ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment’ .
12 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues: Mission to Ethiopia (28 November –  12 
December  2006)’, UN .
13 Assefa, ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment’ .
14 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Marginalised Minorities in Development Programming . 
A UNDP Resource Guide and Toolkit’, May  2010,  36 .
15 JR Stephen, ‘Toward a Minority Convention: Its Need and Content’, in Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,  1990),  102 .
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S ‘Even in the absence of legal recognition granted to minorities by the respective states, 
de facto recognition may assist States to acknowledge and respond to the problems 
faced by minorities . States will be able to better tackle inequality and reduce tensions 
within their societies if they acknowledge that ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity exist; and that groups may challenge discrimination and exclusion along 
these lines .’16
Ethiopia is home for over eighty-five distinct multi-ethnic groups since time 
immemorial .17 The  constitution under Art .  62 authorises the House of Federation 
(Ethiopian Upper House) to give de jure recognition to these groups . The recognition 
or rejection of their (minorities’) existence depends on the subjective criteria set 
under Art .  39(5) of the constitution . In order to be recognised as one of the distinct 
ethnic groups of the country, any minority people should fulfil the criteria of having 
a  large measure of a  common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of 
language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological make-up, 
inhabiting an identifiable and predominantly contiguous territory .18 For example, in 
case of ‘belief in common or related identities’ and ‘a common psychological make-up’, 
which are subjective ones, their determination is difficult . Apart from the difficulty 
in determining them, the constitution does not specify as to who has such power . 
However, as such elements are something that the concerned ethnic group believes 
in, they are the fundament of their existence, such power should be given to the group 
itself . No other body should prove (but may confirm) the existence or non-existence 
of such feelings for them .19
Due to the difficulty and subjectivity of the criteria, coupled with the influence of 
political involvements concerning the decision on the quest for recognition, so far the 
House of Federation has recognised only  75 relatively dominant ethnic groups . But 
there are still more than ten indigenous minorities who have not been yet recognised 
as a distinct nationality of the country . As a result their language, religion and their 
sheer identity, are at the verge of extinction . Of course, these indigenous minorities 
have been settled in these areas for centuries . To mention a few of those minorities20 
16 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Marginalised Minorities in Development Programming’, 
 16 .
17 Z Bahiru, A History of Modern Ethiopia (1855–1991) .  2nd ed . (Oxford: James Currey – Athens: 
Ohio University Press – Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press,  2002) .
18 C Van der Beken, Unity in Diversity – Federalism as a Mechanism to Accommodate Ethnic 
Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia (Berlin: Lit Verlag,  2012),  289 . See also Art .  39(5) of the 
Constitution .
19 A Addis, ‘Individualism, Communitarianism and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities’, Notre Dame Law 
Review  66, no  5 (1991),  615–676 .
20 The House of Federation (HoF), the second House empowered to give identity recognition, has 
rejected claims for recognition of the Danta, Wolene, Bahirwork Mesemese, Zaye, Dube and 
Kontoma stating that these groups do not have a ‘distinct language’ of their own, although Art . 
 39 does not include such a requirement . What Art .  39(5) requires, among other things, is ‘mutual 
intelligibility of language’ and not a distinct language in the way interpreted by the HoF .
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nationwide claiming such recognition includes the Danta, Wolene, Bahirwork 
Mesemese, Zaye and Dube .
1.2 The right to self-determination
Self-determination is one of the most important rights of oppressed population groups 
because of its multi-faces . At the same time, it can be seen from political, economic, 
social and cultural rights .21 The Ethiopian Constitution (Arts .  39 and  52) conferring 
the right to self-determination to Nations, Nationalities and Peoples which can be 
understood as the right to autonomy (self-government), the right to speak one’s own 
language, preserve culture, history, identity and to have separate institutions .
In reality, there are only ten regional states and two city states for nearly eighty-five 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples in the county . Since the members of the federation 
are not homogeneous, there are a number of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples in 
each regional state who are either unrecognised or lumped with other dominant 
groups . In some others like the Southern Regional State, there exist more than fifty-
six Nations, Nationalities and Peoples . As a result, in the states, there exist majorities 
and minorities . States adopt their own mechanism of accommodating the rights of 
national minorities living in their own jurisdiction . The Southern and the Amhara 
Regional States, in their respective constitution, provide for the right of minorities to 
establish their own nationality self-governments and equitable representation in the 
state councils . On the other hand, the Constitution of the Oromia National Regional 
State under Art .  8 provides:
Sovereign power in the region resides in the people of the Oromo Nation and the 
sovereignty of the people is exercised through their elected representatives and 
direct democratic participation . It is worth noting that this provision has ignored 
the existence of non-Oromo ethnic groups, which constitute only  12 .2% of the 
region’s population .22
Moreover, Art .  5 of the Harari Regional State Constitution provides that the Harari 
people are the owner of sovereign power in the region . This stipulation of the 
constitution recognises only the Harari ethnic community, which represents a mere 
 8 .65 per cent of the regional population, as the sole holder of sovereign power . 
Although Art .  6 of the regional constitution provides that Oromiffa shall serve as 
an official language of the region along with the Harari language, there is no other 
provision in the regional constitution which recognises the right of the Oromo 
21 YT Fessha and C Van der Beken, ‘Ethnic federalism and internal minorities: the legal protection 
of internal minorities in Ethiopia’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law  21, no  1 
(2013),  32–49 .
22 Van der Beken, Unity in Diversity .
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S community, which constitutes  56 .41 per cent of the region’s population as a partaker 
of sovereign power in the region .
The above illustrations show that there is no uniform mode of accommodating the 
right to self-government of national minorities among the states . This fact opens the 
room for states to devise their own form of treating national minorities of their region 
which in some instances resulted in denial of the basic rights of Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples of the right to self-government .
1.3 The right to develop and promote cultural and linguistic rights
The survival and flourishing of a minority’s culture depends largely on the validity 
of its language .23 A language policy is a high-level governmental document that sets 
decisions and guidelines for and determines what language and for which purposes 
shall be used in a given country .24 Language and cultural policy are two of the most 
crucial affairs that need special care in a  multi-ethnic state, since unity should be 
preserved without compromising diversity . For good language policy, policy makers 
should consider the following considerations while making the policy: human rights 
implications for minorities, economic utility of each language, national integration 
and government efficiency, group identity as a well as personal identity and aesthetic 
expression .25
In the Ethiopian federation, the Constitution, under Art .  5(1) only states that all 
Ethiopian languages enjoy equal state recognition and as per Art .  5(2) Amharic is the 
working language of the federal government . It looks like Art .  5(1) and (2) of the FDRE 
Constitution contradict each other because it is difficult to give equal state recognition 
to all languages in the existence of one federal working language in a country where 
more than eighty languages are spoken . Still, the constitution uses the official language 
neither for vertical communication between the Federal government and the states, 
nor for the horizontal communication between the regional governments although as 
a matter of practice Amharic is maintained .26 The constitution is supposed to lay the 
ground for the promotion and protection of the minority languages, but the Ethiopian 
Constitution is silent on the use of languages in administration and the media . There 
is also no specific law that regulates the use of languages in education, let alone the 
minorities’ .27 Minority Nationalities can therefore exercise their right to promote and 
develop their culture using this constitutional provision guaranteed to minorities 
and majorities alike . Taking into account their numerical inferiority and political non-
dominance, minority Nationalities need special measures to preserve and develop 
23 Addis, ‘Individualism, Communitarianism’ .
24 A Getachew and A Derib, ‘Language Policy in Ethiopia: History and Current Trends’, Ethiopian 
Journal of Education & Science  2, no  1 (2006),  37–62 .
25 L Calvet, Language Wars and Linguistics Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1998),  34–38 .
26 Assefa, ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment’ .
27 Fessha and Van der Beken, ‘Ethnic federalism and internal minorities’ .
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their own culture .28 However, the Federal Constitution did not provide special support 
to minority nationalities that would enable them to enjoy and develop their culture .
2. Institutional responses: The right to representation of minorities 
at the Federal Houses
Minority groups of peoples are always in need of special protection and consideration 
from survival to preservation of their identity, culture, tradition and ways of life . 
Institutional setups where minorities are represented and their will reflected are the 
basic necessary instruments for better protection of minorities .29 In the subsequent 
subsections, the representation of minorities in the Lower House (House of Peoples’ 
Representatives, hereinafter HPR) and the Upper House (House of Federation, 
hereinafter HoF) will be discussed .
2.1 Minority representation in the House of Peoples’ Representatives  
(the Lower House)
The House of Peoples’ Representatives, the Ethiopian federal law-making body, 
represents the peoples of the Ethiopian people as a whole . The FDRE Constitution 
(Arts .  50–51) empowered the HPR, to have a final say on political issues . It  is the 
supreme political body that enacts laws in compliance with the constitution and plays 
a supervisory role over the executive . Representing the peoples of Ethiopia, members 
of the HPR are elected on the basis of the first-past-the-post electoral system from 
candidates in each electoral district . This means that each candidate who gets the 
larger votes in each electoral district will win the seat . In Ethiopia, where the federal 
system is structured on the basis of ethnic lines, the election of members of the HPR 
by such first-past-the-post electoral system runs the risk that the one seat in each 
electoral district will be won by the candidate who represents the interests of the 
largest ethnic group in the district . This discriminates against minorities from having 
a single representative at the House of Peoples’ Representatives . From the  550 seats 
of the HPR, relatively populous nations (the Oromo and Amhara) occupy  304 seats of 
the very law-making body . Therefore, if the Oromos and Amharas form a quorum, 
their combined vote will suffice to pass legislations to the prejudice of other nations 
and nationalities .30
Thus, the way members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives are elected 
deviates from the very notion of the Ethiopian federation that aspires to accommodate 
28 G Merera, Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy,  1960–2000 
(Maastricht: Shaker Publishing,  2003),  82–83 .
29 N Fasil, Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red 
Sea Press,  1997),  51 .
30 Assefa, ‘Ethiopia’s Experiment’ .
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S diversities . The larger ethnic groups are more strongly represented leaving minorities 
behind from the law-making body of the federation .
The fact that the constitution under Art .  54(3) stipulates – out of the maximum 
number of  550 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives – to reserve a minimum 
of  20 seats for ‘minority nationalities and peoples’, lacks clarity . Even though at 
the federal level all nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia are considered 
minorities, the attempt of the constitution to assign  20 seats for the Minorities in the 
House of Peoples’ Representatives is not unequivocally stated and raises questions, 
because, it is not a clear concept in the Ethiopian Constitution who are minorities and 
what are the possible (objective) criteria for identifying them . And who claims such 
reserved seats is also not explained .
2.2 Minority representation in the House of Federation (Upper House)
Partly, it is the fear of the majority tyranny in the first chamber that many federal 
constitutions avoided by setting a non-majoritarian second chamber where the rights 
of minorities will be exercised and counterbalance the majority rule .31
The Ethiopian second chamber, commonly dubbed as the House of Federation 
(HoF),32 is composed of representatives of each Nation, Nationality and People of 
Ethiopia . According to the FDRE Constitution Art .  61(2), each ethnic group shall 
be represented by at least one member . Moreover, those ethnic groups whose 
population exceeds one million are entitled to have one additional representative for 
every increase by a million . However, as per the FDRE Constitution Art .  61(1–2), the 
second chamber in Ethiopia is unique for many reasons; it has neither law-making 
power nor state representing mission; it rather represents Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples . In Ethiopia, each Nation, Nationality and People is guaranteed a minimum of 
one representative and shall be represented by one additional representative for each 
one million of its population . By this calculation, those two relatively larger ethnic 
groups (Oromo and Amhara) have dominated almost half of the seats of the second 
chamber and have repeated the majoritarian tyranny in the Lower House . This still 
raises questions: how could the minority groups in the HoF exercise their rights if they 
are overridden (outnumbered) by the more populated groups that form the ruling 
party, who have more seats in the house, since the simple majority is a requirement to 
pass all decisions in the house .
Despite the fact that Ethiopia is home for more than  85 Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples, only  69 Nations, Nationalities and Peoples for the third term (2005–2010), 
and  75 for the fourth term (2011–2015) and  76 for fifth term (2016–2020) have seat(s) 
31 A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press,  1999),  3–4 .
32 The HoF is composed of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ . Each nation or nationality has one seat 
and one additional seat is granted for every additional million . The HoF does not have law-making 
power . It is mandated to resolve disputes among regional states, allocate subsidies to regional states 
and interpret the Constitution . See Arts .  61 and  62 of the Constitution .
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in the HoF . This means about  16 minority groups for the third term and  10 for the 
fourth and  9 for the fifth term were unrepresented . This is not in line with Art .  61(2) of 
the Federal Constitution which provides for representation of each nation, nationality 
and people of Ethiopia in the Upper House . As a result, there are still minorities (re)
questing primarily their identity to be recognised, to have self-determination and to 
get representation in the appropriate level of governments including the HoF .
Conclusion
By taking the objective, subjective and the combination of both criteria of defining 
minorities, Ethiopia is a land of minorities . There is not any ethnic group that claims 
to be in a majority position at the federal level . However, the FDRE Constitution tries 
to create majority ethnic groups at regional levels by making ethnicity incongruent 
with the territorial demarcation of the constituent units of the federation . But the 
geographic boundaries of the Regional States are not inhabited by homogeneous ethnic 
groups . Consequently, every regional state has minorities, which have survived the 
influence of the majority for many years . Thus, minorities continue to suffer because 
they are under the mercy of local majorities with no legal framework to protect their 
very right to existence, self-determination, development and promotion of cultural 
and linguistic rights and political representation among others . The  intermingling 
nature of the Ethiopian polity at the regional levels was not considered by the framers 
of the Federal constitutions and the constitution did not set any kind of mechanism 
for protection of minorities living in each local government . The adopted electoral 
system in the Ethiopian federation makes minorities to be the losers and to have 
unfair representation .
The possible solutions to the plight of minorities in Ethiopia can be achieved 
by designing broader political and policy considerations beyond the normative 
constitutional stipulations . Thus, the Federal Government should have responsibility 
as a guardian of intra-regional minorities against possible repression by a regional 
majority . The proportional representation system is relatively better than the first-
past-the-post system that would accommodate and reflect the interests of minorities, 
as well .
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S Language Law and Policy  
of the Federal Government of Ethiopia: 
Implications for Fair Trial and the Rights 
of Non-Amharic Language Speakers Accused
YEMSERACH LEGESSE HAILU1
Ethiopia is a  multilingual country with a  federal form of state structure. 
The   1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE Constitution) gave equal recognition for all Ethiopian languages, 
but has chosen Amharic to become the working language of the Federal 
Government. In order to accommodate the needs of non-Amharic speakers 
in the provision of public services, the Constitution and other laws such as 
the Criminal Procedure Code, require the use of interpreters. Particularly in 
criminal proceedings, non-Amharic speakers are entitled to be assisted with 
a ‘qualified’ interpreter to meaningfully participate in the cases. In practice, 
it is observed that accused people who do not speak the working language of 
the federal government are unable to effectively understand or get prompt 
and detailed information regarding the nature and effect of the case brought 
against them. Even if they know the case, they are not able to effectively 
explain their defences to the court or associated bodies, and thereby defend 
their rights. This study reveals that non-Amharic speakers are not effectively 
served according to the legal standards. This problem subsists mainly due to 
the absence or limited number of interpreters, as well as the use of untrained 
interpreters. Despite some efforts to address the problem, the federal 
government has not yet laid down any formal mechanism by which people 
with limited and/or no Amharic language proficiency are properly served 
in criminal proceedings both before and during trial. This study proposes 
the federal government to establish court interpreter training institutions 
and to standardise court interpretation by allocating the necessary budget; 
lay down a formal mechanism such as enacting detailed laws and working 
manuals for assigning interpreters; providing other local languages the status 
of working language; consulting interpretation technologies and working in 
collaboration with different stakeholders.
Keywords: non-Amharic speakers, language barrier, multilingual 
community, untrained interpreter
1 Yemserach Legesse Hailu, Lecturer, School of Law and Federalism, Ethiopian Civil Service 
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Ethiopia is home to diverse cultures, languages, ethnic groups, religions, customs 
and traditions . The  1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE), which provides the legal basis for Ethiopia’s federal form of government, 
constituted the federation of nine ethno-linguistically composed regional states 
which are predominately delineated based on ethnic identity . These include Afar, 
Amhara, Benishangul-Gumaz, Gambela, Harar, Oromiya, Somali, Southern Nations 
Nationalities and People’s (SNNP) Region and Tigray, and two charter cities, Addis 
Ababa and Dire Dawa .2 Recently a tenth regional state, namely, Sidama, one of the 
Zones in SNNP, was established after a referendum was made on November  20,  2019 .3 
In all these parts of the country, researchers estimate that more than  75 languages are 
spoken .4 In this type of heterogeneous and multilingual community, it is difficult for 
government institutions to provide public services in all the languages of the society . 
Hence, the choice of one or more language as a working language through adopting 
a language policy becomes inevitable even if it may create problems .5
The current Constitution of the federal government of Ethiopia, under Article  5, 
states that all Ethiopian languages are equally recognised . The Constitution makes 
Amharic the working language of the Federal Government even though it recognises 
that regional states of the Federation may determine their own respective working 
languages . Regardless of the fact that both federally chartered cities Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa are home to different ethnic and linguistic groups, this provision implies 
that Amharic language is the only official language that the federal government uses 
in the public domain .
This study reviews the impact of the language policy of the federal government 
of Ethiopia on the rights and freedoms of non-Amharic speakers accused in Addis 
Ababa . It aims at identifying the major challenges non-Amharic speakers encounter 
in criminal proceeding and analyses its implications on their fundamental human 
rights . This work is an extension of the author’s Master thesis done in  2016, which 
only assess the problem in Lideta Sub-City . But the current research is significantly 
different in terms of scope of the area, as it covers the practice of criminal justice 
institutions, that is, police, prosecution office as well the Federal First Instance, High 
and Supreme courts at five selected sub-cities (Kolfe, Nifas Silk Lafto, Yeka, Lideta 
and Bole) of Addis Ababa . The data of the current study was collected from October 
 2019 to January  2020 . The two works are also different in terms of the change in the 
2 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia . Proclamation No  1/1995 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘FDRE Constitution’), Art .  47 .
3 The country is also expecting additional regional states as there are different requests for regional 
statehood . 
4 J Záhořik, ‘Debating language policy in Ethiopia’, Journal of Asian and African Studies  18, no  1 
(2009),  86 .
5 WF Mackey, ‘Language policy and language planning’, Journal of Communication  29, no  2 (1979), 
 48 .
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political and policy landscape that happened in the country . It has also substantially 
benefited from recent literature, published later than the Master thesis . Consequently, 
the findings and the conclusions of the research are also more developed .
Language policy: the need for careful consideration
Despite the attempt for defining the concept, there is no standard definition for 
language policy . For the purpose of this paper, language policy refers to implicit 
or explicit sets of principles or decisions of government authorities to choose one or 
more languages to administer provision of public services in a multilingual society .6 
It  can be said that language policy is an intentional decision made to determine 
language use in the public domain .
The choice of one or more languages in the language policy or law of a country 
is a  necessary evil which often comes with a  challenge of devising a  mechanism 
for accommodating other minority languages, and which is usually associated with 
the availability of financial resources and political will .7 In  a  country like Ethiopia 
with limited resources, choosing a language spoken by a relatively large number of 
speakers may perhaps be viable . But it can also have the effect of limiting or violating 
the linguistic and other fundamental human rights of persons who speak a different 
language .
When a  certain language is chosen as a  working language, it basically means 
that the language will be used as a medium of communication, written or oral, in 
the provision of public services by different branches of the government and other 
sectors . Language policy determines the use of a  language in legislature, judiciary 
proceedings, financial and bank system, media, healthcare services and so on . This 
includes, but not limited to, communication in public institutions such as courts, 
police offices, prosecution offices, health centres, public schools, transportation 
military, and media . Even though most researchers focus on the impact of language 
policy on education, language policy practically influences people’s everyday lives, 
in schools, in the market, in health care centres, and generally in the public spheres .
Language choice poses all kinds of problems that need to be handled cautiously .8 
On one hand, the government should be careful about the impact of language policy on 
national unity and political stability . On the other hand, the issue of accommodating 
the rights and claims of different linguistic groups and the cost thereof is also another 
critical challenge that requires careful consideration . Practically, it has been observed 
that linguistic diversity has been a  source of political conflicts across the world 
6 RL Cooper, Language Planning and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1989) .
7 L Brenda, ‘The Problems with Language Policy and Planning’, Journal of Language, Identity & 
Education  14, no  1 (2015),  36 .
8 R Tsegaye, Issues of federalism in Ethiopia: towards an inventory of legal issues (Addis Ababa: Addis 
Ababa University,  2009) . 
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S affecting the stability and sustainability of a  wide range of political communities .9 
The experience of many countries in Africa, America as well as Asia shows that it has 
been a challenge to create shared identity and common institutions .10 Multilingual 
states shall ensure that the policy represent and reflect the interest of all its members, 
including members of the different linguistic communities who are legally entitled 
to demand public services in a  language that they understand . Thus determining 
language policy requires a careful and deep analysis, weighing up the pros and cons 
of the proposed alternatives .
1. Ethiopian language policy
1.1 The legal basis for the language policy
Language policies may take different formats . It  can generally be found as part of 
an explicit clause in a  constitution and other written legal documents . It  can also 
be developed in a  separate policy document that provides the objective as well as 
detailed guidelines and specific procedures of language usage .11 Ethiopia does not 
have a separate language policy which provides detailed guidelines about language 
policy of the government and how it deals about language problems in different layers 
of government .
Since its adoption in  1995, the Federal Constitution has been the authoritative legal 
document which is usually cited as a  source of the language policy of the country . 
The Constitution also gives equal recognition to all languages in the country . Despite 
that, Article  5 Section (2) of the FDRE Constitution stipulates that Amharic is the 
working language of the federal government . Accordingly, this language has been in 
use as a working language for providing different public services within the Federal 
government structure . Compared to the past experience of the country, in which 
Amharic was predominantly the language of the state, the current constitution can be 
considered as a move forward, insomuch as it attempts to officially recognise linguistic 
diversity and the use of different local languages in different parts of the country .12
In spite of the progress that the Federal Constitution introduces with regard 
to language policy, it is criticised for overlooking equal rights of languages of 
nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia other than Amharic . This is generally 
evident in the public administration, education and the judiciary in the Federal 
setting .13 This paper takes a closer look at the justice sector, especially the criminal 
9 W Kymlicka and A Patten, ‘Language Rights and Political Theory’, Annual Review of Applied 
Linguistics  23, no  1 (2003),  3–21 .
10 B Weinstein (ed .), Language Policy and Political Development . Norwood, NJ: Praeger,  1990 .
11 B Spolsky, Language Policy (Key Topics in Sociolinguistics) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,  2004) .
12 Záhořik, ‘Debating’,  86 .
13 F Haftetsion, The State of Vertical Division of Political Power in the Ethiopian Federation, PhD 
Dissertation (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University,  2017),  261–264 .
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proceeding process, and review the practical challenges of non-Amharic speakers 
at the federal level .
1.2 The right to interpretation in criminal proceedings
With regard to the right to interpretation in criminal proceedings, the current baseline 
instrument in Ethiopia is the  1995 Constitution . The  reading of the constitutional 
provisions indicates that the state of Ethiopia has given special attention to the 
language problem in the justice system as it has dedicated two important articles to 
providing protection for accused and arrested persons with limited proficiency in the 
working language . The protection of the law for accused and arrested persons extends 
from the time of arrest to the time of prosecution in court of law .
The FDRE Constitution, after recognising Amharic as working language, did not 
provide detailed mechanisms how non-Amharic speakers are going to be served in 
the public domain . However, the Constitution specifically provides, under Article  19 
and  20, the rights of accused and arrested persons in the criminal proceedings . Article 
 19 of the Constitution provides that persons arrested have the right to be informed 
promptly, in a language they understand, of the reasons for their arrest or if any charge 
is against them . It also adds that they shall be informed of their right to remain silent 
in a language they understand and/or that any statement they make may be used as 
evidence against them in court of law . In addition to this, Article  20 Section (7) of the 
Constitution provides that accused persons have the right to request the assistance 
of an interpreter at state expense where the court proceedings are conducted in 
a  language they do not understand . The  Constitution not only obliges responsible 
government bodies to assist people with limited working language proficiency, it also 
indicates that the cost of language accommodation shall be covered by the state .
In addition to the constitutional provisions, there are also specific laws that provide 
protection for people with limited working language proficiency . The federal system 
endeavors to accommodate the needs of the diverse peoples of Ethiopia from different 
regions . The  Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia also provides under Article  27 
Section (4) that arrested persons shall be supplied with a competent interpreter where 
he/she is unable to understand the language and his/her answer is to be recorded .14 
Moreover, Article  126 Section (2) of the same document also provides that the 
court shall select a qualified court interpreter where it is required for the purposes 
of any proceedings . This article also adds that a relative of the accused, prosecutor or 
witness shall not be selected as interpreter . From the reading of these provisions, the 
Criminal Procedure Code, in addition to the assistance of interpreter, even requires 
the court to choose ‘qualified’ or ‘competent’ interpreters to assist individuals with 
limited language proficiency in criminal proceedings . But there is no legal instrument 
or other official document that provides for what qualified or competent interpreter 
14 The Criminal Procedure Code, Proclamation No .  185/1961 . Available: https://chilot .blog/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/civil-procedure-code-english .pdf (05 . 06 . 2020 .)
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S actually means . As a result, problems are observed in criminal proceedings across the 
country that impede citizens’ right to access the justice system .
On the other hand, Article  25 Section (2) of the Federal Courts Proclamation 
and its amendments expressly state that the courts shall provide an interpreter to 
individuals that do not know the working language of the federal courts .15
In addition to the constitutional provisions and specific laws, there are numerous 
international and regional human rights instruments that Ethiopia has ratified on 
the right to free assistance of an interpreter in criminal proceeding .16 With regard 
to this, Article  14 Section (3) (f ) of ICCPR provides for minimum guarantees that 
everyone in criminal proceeding is entitled to . It specifically provides that everyone is 
entitled to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court . This provision again held the government responsible 
for covering the cost of interpretation and leaves the accused or arrested persons 
free of cost . Similarly, the regional human rights law, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in this case, provides that the entitlement to the assistance of an 
interpreter is an essential element of fair trial when a person is unable to understand 
or speak the language used by the judicial body .17 Moreover, some researchers also 
argue that the right to an interpreter is a right recognised and protected by customary 
international law .18
By being party to the international and regional human rights laws, Ethiopia is 
required by law to comply with the standards contained in the conventions . These 
legal frameworks generally provide that everyone charged with a  criminal offence 
shall enjoy the minimum right to the free assistance of an interpreter if the accused 
cannot understand or speak the language used before and during trial .
1.3 Attempts to change the language policy at the federal level
The importance of the issue of language policy and its impact on non-Amharic speakers 
has been felt by the federal government . In fact, the issue of language recognition at 
the federal level has been one of the major reasons for political debate . In addition 
to organisational efforts to address the problem among the federal institutions, the 
federal government has shown its willingness to change the language policy . For 
instance, in July  2017, while discussing the special interest of Oromiya over the capital 
city Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian Council of Ministers approved a  draft act which 
would make Afan Oromo a second working language of the federal government . This 
draft act was criticised by researchers for lacking the proper language policy and 
15 Proclamation No .  25/1996 . 
16 Article  9 Section (4) of the FDRE Constitution actually states that all international agreements 
ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land .
17 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (November 
 1999), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, African Union .
18 J Sherman, ‘The Right to an Interpreter under Customary International Law’, Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review  48, no  3 (2017),  257 .
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evaluation .19 The Council of Ministers neither adopts an explicit model to recommend 
Afan Oromo as a working language nor does it explain why other local languages 
were not considered . Consequently, this decision was criticised because it lacked to 
foresee the consequent practical challenges . The draft act did not discuss as to how 
the language policy will be implemented . Issues such as constitutional amendment, 
resource allocation, institutional reforms and other subsequent measures were not 
properly discussed . Moreover, it overlooked the interest of residents of Addis Ababa, 
where more than  70 per cent of the population belongs to other linguistic groups . 
As a result, this act may lead to continuous political unrest in the country and may 
also put the national standing at stake .
The other recent attempt to change the policy was made by Abiy Ahmed, the 
current Prime Minister of Ethiopia, who has been trying to take numerous reform 
measures since he come to power in April  2018 . In his public statement on November 
 2019, Abiy Ahmed stated that he and his party, that is, the Prosperity Party, which was 
formerly known as Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, was working 
to incorporate more languages and improve the language policy at the federal level 
in a  reform measure . He said his party had decided to incorporate Affan Oromo, 
Tigrinya, Somali and Afar languages as working languages of the federal government 
in addition to Amharic .20 He said: ‘This is a  significantly better approach than the 
previously ones which will enable Ethiopians learn from one another and strengthen 
their desire to build their country .’21
Similarly to the previous attempt, the Prime Minister’s announcement was 
criticised for lacking a  legal ground and a  detailed justification for this decision . 
Perhaps, the decision to change the language policy is the result of political, economic 
and social conjunctions in the country .22
1.4 The practice in criminal proceedings
Language barrier can be a  daunting experience for non-Amharic speakers going 
through the legal system, especially if they appear before the law as an accused . 
The  accused person’s ability to understand the proceeding and communicate with 
lawyer, judge or others has a direct impact on his right to access the justice system, 
fair trial and other fundamental rights . Usually, a person with no or limited language 
proficiency has ‘difficulty speaking or comprehending working language in a pressured 
or highly charged situation or in a location that is not part of their common experience, 
19 L Yemserach, ‘Challenges and Prospects of Adding Working Language in Ethiopia’, Conference 
Paper, presented on Legal and Human Rights Academy / Policy Forum on Sustaining Political 
Reforms, Democratization and Human Rights in Ethiopia: Informing the Next Steps, October  1, 
 2018, Adama, Ethiopia .
20 Abiy Ahmed’s speech from FDRE Office of the Prime Minister is available at www .youtube .com/
watch?v=0m5TRUFLQ3M (05 . 05 . 2020 .)
21 Ibid .
22 A Minasyan, ‘Language policy, national identity and politics’, European Scientific Journal  2, (2014) .
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S such as in a court room or at a police station’ .23 Moreover, words used in court of 
law comprise much legal jargon which is usually not easily understood by persons 
outside the legal professions . It is thus important to assist non-Amharic speakers with 
language and ensure their meaningful participation in criminal proceeding .
The current Ethiopian legal system uses interpreters as a means of breaking the 
language barrier in legal proceedings . Hence, government institutions such as the 
police station and courts are by law responsible to meet the need of people who do 
not know the working language of the federal government by providing interpreters .
In this study, non-Amharic speakers can refer to three groups; Ethiopians who 
speak local languages other than Amharic, people with hearing impairments who use 
sign language and non-nationals who speak different foreign languages . These groups 
of individuals encounter more or less similar problems when it comes to language 
barrier in a criminal proceeding, even if the magnitude of language barrier or the 
challenge thereof is different .
1.4.1 Language barrier before trial
A criminal proceeding usually starts with the police, and a  person is entitled to 
certain fundamental human rights at the first contact with the police officer who 
arrests him/her . As per the FDRE Constitution as well as other specific legislations, 
an accused/arrested person has a right to be promptly informed of the nature and 
cause of charge against him in a  language he understands .24 Arrested persons who 
do not know the working language also have the right to be informed of his right to 
refrain from making a statement at the police station . And if he provides statement, 
he shall be informed, in a language he understands, that it will be used as evidence in 
court of law .25
Usually, in a  country like Ethiopia, it is not unusual to observe that accused 
individuals do not know their rights in legal proceedings in general and police 
stations in particular . Hence, it is at this critical stage of criminal proceeding that an 
interpreter should be available to break the language barrier . At the police station, 
the investigating police officer needs to communicate with the accused in different 
phases such as during detention, recording statement, investigation and application 
of remand . In order to conduct these responsibilities effectively, the police shall be 
assisted with an interpreter if they do not speak the language of the accused .
The state is therefore responsible to allow arrested persons to make an informed 
decision about making statements to police . For non-Amharic speakers, the state is 
23 RW Cole and L Maslow-Armand, ‘The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Addressing Foreign 
Language and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of Criminal Proceeding’, Western New England 
Law Review  19, no  1 (1997),  193–228 . 
24 FDRE Constitution Art .  19 s . (1) . 
25 FDRE Constitution Art .  19 s . (2) . 
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not only responsible for informing the accused/arrested of his/her rights before trial, 
it is also expected to do it in a language that he understands .
The results of the study show that in Addis Ababa there are numbers of cases 
involving both local and foreigner people who do not speak the working language 
of the police . Regardless of the number of cases that appear before the police, there 
are no formal institutional or legal mechanisms laid down to assist non-Amharic 
speakers either to inform the accused/arrested the nature of the crime or his/her right 
not to make statement . Unless the police officer knows the language of the accused, 
it is very difficult for the accused person to know the nature and cause of crime if he 
is detained outside the police station . Even after arriving at the police station, a non-
Amharic speaker may not be promptly informed of the charge brought against him 
because there are no interpreters hired at the police station . It is only when the search 
for possible interpreter is successful that non-Amharic speakers can be provided with 
the necessary information that the law requires .
Non-Amharic speakers generally shall be well-informed of their right to choose 
whether to make a statement or not, which also requires communication and effective 
understanding between the police officer and the accused person . Especially, in 
Ethiopian legal system whereby the statement of the accused can be taken by the 
court as evidence, it is important that these groups of individuals get the necessary 
information that the law requires in a language that they understand .
According to Article  86 of the Criminal Procedure Code,26 a statement shall be 
read out to the accused before he is asked to sign it . After taking down the statement 
of the accused in Amharic, the police officer is expected to use the same interpreter 
to read what has been written in the statement before letting the accused sign it . But 
the practice shows the contrary .
The majority of non-Amharic speaker participants in this study stated that 
their inability to read and speak the working language of the federal government 
significantly limited them from exercising their fundamental rights such as the right 
to express their ideas, the right to defend oneself and the right for fair trial .
The absence of interpreters at the police station has an impact not only on the 
accused’s fundamental rights, but also on the police officers’ day to day activity . 
The police officers stated that this has an impact on their daily work, as the search 
for an interpreter had been taking most of their time, which they could have used to 
do other important activities . The very fact that a non-Amharic speaker is involved 
in a criminal case always implies that the proceeding will be prolonged . Perhaps this 
is partly because interpretation by its nature requires extra time, patience and effort, 
especially from the police .
In police stations, it is either the police officers or other individuals such as 
friends, families of the accused, or anyone who claims to be a  bilingual, who acts 
as an interpreter to assist with the language barrier . All individuals who provide 
26 The Criminal Procedure Code, Proclamation No .  185/1961 .
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S the interpretation service are expected to provide the service on a voluntary basis 
and no payment is made for them . This definitely compromises the quality of the 
interpretation service, which may negatively affect the accused person’s fundamental 
right . According to some accused respondents, the fact that the police officers are 
the ones who act as interpreters in criminal cases of non-Amharic speakers poses the 
question of neutrality, which is a very essential aspect .
The issue of language barrier also raises a  similar challenge for the public 
prosecutors assigned in that specific police station . Usually, prosecutors are assigned 
in police stations to work in collaboration with the police officers during criminal 
investigation . Hence, they will be expected to talk to non-Amharic speakers while 
framing and preparing their charges . Usually, an investigating police officer and 
public prosecutor share the same office so as to work together on criminal cases . 
Hence, the public prosecutors can observe and assist police officers in numerous 
instances starting from recording statement to visiting prisoners in the respective 
temporary detention centres . Similarly to police officers, public prosecutors are 
also involved in the search for a person who could assist them in interpreting the 
language of their clients . Public prosecutors involved in this research stated that 
even if there are no formal guidelines or procedures for assigning an interpreter, they 
usually give priority for bilingual police officers at that station to help them with the 
communication barrier . It is after checking that there are no bilingual police officers 
that the prosecutors tell the accused person to bring their own interpreter or start to 
search for any interpreter around .
The current practice of the criminal proceeding before trial shows that there are no 
interpreters hired at the police station to break the language barrier in cases involving 
non-Amharic speakers . Moreover, there are no guidelines or formal procedure laid 
down to indicate how communication with accused people who do not know the 
working language should be provided . This can imply that the issue of non-Amharic 
speakers or the challenges they are encountering at police stations has not been felt 
by concerned bodies .
1.4.2 Language barrier during trial
The current criminal benches, the Federal First Instance Court (FFIC), Federal High 
Court (FHC) and Supreme Court (SC), are divided into different special courts that 
entertain specific cases on specific areas . These special benches include those that 
only see flagrant offences, remand applications from police, tax and customs, children 
and young offenders and women and children bench . And hence, the occurrence of 
cases involving non-Amharic speakers before one court depends on numerous factors 
such as the nature of cases, the area where the crime is committed, and the types of 
institutions in a certain sub-city .27
27 The situation with language interpreters is relatively better at the Federal Supreme Court, as most 
cases involve the exchange of written pleadings and not the physical appearance of the plaintiff and 
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The problem that language barrier may cause to the rights of citizens seems to be 
felt better in the judiciary than the executive . In all three levels of court structure, the 
job post for language interpreter, for both local and foreign languages, exists even 
though most of the job posts are vacant . The reason for this will be discussed in the 
following section .
In spite of the government’s commitment to respond to lingual diversity and 
implement the legal requirements, the result of this study shows that multiple 
challenges, especially logistical limitations, hinder the justice system to achieve its 
objective at the level possible .
1 .4 .2 .1 Major challenges in interpretation in court
A . Lack of qualified court interpreters
In a  criminal legal system, the role of interpreters is indispensable as life, liberty, 
and other rights of the accused depend on the quality of service of the interpreter . 
Currently, when cases of non-Amharic speakers are presented before federal courts, 
the judge may take formal measures where he/she issues a written order to the main 
registrar office and/or other governmental and non-governmental institutions . When 
formal options are unfruitful, the judge asks anyone in and around the courtroom who 
speaks the language of the accused without any written or recorded communication . 
This includes employees such as assistant judges and secretaries as well as non-
employees of the court such as police officers, relatives of the accused,28 interpreters 
that the accused bring and court attendants .
The job qualification required for local language court interpreters was completion 
of the  12th grade with four or more years of experience in any sector . Recently, due to 
the request of the court, the qualification was changed . Nonetheless, almost none of 
the interpreters in the study had experience in interpretation service . Hence, most 
interpreters provide a summarised interpretation, which is not advised in court of 
law, especially in criminal proceeding .29
the defendant in court . When interpreter is required, there are permanently hired interpreters that 
currently work in the court for English and Affan Oromo languages . For other languages, a similar 
challenge is encountered at the Federal Supreme Court level . 
28 This in fact is against Article  126 Section (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Proclamation No . 
 185/1961) that clearly states that no person shall be selected who is a relative to the accused or the 
prosecutor, or himself/herself a witness . 
29 According to William E . Hewitt there are different types of court interpretation . But only two 
models, namely, simultaneous and consecutive interpretations should be used in court of law . 
Simultaneous interpreting is rendering an interpretation continuously at the same time someone 
is speaking . On the other hand, ‘consecutive interpreting is rendering statements made in 
a source language into statements in the target language intermittently after a pause between 
each completed statement in the source language’ . According to this author, there is also a third 
common mode of interpretation called ‘summary’ interpreting . This mode of interpreting refers to 
paraphrasing and condensing the speaker’s statement . Unlike the two previous models, the latter 
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S Moreover, court interpreters do not have prior short or long term legal training, 
which makes the interpretation service more difficult . In many cases, people who had 
little or no familiarity with the court setting or legal jargons served as interpreters .
All participant judges commonly confirmed that it is not unusual to observe 
incompetent interpreters committing mistakes during trial . When competent 
interpreters are lacking, the individual’s legal rights in the judicial system and their 
rights and freedoms within the system will be jeopardised . These inevitably result in 
commission of errors and misunderstanding .
In order to improve the service of court interpreters, different measures are taken 
by the government . One of the measures includes the job grading reform taken by the 
Federal Civil Service Commission . As interpreters are employees of the government, 
the job post requirement as well as benefits are usually revised by the Commission . 
As part of its usual activity, the Federal Civil Service Commission of Ethiopia was 
conducting a research to review all of the job posts in governmental institution from 
the year  2008 to  2013 .  With regard to the job post for court interpreters, taking 
into account the comments forwarded from the judiciary administration offices, 
the Commission has made improvements to the qualification thereof . Accordingly, 
local language interpreters are required to have qualification of a degree in any field 
of study and two years of experience . Although this may be praised as an effort to 
increase the quality of service, this has resulted in another problem . According 
to  human resource management of the courts, these job posts have stayed vacant 
since the implementation of the newly revised job grading reform because they could 
not find anyone who is interested and fulfils the qualifications . According to the 
Human Resource Management of the First Instance Court, the reform has actually 
worsened the situation in courts, leaving them with no applicants that qualifies the 
requirement for local language interpreter job post .
Overall, interpreters play an important role in court of law, especially in criminal 
proceeding . They are the voice and ears of judges, public prosecutors and other parties 
on one hand, and those of non-Amharic speakers on the other . They contribute their 
share for the overall efforts of protecting the rights of the accused in criminal justice 
system . Nevertheless, the current strategies employed at the federal level to respond 
to the need of non-Amharic speakers in criminal proceeding are still inadequate .
B . Lack of incentive mechanisms for interpreters
According to the records of the human resources of the courts, there are only few 
permanent interpreters at the federal level who are hired for limited languages . This 
shows that the number of interpreters are insignificant compared to the diverse 
languages spoken in the country and the need in courts . Most interpreters in the 
does not provide a precise rendering of everything that is being said in to the target language . 
See William E Hewitt, Court Interpretation: Model Guides for Policy and Practice in State Courts 
(Williamsburg: National Centre for State Courts,  1995),  31 . 
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study indicated that this is due to the unattractive salary or per diem payment, the 
absence of incentive mechanisms for court interpreters .
Most interviewees indicated that the challenges in strategies to overcome language 
barrier in court of law has been mainly related with budget . Even though the issue of 
budget is essential, it cannot be a justification to deny rights of citizens, because this 
is the issue of access to justice and equality . It is also the duty of the government to 
provide public services fairly if not equally for any tax paying citizen in the country .
C . Different payment for foreign languages and local languages interpreters
Despite the fact that the government is expected to give more attention to 
accommodate local languages, the practice until  2017 shows that the number of 
foreign language interpreters, English in this case, as well as the salary was greater 
than those of local language interpreters . The  starting salary for a  local language 
interpreter was  1305 .00 birr (one thousand three hundred and five birr) while it is 
 3425 .00 birr (three thousand four hundred and twenty five birr) for a foreign language 
interpreter . The qualification as well as the payment for a foreign language interpreter 
is higher than those of local language interpreters . And this has been indicated as 
a problem discouraging local language interpreters . But since  2017, the qualification 
required for local and foreign language as well as the payment has been the same, 
still, there have been no interpreters hired for local language interpreters since then .30
D . Absence of job post for sign language interpreter
The absence of job post for sign language interpreter may imply that sign language 
has not been recognised as a language by itself, or other verbal languages overshadow 
it . It may also imply that the concern of persons with hearing impairment has not 
been given due attention in court proceedings .
Despite the current language policy that Ethiopia follows, it can be seen from 
the above discussion that only little has been done in terms of accommodating the 
diverse needs of non-Amharic speakers in criminal proceedings . The practice of using 
random individuals in court interpretation will definitely increase the chance of error 
and misinterpretation . In addition to that, the absence of means of ensuring quality 
of service and accountability is also very problematic . The fact that most interpreters 
who are formally or informally assigned do not have experience of interpretation also 
has an impact on the justice process .
30 The fact that the qualification requirement for local language interpreters increased even pushes 
away those applicants for the post . It led to an absence of permanently hired interpreters in courts, 
except some few in the Supreme Court . According to the Human Resource Management in Federal 
First Instance Court, they are now planning to request the Federal Civil Service Commission to 
lower the qualification requirement again as they could not find anyone that with a degree and two 
years’ work experience .
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S In many countries, such as the USA and Canada, courtroom interpretation has 
been professionalised as there are different legal frameworks and guidelines that 
require interpreters to pass through regular ‘training programs, certification standards 
and codes of ethics’ .31 But in Ethiopia, where there are no standard requirements 
for court interpretation, it is not unusual to observe unprofessional interpreters 
providing service in courtroom . And this creates a significant variation in the quality 
of courtroom interpretation, leaving the risk of errors on the shoulder of the accused, 
who is vulnerable in criminal proceedings .
1 .4 .2 .2 Language barrier in criminal proceedings and its human rights 
implications
The absence of interpreters in criminal proceedings before trial not only affects the 
accused person’s right to interpreters, but also his/her right to fair and speedy trial 
and fair procedures . It will also affect his constitutional right to be brought before 
court of law within a reasonable time after having been charged . Similarly, the accused 
person’s right to be informed about the charge brought against them, to be informed 
of his/her right not to answer questions during investigation, the right to bail, and the 
right to liberty will likely be confined .
Correspondingly, in court of law, the number of interpreters to assist the language 
barrier during trial has a  similar impact on the accused person’s human rights . 
The continuous adjournment of cases will eventually lead to delayed justice . And as 
often said, ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ . The right to justice, the right to defend 
oneself, the right to speedy trial and other rights of the accused will be limited and/
or violated .
The language barrier also affects non-Amharic speakers’ emotional wellbeing, as 
they can easily feel frustration when they are unable to express themselves effectively . 
Most of the research participants stated that the language barrier put great limitation 
on their capacity to express their ideas, feeling or even to ask questions to the 
responsible person before, during or after trial .
In addition to this, most non-Amharic speakers also indicated that language 
barrier in the criminal proceeding also affected them economically . They stated 
that they usually incur costs of travel and accommodation for themselves as well as 
witnesses for court appearance when in fact their cases may not be seen the first day 
because the judge will adjourn the case if there is no interpreter available at that time . 
The  inadequate service of interpreters and continuous adjournments of cases will 
also indirectly affect individuals who are socially and economically dependent on the 
accused, such as children, family members and relatives .
31 MI Ahmad, ‘Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference’, UCLA Law Review 
 54, no  5 (2007),  999–1086 .
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The study also observed that there are no interpreters in prison, which again affect 
the accused person’s right to appeal . Given the limited period for appeal, it is very 
difficult for the accused to effectively communicate with prison administrators and 
express the intention for appeal .
The prolonged proceeding in criminal cases will also have impact on evidences 
that need to be timely presented before court of law and assist the judge to provide 
fair judgment .
Conclusion and recommendations
Ethiopia has adopted an accommodationist language policy to linguistic diversity, 
taking into account the multilingual nature of nation, nationalities and peoples that 
comprise the nation . Hence the federal government is expected to lay down the 
necessary legal and institutional mechanisms by which people that do not speak the 
working language of the constituent members of the federation are assisted in their 
attempt to access the justice system .
Despite the promise in the Constitution and other legal documents, non-Amharic 
speakers are encountering different challenges at the different stages of criminal 
proceeding . The current practice shows that the federal government has not laid down 
any formal mechanism by which people with limited and/or no Amharic language 
proficiency are properly served in criminal proceedings before trial . Even though the 
situation looks better in courts as there are permanently hired interpreters, most of 
the job posts are vacant as the salary and incentive mechanisms for interpreters are 
very low .
The absence of adequate and professional interpretation service affects the day to 
day activities of justice institutions such as the police, public prosecutors and courts . 
It also affects the quality of interpretation services, which directly or indirectly affect 
the accused’s fundamental human rights in criminal proceeding . It also affects the 
economy as well as the trust of the accused towards the justice system in general . 
Overall, the issue of persons with limited or no Amharic language proficiency is acute 
and should be given the attention it deserves .
In order to improve the challenges of non-Amharic speakers at the federal level, 
it is recommended that the current language policy be revised in a way that provides 
opportunity for local languages as well as international languages such as English to 
be recognised as working language of the federal government, based on a scientific 
research . The language policy should come up with defined criteria such as number 
of people speaking that language in the federal city, population size, contribution to 
GDP that will provide each local language an equal opportunity to be considered for 
federal working language .
It is important for the government to adopt a new language policy in a separate 
document that explicitly provides the rationale of the policy . In  addition to this, 
detailed laws and working manuals should be prepared to lay down clear procedures 
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S that need to be followed while handling the language barrier in public sectors 
including justice sector .
Besides, it is important for the government to consider establishing federal courts 
in different regions of the country, especially Federal Supreme Courts . That would 
enable non-Amharic speakers to access the justice system in their own language and 
also avert costs related to interpretation services . If such is also the case at regional 
level, similar measures should be taken .
The role of interpreters is undeniable in bridging the communication barrier . 
In  order to ensure that there are adequate and qualified interpreters, the job 
grading, salary and incentive mechanisms should be improved . As the major factor 
impeding this is related to resource, it is recommended that the government work 
in collaboration with concerned stakeholders such as civil society organisations and 
embassies to solicit sustainable funding for interpretation service in the justice sector . 
Besides, in order to provide competent and qualified interpreters, the government 
should facilitate the opening of professional interpreters training centres in the 
private and public higher educational institutions . The institutions will be helpful in 
providing standardised interpreter training for legal, medical, conference and other 
interpretation services . Moreover, higher educational institutions could also conduct 
scientific research on the issue across the country, provide reliable data and updated 
recommendation to address the problem .
It is also important for Ethiopia to draw a lesson from others such as California 
that considers the use of technology to respond to language barrier in public services . 
It  is thus advisable to invest in the development of advanced software and other 
innovative technologies that could assist language barrier in criminal proceedings 
and other public services .
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S Indigenous Tribes in Brazil and the Increasing 
Attack from Business Interests
DESTINY MUGASHA KEBIRUNGI1 – ALEX FORSTER2 – 
ERIN WATKINSON3
The article offers an overview of the evolution of Brazilian law in relation 
to the living descendants of indigenous people who lived on the territory of 
Brazil before Portuguese colonisation. The  legal developments reflect the 
evolution of the relation between the Brazilian state and the indigenous 
peoples since Brazil gained independence. This short article also offers a look 
at the implementation of relevant international norms on the rights of 
indigenous peoples in the Brazilian context.
Keywords: indigenous people’s rights, Brazil, constitutional law, 
international law
Introduction
The focus of our analysis is on the living descendants of indigenous Brazilians, 
referred to as ‘Indians’ in Brazilian law, from tribes that existed prior to 
Portuguese colonisation in  1500 . In  1500, a broad estimate of the number of 
indigenous Brazilians would be in the order of millions, spread across thousands 
of tribes .4 Of course, it is impossible to give any kind of exact figure, as this 
significantly pre-dates any kind of census information . In contrast, the  900,000 
or so indigenous Brazilians recorded in the  2010 census offers some insight 
into the demographic trends .5 Whilst this figure is significantly more exact, 
it is worth noting that numbers will vary somewhat according to the group 
gathering the data . This article will discuss the relationship of the Brazilian 
state with indigenous groups since independence . It  will analyse the role of 
1 Destiny Mugasha Kebirungi, postgraduate student, Law School, University of Liverpool, 
e-mail: dkmugahsha@gmail .com
2 Alex Forster, postgraduate student, Law School, University of Liverpool
3 Erin Watkinson, postgraduate student, Law School, University of Liverpool
4 RV Santos et al ., ‘The identification of the Indigenous population in Brazil’s official 
statistics, with an emphasis on demographic censuses’, Statistical Journal of the IAOS  35, no 
 1 (2019),  29–46 .
5 Ibid .
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S soft law instruments, ILO Convention No .  1696 and also the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (henceforth: the Declaration) .7 It will also discuss the 
role of customary international law, by analysing the role of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (henceforth: IACtHR), and argue whether the current provisions in 
place are sufficient enough to protect indigenous tribes in Brazil from the increasing 
attack from business interests .
1. The relationship of the Brazilian state with indigenous tribes since 
independence
Indigenous tribes occupy a  number of demarcated territories, amounting to 
 115  million hectares across Brazil .8 Around half of the indigenous population live 
within legal Amazonia, though this represents  98 .5 per cent of the land by area .9 
The  Amazon is well-known as the site of abundant natural resources, including 
lumber and mineral resources . Meanwhile, Brazil’s large and influential beef industry 
has been growing for decades into what is now the single largest global producer, 
driving demand for land .10 These economic interests appear to have converged on the 
Amazon and indigenous lands, leading to anxiety and public campaigns to uphold the 
existing legal protections .11
Taking a  wider view for the time being, it is possible to identify three general 
periods in the government’s approach to tribal issues in Brazil . These could have been 
divided in a number of ways, but here the aim is to give insight into broad trends, 
rather than a comprehensive breakdown of historic government policies . The periods 
identified here are:
 • Independence –  1988 Constitution;
 • 1988 Constitution – the collapse of Dilma Rousseff’s Government;
 • Collapse of Dilma Rousseff’s Government – Present .
Each period has a respective theme . First, the gradual and hard-won battle for legal 
protections for indigenous peoples and associated territories . This was followed 
by a period of rapid development to a minority rights regime that has been widely 
praised as world leading . Finally, the wholesale change in political environment that 
has led to constitutional realignment and pledges to dismantle protections .
6 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous People and Tribal Peoples Convention 
(adopted June  27,  1989, entered into force September  5,  1991) . C169 .
7 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (adopted 
October  2,  2007) . A/RES/61/295 . 
8 Santos et al ., ‘The identification’,  31 .
9 Ibid .
10 GB Martha Jr, E Alves and E Contini, ‘Land-saving approaches and beef production growth in 
Brazil’, Agricultural Systems  110 (2012),  173 .
11 D Phillips, ‘Brazil: Indigenous people rally in capital to protest against Bolsonaro onslaught’, 
The Guardian, April  24,  2019 .
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1.1 From independence to the  1988 Constitution
Brazil gained its independence from Portugal in  1822 . Since the arrival of the colonists, 
the indigenous population had significantly reduced and relocated, with surviving 
tribes forced away from coastal mining areas and seeking refuge from violence deeper 
in the Amazon .12 Independence resulted in little immediate change for these peoples . 
Pedro I stayed on as Emperor of the former colony, whilst most of the other royals 
returned to Portugal .13 Exploitation of the large and mixed population remained 
the bedrock of the Brazilian economy, becoming the last nation in the Americas to 
abolish slavery, almost four centuries after the trans-Atlantic slave trade .14
Even after these changes did take place, violence towards tribes continued well 
into the  20th century . If  they lived on a  territory that were deemed economically 
exploitable, as the Guarani did in the  1940s, they were dislodged and forced into 
smaller settlements .15 Crimes against others were more egregious still, as  87 tribes 
were entirely lost between  1900 and  1957 due to a combination of violence and the 
introduction of unfamiliar diseases .16 In terms of lived experience, the creation of the 
Brazilian state plainly reflected Portuguese colonisation . Indigenous peoples were at 
best considered a nuisance and impediment to economic development, and at worst 
savages that were deemed inferior and worthy of extinction .
However, in response to the violence both perpetrated and effectively sanctioned 
by the state, indigenous rights groups emerged to offer support and lobby for 
protections . Many of these groups were Christian missionaries, aiming to spread 
religious messages amongst Amazonian peoples whilst offering assistance .17 
Assimilationist policy was also the approach taken by governments when measures 
were taken to protect tribes in the  20th century . It was hoped that more developed 
Brazilians would be able to supervise the intellectual and cultural maturation of the 
‘childhood of humanity’ .18 For the majority of this initial period, the few efforts made 
to help indigenous peoples were motivated by the desire to bring an end to their way 
of life and unilaterally integrate them into majority Brazilian society . It was only by the 
 1970s that a wave of activist-scholars set the groundwork for what is now recognised 
as a modern, multiculturalist approach . Efforts to politically organise tribes around 
the premise that theirs was a distinct culture deserving of protection and rights set 
the stage for the next period in Brazil’s relationship with its native peoples .
12 Y Miki, Frontiers of Citizenship: A Black and Indigenous History of Postcolonial Brazil (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,  2018),  2 .
13 Ibid .  4 .
14 Ibid .
15 MC Cunha et al ., ‘Indigenous Peoples boxed in by Brazil’s political crisis’, HAU Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory  7, no  2 (2017),  404 .
16 P Calafate, ‘The Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil: Historical Development and 
Constitutional Acknowledgment’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights  25, no  2 
(2018),  207 .
17 Santos et al ., ‘The identification’,  34 .
18 Ibid .  30 .
DESTINY MUGASHA KEBIRUNGI – ALEX FORSTER – ERIN WATKINSON





S 1.2 From the  1988 Constitution to the collapse of Dilma Rousseff’s government
The latter half of the  1980s marked a  radical change for Brazilian politics and 
society .  1985 saw the fall of the military dictatorship that had led the country for 
the last  20  years, ultimately resulting in the  1988 Constitution .19 Along with the 
strengthening of democratic institutions, it also codified the abandonment of state 
guardianship and assimilationist policies for indigenous tribes, adopting many of the 
policy recommendations of multiculturalist scholars that had come to prominence 
in the previous decade .20 Autonomy was increased, giving tribes far more input on 
the decisions made over their lands – although the ultimate sovereignty still lies with 
the Brazilian state .21 A  specific agency, The  National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), 
was created in order to oversee, centralise and formalise the assistance provided to 
indigenous groups . However, it is notable that much of the practical work continued 
to be conducted by evangelist groups .22 These efforts for indigenous Brazilians and 
a broader focus on individual rights led to the popular nickname ‘Citizen Constitution’, 
receiving praise as the foundations for a  future multiculturalist society that would 
integrate all peoples with respect for the individual cultural differences .23
1.3 From the collapse of Dilma Youseff’s government to the present
The ensuing two decades saw indigenous rights stronger than they had ever been 
in Brazil, albeit still with significant flaws . Through the  1990s it was observed that 
autonomy of political leadership was not a viable option, so tribes had to rely on white 
NGOs to gain access to political and economic channels .24 Effective requirement of 
‘private wardship’ did undermine the strength of the process, despite practical gains .25 
It  is fair to describe this period as one of ‘imperfect yet significant’ progress in the 
codification of indigenous rights, as the majority of territories were demarcated and 
consecutive governments would continue this course of policy .26 This period came 
to an end in  2016 . President Dilma Rousseff was impeached by the Senate on August 
 31, coming on the back of a  corruption scandal that had implicated much of the 
political class, in the context of Brazil’s greatest economic slump in decades .27 Brazil’s 
19 JRS Pinto, ‘The legislative and public policies in Brazil: before and after the  1988 Constitution’, 
Journal of Legislative Studies  22, no  4 (2016),  484 .
20 Santos et al ., ‘The identification’,  31 .
21 Ibid .  32 .
22 Ibid .  34 .
23 Cunha et al ., ‘Indigenous Peoples’,  404 .
24 AR Ramos, ‘The Indigenous Movement in Brazil: A Quarter Century of Ups and Downs’, Cultural 
Survival Quarterly  21, no  2 (1997),  50 .
25 Ibid .  53 .
26 L Valenta, ‘Disconnect: The  1988 Brazilian Constitution, Customary International Law, and 
Indigenous Land Rights in Northern Brazil’, Texas International Law Journal  38, no  3 (2003),  643 .
27 J Watts, ‘Dilma Rousseff impeachment: what you need to know – the Guardian briefing’, 
The Guardian, August  31,  2016 . 
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Senate voting for impeachment brought an end to  13 years of Workers’ Party rule 
and was a major victory for the agribusiness lobby, having previously struggled in 
a system in which the balance of power still significantly favoured the executive over 
the legislature .28 Rousseff was succeeded by her Vice President, Michel Temer, of the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party .
Moving into the final period, the political crisis created the circumstances for the 
attempted dismantlement of the indigenous rights regime . President Temer was also 
implicated in the corruption scandal, meaning that his ability to govern depended 
on the Senate keeping him in place .29 The agribusiness lobby, which had been long-
time opponents of the strong land rights that inhibited the economic development 
of tribal land and those that upheld the system, backed Temer through threats of 
impeachment in return for ‘tougher abortion restrictions and looser gun control’ .30 
With the government now effectively in the hands of this lobby, farmers’ interests 
were advanced at the expense of indigenous groups and a leading member went on to 
state that they would support Temer’s economic plan on the basis that the president 
was a Christian who believes in marriage between a man and a woman .31 Such leverage 
over a president was unprecedented, and it started the erosion of human rights and 
conservation laws in the  28 months he was in power .32
2018 ended with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, a  long-time Congressman with 
strong ties to the agribusiness lobby . His first measure on January  1,  2019 was to begin 
dismantling FUNAI, aiming to take it out of a human rights ministry and place it in 
the Agriculture Ministry that was controlled by farming interests .33 Headed by an 
evangelical pastor whose group has worked in indigenous communities, the decision 
was met with consternation by staff of the agency and has been perceived as a sign 
of the move away from a multiculturalist approach .34 Fears were only compounded 
by Bolsonaro’s previous statements as a senator, when he was quoted as regretting 
‘that the Brazilian cavalry wasn’t as efficient as the Americans, who exterminated 
the Indians .’35 Rhetoric and policy have aligned against indigenous peoples under the 
Bolsonaro government, and it is in this context that violence against these groups has 
increased from loggers, miners and ranchers wishing to exploit demarcated land .36 
28 Ibid .




32 Cunha et al ., ‘Indigenous Peoples’ .
33 D Phillips, ‘»We are fighting«: Brazil’s indigenous groups unite to protect their land’, The Guardian, 
March  4,  2019 . 
34 D Phillips, ‘Bolsonaro to abolish human rights ministry in favour of family values’, The Guardian, 
December  10,  2018 . 
35 F Watson, ‘The uncontacted tribes of Brazil face genocide under Jair Bolsonaro’, The Guardian, 
December  31,  2018 . 
36 S Guajajara, ‘The fight to save the Amazon is urgent as there is no Plan B’ . Down to Earth, August 
 28,  2019 .
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S As fires continue to burn across the Amazon, it appears that the domestic means of 
conservation that are attached to tribal land are no longer effective and being actively 
undermined by the state .
2. The role of the ILO Convention No.  169
In pursuit of universal social justice, the ILO Convention No .169 has been concerned 
with the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples virtually since its interception .37 
Convention No .  169 is based on the obligation to identify and demarcate indigenous 
and tribal peoples’ territories .38 Article  14 .2 of this Convention states: ‘Governments 
shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned 
traditionally occupy and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership 
and possession .’39 The government has the obligation under Article  6 Sections (1) (a) and 
(2) of the Convention, to consult the peoples covered by the Convention through their 
representative institutions .40 Furthermore, according to Article  7 Section (3) of the 
Convention, ‘governments shall ensure that studies are carried out in cooperation with 
the peoples concerned to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact 
on them of planned development activities’ .41 It is important to note that Convention 
No .169 is the only international instrument which specifically provides protection for 
indigenous and tribal peoples .42
Convention No .  169 has been taken into account in the interpretation of 
constitutional norms concerning indigenous tribes in Brazil .43 For instance, the 
Supreme Federal Tribunal explicitly invoked ILO Convention No .  169 when deciding 
cases relating to property rights of the quilombola communities .44 In  these cases, 
 8,713 hectares was cleared for the spaceport in the early  1980s, displacing over 
 1,500 quilombolas without sufficient land to maintain their livelihood . Sliberling notes 
that to date, over  160,000 hectares have now been cleared .45 Similarly, in the Belo 
Monte Dam46 case, a report released by the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations for the ILO found that the Brazilian government 
37 Monitoring Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights through ILO Conventions: A compilation of ILO 
supervisory bodies’ comments  2009–2010, International Labour Organization .  4 . 
38 Ibid . 
39 ILO Convention No .  169 (n  3), Art .  14 .2 . 
40 Ibid . 
41 Ibid . 
42 C Phuong, The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  2005),  49 . 
43 MVC Ormaza, The Requirement of Consultation with Indigenous Peoples in the ILO: Between 
Normative Flexibility and Institutional Rigidity (The Hague: Brill,  2017),  90 . 
44 Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil, Judgement No .  027/2007/JCM/JF/MA (Jurisdicia Federal de  1a 
Instancia) . 
45 SL Silberling, ‘Displacement and quilombos in Alcantara, Brazil: modernity, identity, and place’, 
International Social Science Journal  55, no  175 (2004),  145–156 . 
46 Communicades Indigenos da Bacia do Rio Xingu v Brasil (Belo Monte Dam Case) . Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Report No  381/10 (I-ACHR, April  1,  2011) .
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directly violated the rights of indigenous communities in the Xingu region of the 
Amazon while moving forward with the controversial Belo Monte Dam project .47 
The report shows that by failing to conduct indigenous hearings in villages impacted 
by the Belo Monte Dam prior to approving the project’s construction, Brazil violated 
Convention No .  169 which guarantees indigenous peoples the right to free, prior and 
informed consultation over projects that affect their lands and rights .48 According to 
the ILO document, ‘the Commission notes that, under Article  15 of the Convention, 
the government is obliged to consult indigenous peoples before undertaking or 
permitting any programs for the exploitation of existing resources on their lands,’ 
going on to state that Belo Monte would change the navigability of the Xingu, while 
irrevocably impacting the fauna, flora and climate of the region . These impacts, the 
ILO said, ‘go beyond the flooding of land or displacement of these people .’49
However, there has been little progress in the development of national regulation 
regarding indigenous tribes in Brazil, despite the fact that the Brazilian Congress 
ratified the ILO Convention in  2002 .50 In fact, Tauli-Corpuz observed that until  2016, 
there was no established mechanism for consultation of indigenous tribes in relation 
to legislative measures .51 For instance, although the official recognition of a quilombo 
does not usually lead to effective land legalisation, there is no legislation to regularise 
the rights and territorial space of the quilombolas .52 In  2003, CONAQ, in partnership 
with ACONERUQ and COHRE, established the National Campaign for Land 
Regularisation of Quilombo Territories and almost five years later, the Campaign 
ended without achieving its primary objective .53
We agree with Demissie who argues that one of the reasons as to why Convention 
No .  169 is not fully effective is because countries can sign and ratify international 
conventions but are not obliged to implement or enforce them .54
In conclusion, in regard to what steps the ILO Convention No .  169 can take to 
prevent the threats made by the Bolsonaro government, at the moment nothing 
can be done, since states have the right to sign and ratify international conventions 
but are not obliged to implement or enforce them, unless that is enforced by the 
treaty itself (which does not seem to be the case here) . If that does happen, then an 
alternative legal argument is that the state is still bound by international customary 
law in certain areas and that, from a human rights law perspective, the existence of 
47 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference,  98th Session,  2009 . 674 . 
48 ‘ILO Says Brazil Violated Convention  169 in Belo Monte Case . International Labor Organization 
Confirms Government Violated Indigenous Rights .’ State News Service, March  7,  2012 . 
49 Ibid . 
50 Ormaza, The Requirement,  91 . 
51 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in her Mission to Brazil, para .  63 .
52 F Demissie, African Diaspora in Brazil: History, Culture and Politics (New York: Routledge,  2016), 
 138 .
53 Ibid . 
54 Ibid . 
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S indigenous peoples does not depend on state recognition . This will be discussed in 
the next chapter .
3. The role of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Convention No .169 
are mutually reinforcing instruments providing the framework for the universal 
protection of indigenous and tribal people’s rights . This Declaration came into force 
on December  13,  2007 and  143 countries voted in favour of this, including Brazil . 
In comparison to the Convention No .  169, the UN Declaration demands free prior 
and informed consent and not just consultation .55 It is therefore arguable that since 
Brazil voted in favour, then it is bound under customary law due to its practice in 
favour of, or at least not against the extent of indigenous rights .
4. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The  Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)  is an autonomous judicial 
institution based in the city of San José, Costa Rica . Together with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), it makes up the human rights protection 
system of the Organization of American States (OAS), which serves to uphold and 
promote basic rights and freedoms in the Americas . It is important to note that this 
Court rules on whether a State has violated an individual’s human rights, rather than 
if individuals are guilty of human rights violations .
The ‘Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Commmunity v Nicaragua’56 was a case ruled 
by the Court and similar to the situation in Brazil, in terms of indigenous peoples’ 
rights and increasing attacks from business interests . This case involved the petition 
before the IACHR denouncing ‘the State of Nicaragua for failing to demarcate the 
Awas Tingni Community’s communal land and to take the necessary measures 
to protect the community’s property rights over its ancestral lands and natural 
resources . . . . The  IACHR submitted the case to the IACtHR, who concluded that 
Nicaragua had violated the right to judicial protection and to property’,57 as a result 
of the state’s failure to ‘delimit and demarcate’ the lands of the Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tigni people .58 In addition, the IACtHR ‘decided that the State had to adopt 
the necessary measures to create an effective mechanism for demarcation and titling 
of the indigenous communities’ territory, in accordance with their customary law, 
values’ and customs .59 The Court also ordered the Nicaraguan government ‘to refrain 
55 J Hohmann and M Weller (eds .), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  2018),  262 . 
56 Inter-American Court of Human Rights – The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v . Nicaragua – Judgment of August  31,  2001 . 
57 Caselaw database, ESCR-Net . 
58 Hohmann and Weller, The UN Declaration,  191 . 
59 Caselaw database . 
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from any acts that might affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property 
located in the geographic area where the members of the Awas Tingni community live 
and carry out their activities,’60 until their lands were demarcated and titled .
This case is of major significance, because it is a leading case in the jurisprudence 
of the Court on the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral land61 and is a major 
step in the fight against the historical and ongoing subjugation of indigenous peoples 
in the region .
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have discussed how conflict of interests between the Brazilian 
government and indigenous peoples has been ongoing before the state of Brazil 
was formed in  1822 . Despite the fact that indigenous peoples were driven into the 
Amazon as a place for refuge, they have been offered little respite as the ‘resource 
rich’ rainforest has now become the next subject for increasing business interests 
and economic development . The ensuing  150 years have seen regular and massive 
atrocities committed, either by the state or with its complicit disinterest, as indigenous 
Brazilians faced displacement or slaughter when their land became sought after for 
economic exploitation .
A series of hard-fought and gradual victories through the  20th century, emphasising 
the right of all peoples to live with security for their culture and lifestyle, culminated 
in the  1988 Constitution, which included a  range of provisions to codify these 
protections . Ensuing decades have seen the adoption of a multiculturalist approach by 
the state, with strong rights over land and a dedicated ministry to act in the interests 
of indigenous groups . However, with the collapse of Dilma Rousseff’s government, 
 2016 saw a reversal in this momentum . As the agribusiness lobby became the most 
powerful group in Brazilian politics, protected lands once again became the focus 
for companies’ seeking to utilise the resources . This lobby consolidated its interests 
with the  2018 election of Jair Bolsonaro, who immediately set about dismantling 
and weakening many of the legal measures designed to protect indigenous peoples . 
At present, the position of indigenous peoples in domestic law and politics appears 
to be at its weakest since the  1988 Constitution, leading some to turn to international 
law for help .
Although the ILO Convention No .  169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples are mutually reinforcing instruments providing the framework 
for the universal protection of indigenous peoples and tribal people’s rights, they are 
not legally binding in nature . We have also argued that land and natural resources 
60 Ibid . 
61 Hohmann and Weller, The UN Declaration,  192 . 
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S are crucial for the survival and cultural heritage of indigenous peoples .62 Therefore 
if development projects from business interests emphasised the full, well-informed 
involvement of indigenous peoples, governments would no longer be able to treat 
them or their cultural lands as expendable .63
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S Debating (Post-)Coloniality in Southeast 
Europe: A Minority Oriented Perspective 
in Bulgaria
FRANCESCO TRUPIA1
Despite the fact that its scholarly application has been considered highly 
problematic in the former Eastern Bloc and barely employed due to the 
Marxist background, post-colonialism has been recently introduced by a large 
number of scholars and academics. Yet, theoretical experiments, research, 
and projection of post-colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe have 
come to compose an abundant field of reference. Drawing on this theoretical 
approach, this paper aims to debate the category of post-coloniality in post-
communist Bulgaria in order to better venture the parapet of the post-1989 
transition. Employing a  ‘minority perspective’, which will reveal minority 
positionality in the contemporary Bulgarian cultural and political ground, 
this paper traces potential power actions of (dis)possession of knowledge among 
subaltern groups, which actions continue to negate, disavow, distort, and 
deny access to different forms of minority cultures and life visions represented 
by non-majoritarian segments of the Bulgarian society. In general, this paper 
digs into the historical experience of the ethnic Turks and Muslim minority 
groups in Bulgaria prior to (1) the communist experience, (2) throughout and 
after the collapse of communism, and (3) in the contemporary Republic of 
Bulgaria. In particular, post-coloniality – understood in terms of ‘coloniality 
of being’  –  shall offer a  better and critical angle of investigation over the 
issues of human marginalisation, cultural subordination, and knowledge 
exploitation in Bulgaria and Southeast Europe.
Keywords: post-coloniality, Bulgaria, post-1989, ethnic Turks, Muslim minority
Introduction
In the constant attempt to investigate new intersectional aspects of post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe, the post-colonial transfer2 gained 
1 Francesco Trupia, Postdoctoral Scholar, Centre of Excellence Interacting Minds, Societies and 
Environments (IMSErt), Nicolaus Copernicus University, e-mail: trupia .francesco90@gmail .com
2 Dorota Kołodziejczyk, ‘Post-Colonial Transfer to Central-and-Eastern Europe’, Teksty 
Drugie no  1 (2014) (Special Issue),  124–142 . 
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S popularity among scholars . Whether or not a post-colonial CEE3 has arguably existed, 
or continues perhaps to exist, has become a fascinating interdisciplinary inquiry long 
before  1989 .
However, thirty years after the demise of the formerly so-called Eastern Bloc, 
the post-colonial paradigm remains largely controversial and contested across the 
region . Since the paradigm is deeply rooted in historical experiences of nations of 
the Global South and scholarly dependent largely on Marxist literature,4 the notion 
‘post-colonial’ has been rejected or barely used in the post-communist academia . 
Nonetheless, experiments, research and projection of the post-colonial paradigm 
compose an abundant field of reference despite resonating negatively with the past of 
the region . Recent revival of ethno-national discourse and sense of collective anxiety 
towards the ethnic Other, the field of post-colonial studies and post-structuralism 
have not managed to cohabit with the anti-communist environment, while, conversely, 
civil society actors and resistant movements born before and throughout the post-
communist transition have largely employed it .
From a minority perspective, the post-colonial paradigm seems useful to venture 
the parapet of externally imposed discourse, which continues to dispossess, discard 
and set aside “Other’s knowledge” through a  power-organised, albeit subtle and 
lasting operation of cultural patronisation . In  this, the post-communist and the 
post-colonial trajectories share vacuumed political programmes of inclusion that 
contrive intervals between which divisions and separations remain at the disposal of 
political entrepreneurs and their interests-oriented commitments . Arguably, it would 
seem that post-colonialism and its scholars, such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
Edward Said, and Homi K . Bhabha, among others, have little to offer across the post-
Communist space . Application of the post-colonial paradigm over the successor 
republics of the Soviet Union and formerly satellite region cannot reveal a  ‘Soviet 
colonialisation’, but only a ‘second class empire’ that differs from those resulting from 
Western experiences .5 By the same token, a post-colonial paradigm seems to bring in 
the post-communist CEE more problems than benefits .6 On the contrary, one might 
argue that a post-colonial analysis in CEE missed the chance to include those minority 
resistances that between the ’70s and the ’90s began to mobilise themselves through 
an anti-imperialist discourse .7 Despite the fact that the ‘Soviets’ are not understood 
as ‘colonisers’ in toto, the lingering problems of racism and ideological prison-style 
Nation’s ‘Proletarian superiority’ over all other classes and segments of societies 
were blatantly colonial in its hierarchic methods of doing politics . The  Party-state 
3 From now on, CEE is used to abbreviate ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ .
4 J Peter Braueunlein, ‘Postcolonial Theory’, in Religion and Southeast Asia: An Encyclopaedia of 
Faiths and Cultures, ed . by Jesudas Athyal (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,  2014),  1–8 .
5 Madina Tlostanova, ‘Towards a Decolonization of Thinking and Knowledge: a Few Reflections 
from the World of Imperial Difference’, Decolonial Theory and Practice in Southeast Europe no  3 
(2019) (Special Issue),  1–15 .
6 Kołodziejczyk, ‘Post-Colonial Transfer’,  125–140 .
7 Ibid .  133–134 .
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rhetoric and its overwhelming propaganda machine, which trumpeted the virtues of 
egalitarianism and internationalism, was only later unveiled due to the demise of the 
former Eastern bloc . The latter meant nothing more than the failure of the Russian 
messianism, whose expansionism embodied for decades an imperial fatigue nurtured 
by orthodox outlook of religion, constructed around the dictatorship of the ‘Great 
Proletariat’ and developed by the Russians as the only constitutive ruling ethnos .8
Perhaps not entirely colonised, yet CEE could be understood as a  historically 
semi-colonial region,9 where the relation to power was as ambiguous as the relation 
with the subaltern Other, the foreigner, the alien .10 Granted, both Russian and Western 
cultures were a discursively hegemonic reflection throughout diverse societies, upon 
which stereotypes of inferiority as well as otherness and subalternity were ascribed . 
Beyond a doubt, the aftermath of the communist demise was a clear manifestation of 
a wide range of one’s own subjectivity (that is, collective, national, political) previously 
negated by an imperial discourse . Similarly to post-colonial states in the Global 
South,11 while post-communist successor states emerged with a mass of communities 
historically antagonistic and confrontational toward each other, others were found 
nurturing their new forms of antagonism to construe, or to construct, and nourish by 
a long-term period of colonially ‘divide and imperial’ policies .
The post-1989 transition toward full-fledged democracy opened anew the 
historical experience of cultural patronisation and power-centred oppression of 
non-aligned segments of society against those who had suffered the same period 
of oppression . Through externally imposed ascriptions of exotic downgrading and 
assertion of forms of cultural backwardness, a sharper correlation between the ‘post-
communist’ and ‘post-colonial’ can be conceptualised regarding minority identities 
(that is, hybridity, in-between-ness, and liminality) . If the typically identifiable (post-)
colonial states across the globe adopted majoritarian identities as national identities, 
dismissing Other’s into another (subaltern) position to be accommodated, moderated, 
challenged, or even eliminated because seen and understood as a potential threat,12 the 
same phenomenon happened to the post-Communist states in CEE . In this regard, the 
post-colonial paradigm is neither an identity manifesto, nor a theoretically redefined 
identity policy program, nor the end of the colonial but its troubling continuity13 
that shed new light on imposed discursive hegemonic ascriptions upon those who 
have been deprived to speak as independently, fully recognised subjects . Although 
8 Ostap Kushnir, Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism. The Divergent Break (Lanham: Lexington 
Books,  2018),  25–65 .
9 Braueunlein, ‘Postcolonial Theory’ .
10 Ibid .
11 Joshua Castellino, ‘Identity and Human Rights in a “Populist” Era: Urging Caution and Pragmatism 
in Minority Rights Protection’, in Populism, Memory, and Minority Rights. Central and Eastern 
European Issues in Global Perspective, ed . by Anna-Mária Bíró (Leiden: Brill,  2018),  342–356 .
12 Ibid .  345–346 .
13 Marianne Hirsch, The Postmemory Generation. Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust 
(New York: Columbia University Press,  2012),  5 .
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S navigating within post-communist societies through the prism of post-colonialism 
may be debatable, the latter may nevertheless lead towards a  critical, analytical 
instrument to unravel identity issues digging up mechanisms of subordination that 
certain groups are subject to, navigating, thus revealing, nodal points and structures 
around and in-between which cultural backwardness and political subalternity have 
been imposed on .
Given this token, in this paper I argue that a form of factual colonisation could 
be conceptualised in CEE and, in its turn, in Bulgaria, with reference to post-
1989 majority–minority relations . From a  historical viewpoint, a  factual (post-)
colonial phenomenon14 is nothing but a socio-cultural Bulgarian attitude of cultural 
patronisation which was simply reversed against those who once used it against 
them .15 The paradigm of post-coloniality might raise criticism for not being properly 
employed and examined in a particular field or in those disciplines that secure its 
frontiers and contents . However, as a  scholarly paradigm of discontinuity, post-
colonialism is here used to put into question not only the procedure of its use, but 
also theoretical problems of historical analysis .16 Therefore, this paper aims to shed 
light on Bulgaria’s factual colonialising attitude toward non-Bulgarian segments of 
society, which has been constantly power-organised through mechanisms of cultural 
patronisation against Other’s being . This does not only reveal post-1989 trajectory 
of power where minority groups have fallen from a  voiceless position to being 
considered claimers of frivolous and superfluous demands, but it is traced back to the 
first experiences of liberated Bulgaria from the ‘Turkish yoke’ in  1878 . In few words, 
the paradigmatic vector brings light to the modalities of hegemonic appropriation 
and externally imposed ascription of cultural features that in Bulgaria have been kept 
at work in order to cement power position in certain segments of society rather than 
initiating a mutual process of empowerment upon ‘other’ cultures and groups . What 
is here considered as a much subtler category of thinking, which has been left working 
in the region and shaped a form of (post-)colonialising attitude, came in support of 
ethno-national majoritarian cultural models and subjugated minority cultural claims 
accordingly .
1. A factual colonialisation? A minority perspective in Bulgaria
Unlike other Balkan countries, Bulgaria did not apparently suffer from minority 
issues in the aftermath of communism . Paradoxically, albeit unsurprisingly during 
the communist period, Bulgaria declared to have no minorities in the country .17 Only 
during the period throughout the accession process to the European Union minority 
14 Andrei Terian, ‘Is there an East-Central European Post-Colonialism? Towards a Unified Theory of 
(Inter)Literacy Dependency’, World Literature Studies  3, no  4 (2012),  21–36 .
15 Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy and History (Oxford: Blackwell,  1971),  157 .
16 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Routledge Classics,  2002),  23 .
17 JF Brown, Bulgaria under Communist Rule (London: Pall Mall Press,  1970) .
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issues appeared in the political discourse and the wider public . While attempting to 
guarantee internal stability to democratic institutions along with respect of the rule 
of law, human rights and minority rights,18 Bulgaria had to fully assert the presence 
of non-Bulgarian citizens in its society . This presupposed a quite delicate manoeuvre 
that could not have taken the risk to impinge on post-communist Bulgaria’s historical 
attempts to assert a  ‘Europeanised identity’ which was historically denied to the 
country by the Ottoman Empire and the communist takeover . This newly proposed 
Bulgarian European identity went rapidly under research about political changes 
and relatedly different locations of space rather than consequences of power . From 
a geopolitical viewpoint, the post-1989 period brought Bulgarians to definitely refuse 
a certain Oriental legacy that had prevented Bulgaria to return to Europe much earlier . 
Henceforth, socio-cultural and political microhistories of ethnic minority groups 
become centrally paramount for shedding light on how Bulgarian policies have kept 
ethno-nationalist signs of pathological revenge at work against non-Bulgarians . Along 
the Ottoman/post-Ottoman and communist/post-communist thresholds, it would 
be unwise to understand a  power-centred Bulgarian cultural attitude and political 
approach toward minority groups in terms of factual colonialisation .
Some might here argue that the Bulgarian scenario with regard to the Muslim 
minority – the majority of whom are of Turkish and Roma origin – opens the view 
to a  bigger picture regarding the cultural challenge to include European Muslims 
into a contemporary vision of Europe .19 Nevertheless, in Bulgaria and other Balkan 
countries likewise, the ‘Europeanising project’ has constantly separated the Balkan 
Muslims from the rest of the ethnic majoritarian cultural systems and, at the same 
time, from the rest of the Muslim world .20 On a cultural level, a full recognition of 
European Muslims as autochthonous peoples of Europe evokes in Southeast Europe 
the image of periphery . Particularly in Bulgaria, the political debate simply overlooks 
the presence, or discards the existence, of non-Bulgarian communities living in their 
national territory, namely in their historical land of origin .
Therefore, the proposed post-colonial paradigm might not only be a  vector to 
scholarly investigate Southeast Europe since the victory of the First World War by 
the great powers of the twentieth century exposed and broke down the same region 
along the axially artificial barrier of South–North and West–East Europe .21 It might 
also delineate a  colonisation-like political attitude toward Muslims in Bulgaria as 
18 Spasimir Domaradzki, ‘Opportunistic Legitimisation and de-Europeanisation as a Reverse Effect of 
Europeanisation’, Global Discourse. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs  9, no  1 (2019), 
 223 .
19 Gerald Shenk, ‘What Went Right: Two Best Cases of Islam in Europe – Cordoba, Spain and 
Sarajevo, Bosnia’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe  26, no  4 (2006),  7–20 .
20 Piro Rexhepi, ‘Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the 
Balkans’, in Eastern Europe Unmapped: Beyond Borders and Peripheries, ed . by I Kacandes and Y 
Komska (New York: Berghahn,  2018),  53–78 . 
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S a consequence of the Soviet new-style colonies across the Eastern Bloc that suppressed 
national inspirations,22 and the more locally-nuanced factual colonisation of central 
power toward ethnic minorities within each People’s Republic . Not surprisingly, 
during the event held in Sofia in  1966, the communist Romania’s leader Ceauşescu 
addressed his Bulgarian alter ego Todor Zhivkov by remarking how Balkan people, who 
had historically been quite often the pawns of the imperialist powers in their policy 
of domination and conquest, had a  mutual interest in cooperation . If  the politics-
oriented interests by which that speech was delivered are clear, addressing directly 
Zhivkov and his position on Bulgaria’s favourable relations with USSR, it seemed 
that the idea of Soviet imperialism was haunting across Southeast Europe, notably 
in Yugoslavia with the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) . Both post-communist 
Romania and Bulgaria’s transitions toward fully-fledged democracy occurred with 
an overwhelming ethno-nationalist sentiment and anti-communist rhetoric which 
reinforced a  centralist character of the national state . As  a  matter of fact, societal 
position of national minorities rapidly deteriorated .23
However, Bulgaria’s factual colonisation toward non-Bulgarian people began 
much earlier than the communist takeover . In  fact, the simply reversed historical 
process of cultural colonisation against those who once used the same method 
against Bulgarians, namely the Ottoman Turks, began to take place against the non-
anymore hegemonic Turkish minority even before the liberation of the country in 
 1878 . For instance, in contemporary Southern Bulgaria, formerly Eastern Rumelia, 
ethnic Turks – almost all of whom were Muslims – began to experience the attacks 
of Christian Bulgarians since  1876 . Similarly, in the Northern region, Muslim centres 
and buildings such as the large library of old Turkish books and the mosque in 
Tûrnovo were destroyed in  1877 . In Sofia, the ‘forest of minarets’ was definitely cut 
down in December  1878 . The liberation from the Ottoman rule put some pressure 
on Muslims, who forcedly remained marginalised in rural areas they had historically 
inhabited . Although the Treaty of Berlin (1878) emphasised the rights of property 
to Muslims in Eastern Rumelia, insisting upon freedom of worship for all faiths and 
outlawed discrimination on the basis of religion, Bulgaria respected only on paper 
such indications .24 In fact, a period of disorientation and psychological demoralisation 
among the Turkish population followed several forms of oppression: villages were 
burned and locals driven from their lands . Turks and Pomaks who decided to remain 
in Bulgaria rather than emigrating toward Turkey, kept a traditional lifestyle without 
changing social habits and separating themselves from ethnic Bulgarians who began 
to consider ‘old-fashioned’ their lifestyle . In  addition, subtler forms of oppression 
22 James Mark et al .,  1989. A Global History of Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,  2019),  177 .
23 François Fejtő, A History of the People’s Democracies. Eastern Europe Since Stalin (Middlesex: 
Penguin Books,  1974),  247–414 .
24 R Julian Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2005), 
 112–113 .
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were carried out . For instance, since Turks were accustomed to leave part of their 
land fallow, Bulgarian authorities interpreted such agricultural practice as a ‘Turkish 
forfeit’ of properties, thereby considering their lands terrae nullius to own . Moreover, 
taxes on land hit Muslim landowners25 who were not excluded to serve the Bulgarian 
Army . Although they were not obliged to wear Christian symbols on their uniforms, 
yet they were forced to obey Christian officers, observe Christian festivals and eat 
Christian food . Measured by mother-tongue, the number of ethnic Turks declined 
rapidly,26 and in September  1940 in Southern Dobruja many ‘Ottoman name places’ 
were changed .27
Once the Communist ruling elites cemented their power position, attempts to 
awake a  ‘socialist consciousness’ among the Turkish and Muslim minority28 were 
carried out accordingly . A  kind of Bulgarian psychological revenge against the 
‘Ottoman Turks’ was kept at work, politically veiled by the fact that Islam would 
have played a dangerous role in a communist society due to its cultural and religious 
distinctiveness . Islam was indeed perceived as an obstacle for the progress of the 
communist society despite the fact it was barely performed .29
Throughout the communist experience, Bulgaria continued to face some troubles 
with the same Turkish minority members (750,000, or  10 per cent of the population) 
due to their refusal to be ideologically assimilated . The majority of ethnic Turks were 
not essentially disturbed by the anti-Turkic campaign, such as the one conducted 
by Rabotnichesko Delo, the official voice of the Bulgarian communist regime, which 
constantly targeted Islam and Turkey as perilous entities for the country . However, 
rather than a  religious concern, Islam was externally presented in Bulgaria as 
a  leading-threat instrument against the communist state in order to hide the real 
political purposes and real power concerns .30 The homogenously and geographically 
compact mass-disagreement of the Turkish peasantry against communist institutions 
began to be expressed in forms of resistance against land collectivisation .
Interestingly enough, it must be pointed out that such ‘Turkish peasantry 
resistance’ was kept voiceless and depoliticised by communist Bulgaria’s machinery 
of propaganda as well as by the minority’s attitude to remain immune from it while 
renouncing to understand Turkey as their country of origin . Because of this, ethnic 
Turks and Muslims could not catch the momentum when many oppositionists in the 
 1970s were discovering the importance of political and civic freedoms, beginning to 
constitute the liberal consensus for the post-1989 transition to democracy . In  fact, 
while across the Eastern Bloc anti-party mobilisation was inspired by anti-imperialist 
25 Ibid .  112 .
26 Ibid .  113 .
27 Ibid .  204 .
28 Ina Merdjanova, ‘Uneasy Tolerance: Interreligious Relations in Bulgaria after the Fall of 
Communism’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe  26, no  1 (2006),  1–11 .
29 Crampton, A Concise History,  58 .
30 Fejtő, A History,  295 .
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S solidarities and anti-colonial movements,31 Bulgaria’s Turkish peasantry did not 
manage to defend their socio-economic rights as well as basic civic-political rights . 
Moreover, they missed the chance to employ a vocabulary of anti-imperialist self-
determination that was commonly used by minorities in multi-ethnic States32 and by 
trade unions’ independent resistances such as Solidarność in Poland .
Particularly in socialist countries with substantial Muslim minorities, such as in 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Caucasus, Muslims experienced intermittent persecution 
since  1956 .  In Bulgaria, campaigns of oppression and cultural patronisation were 
carried out without interruptions instead . In   1951,  154,000 ethnic Turks from 
Southern Dobroudja were ‘repatriated’ in Turkey, even though Ankara expressed its 
unwillingness to absorb them by shutting its gates along one of the most debated 
borders of the Eastern Bloc . During communism, fewer than  1 per cent of Muslims 
attended and graduated from Bulgarian universities due to a  large exclusion from 
higher education and lack of promotion of education among them . Although Islam 
was always barely perceptible in the wider public, Muslims were liable to lose their 
jobs .33 The  long-term period of intimidation began to target Pomak communities 
since the  1970s, the majority of whom was subjected to physical and psychological 
terror tactics aimed at forcing them to ‘adopt back’ Bulgarian identity .34 Many refused 
and were therefore imprisoned . The  de-Stalinisation of Eastern Europe and the 
rehabilitation of Stalin’s victims did not have much importance in Bulgaria,35 where 
 1300 citizens,  500 of whom were Pomaks, were tortured and sent to prison on Belene 
Island .36
As the time passed by, at the moment of the upcoming advent of Gorbachev, in the 
highest echelons of the Communist Party, ethnic Turks and other Bulgarian Muslims 
were forced to choose from a list of Christian names37 or Slavic ones that ‘they wished 
to adopt’ . Between  1984 and  1989, the communist regime carried out the largest 
military operation undertaken by the Bulgarian army since the end of the Second 
World War38 and one of the cruellest policies of ‘identity transformation’ of Turks 
in general and Muslims in particular . Under the name of ‘Great Revival’, Bulgarian 
Turks and Muslims were given by force Bulgarian names in order to align them with 
a Slavonic ‘ethnic code’ . Unveiling a never-ended anti-Turkish mentality in Bulgaria, 
those ethnic Turks who postponed changing their names, or openly refused to do 
so, were forced to adopt anyway a different name decided by Bulgarian authorities, 
31 Mark et al .,  1989,  83–84 .
32 Ibid .  174–178 .
33 Crampton, A Concise History,  58 .
34 Ibid .
35 Ibid .
36 Ibid .  59 .
37 Jordan Baev, ‘De-Stalinisation and Political Rehabilitations in Bulgaria’, in De-Stalinising Eastern 
Europe. The Rehabilitation of Stalin’s Victims after  1953, ed . by Kevin McDermott and Matthew 
Stibbe (London: Palgrave Macmillan,  2015),  164 .
38 Crampton, A Concise History,  205 .
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which had the last word on which name was ‘proper’ per each person . Especially 
in  1985, the ‘Great Revival’ provoked yet another mass-scale migration of  350,000 
Bulgarian-Turks (of whom about  100,000 later returned to Bulgaria) in the direction 
of Turkey . Once again, state confiscations of Muslim properties and charitable 
foundations reduced the number of functioning mosques and persecution of Muslim 
leaders .39 Halil Ahmedov Ibishev, a  Turkish figure who left Bulgaria during the 
campaign with Naim Süleymanov, was told to explain to his community that anyone 
who resisted would be ‘killed like a dog’ .40 Although Muslims did not have permission 
to carry weapons in the army,41 thus less likely to be inconspicuously in possess of 
weapons, the communist regime discovered documents about a Cyprus-like Turkish 
action in Southern Bulgaria which was (arguably) about to break up and supported 
by pan-Turkic and pro-Turkey nationalism . To a certain extent, this potential threat 
justified the ‘regenerative process’ that Muslim Turks had gone through, to whom it 
was allowed to return to the bosom of their mother nation .42 In convincing them to 
have had once ‘Bulgarian roots’, thus Bulgarian descendants and family connections 
with Bulgarian ancestors lost in time due to the mass-scale conversation to Islam 
that the Ottoman domination imposed,43 communist Bulgarian authorities managed 
to damage their reputation in the wider Muslim world . What had become a de facto 
dogmatic position for all Bulgarian academia, was the ideological cornerstone of 
the ‘Revival Process’, whose implementation and consequences failed to register in 
scholarship of European public memory after  1989 .44
In the course of the fall of the Communism and the arrival of democracy, common 
hostility and mistrust toward ethno-minority groups did not disappear in Bulgaria . 
While on a  political level the newly established Bulgarian Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF), the main platform of anti-communist organisations and voices, did 
not show much willingness to break convincingly with the nationalist legacy of the 
communist past,45 on a  cultural level Bulgaria had to seriously restore its national 
identity . Throughout, ethnic Turks and Muslims embraced a certain kind of oriental 
legacy46 that in the eyes of Bulgarians meant ‘backwardness’ . In support of a European 
identity, the whole Bulgarian political spectrum was founded on an explicit rejection 
of the country’s errant oriental qualities . The  Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), 
the main heir of the political culture of the previous Communist regime, came to 
39 Merdjanova, ‘Uneasy Tolerance’ .
40 Crampton, A Concise History,  60.
41 Ibid .  58 .
42 Baev, ‘De-Stalinisation’ .
43 Mario Marinov, Religious Communities in Bulgaria (Blagoevgrad: South-West University 
Publishing House,  2017),  74 .
44 Tomasz Kamusella, Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War. The Forgotten  1989 Expulsion of Turks 
from Communist Bulgaria (New York: Routledge,  2019)  24-25,  67 .
45 James Dawson, Cultures of Democracy in Serbia and Bulgaria. How ideas Shape Publics (London: 
Routledge,  2016) .
46 BE De Dominicis, ‘The Bulgarian Ethnic Model: Post-1989 Bulgarian Ethnic Conflict Resolution’, 
Nationalities Papers  39, no  3 (2011),  450 .
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S mobilise Bulgarians against the restoration of cultural rights to the Turkish minority . 
Ivan Kostov, economic expert for the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), similarly 
remarked that ‘[Bulgarians] have to say what we do not want to be, what [they] want 
to leave out of Europe . . . stressing the need »to leave a part of our morality, a part of 
our oriental nature«’ .47
Despite this, ethnic minority groups managed to seek out recognition in  1991 
and secured their political representation by establishing the Turkish-nominated 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which succeeded to uphold basic 
cultural rights for Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks . However, such recognition did not occur 
through a full recognition of ‘ethnic basis’ since the legal statement was adopted in 
accordance with the court decision that denied the MRF to choose its first name, 
namely ‘Movement for Rights and Freedoms of the Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria’ . 
The immediate pressure from the Council of Europe on the Bulgarian Constitutional 
Court allowed MRF to participate in elections to the Constitutional Assembly of June 
 10,  1990, despite the fact that the original name was changed and a historical trajectory 
of suspicion and hostility continued to deter political expression of minority groups 
in Bulgaria . The MFR has never been recognised on ethnic or religious affiliations 
forbidden constitutionally by Article  11 (Paragraph  4) which, along with Article  34, 
obliges all Bulgarian citizens regardless of their ethnicity and religion to learn the 
official language . In other words, the constitutional clause necessitates the MFR to 
refuse any position of an ethnic organisation, and, more broadly, dictates the party to 
accept Bulgaria’s majority rights48 on a cultural and political level .
Immediately after the communist dissolution, newly established Bulgarian 
institutions began to deal with the accession process to the European Union . In the 
eyes of Bulgarians, the opportunity to become an EU member state meant nothing 
but keeping the ‘right track’ against the one that had mistakenly led astray Bulgaria 
under the so-called Turkish yoke49 firstly, and the Moscow-centred communist 
power secondly . Against the pitfall to be associated with backwardness as happens 
for the Balkans,50 in the attempt to secure its accession to EU, Bulgaria ratified the 
Framework for the Protection of National Minorities in  1999 and reintegrated 
a minor component of Turkish-language provision in some of the country’s schools51 
after having been suspended in  1975 . On the other hand, however, the constant and 
never-ending hostility toward Islam in general and Muslims in particular conformed 
beyond any doubt the psychological revenge of the Bulgarian ethnos against historical 
pages of domination and suffering in the ‘Ottoman waiting room’ . Among others, this 
may explain why the post-accession period did not mean only stagnation for Bulgaria 
47 Dawson, Cultures of Democracy,  88 .
48 De Dominicis, ‘The Bulgarian Ethnic Model’,  84 .
49 Crampton, A Concise History,  160 .
50 Snyder and Younger, The Balkans,  1 .
51 De Dominicis, ‘The Bulgarian Ethnic Model’,  88 .
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as EU Member State, but also a noticeable backsliding52 with regard the respect of 
minority rights in the country .
Three decades since the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, Bulgaria’s de facto 
minority party, namely the MRF, represents an ‘enigma-within-an-enigma’ .53 While it 
seems to be culturally paramount for Bulgarian elites to offer an anti-Turkish rhetoric 
in order not to be seen in political cohabitation with the MRF, the latter has taken part 
in majority coalition in the Parliament in the last years, and, together with BSP and 
GERB respectively, it has kept close and unhealthy relations with economic elites .54 
Often, however, the majority of political parties accuse the MRF to stock ethnic 
tensions,55 and the latest decision of the Local Council of Stara Zagora to ‘Bulgarise’ 
place-names with a  clearly Turkish or Arabic origin, confirmed that behind the 
ratification of international conventions, the mentality of most Bulgarians has not 
changed much . There is little doubt, however, that post-Communist Bulgaria’s national 
identity lies in a sort of ideological continuum that the Bulgarian authorities and their 
master narrative have historically held and performed against the heirs of Ottoman 
representatives after  1878 .  Since the liberation of Bulgarian from the so-called 
“Turkish yoke”, a  widespread anti-Turkish sentiment largely marked ideologically 
the country power institutions and Bulgarians . At present, common knowledge and 
values of national identity reflect a constant image of ethnolinguistic-ethnoreligious 
nationalism steeping in the Bulgarian language and Orthodox Christianity . The latter 
is, in the very end, the troubling continuity of a de-facto colonialization that has never 
stopped to function from Communism to the first demonstration for democracy in 
Bulgaria, where those who called for the return of the names of Turks and Muslims, 
were accused of being “traitors” and “enemies of the Bulgarian nation” .56
Conclusion
In the contemporary history of Bulgaria, the study-case of minority groups reveals 
how power-organised methods of factual colonialisation in public policies were 
simply implemented on the ground by looting natural resources and (dis-)possessing 
cultural legacies of certain segments of society . In other words, hierarchic relationships 
between Ottoman Turks and subaltern Bulgarians were reorganised after the  1878 
Bulgarian liberation movement against the subaltern Turks . The latter can be usually 
reserved for discussions in a global history context – namely, colonialism and anti-
52 Domaradzki, ‘Opportunistic Legitimisation’,  230 .
53 Clive Leviev-Sawyer, Bulgaria: Politics and Protests in the  21st Century (Sofia: Riva,  2015) .
54 KH Pedersen and L Johannsen, ‘Democratic Consolidation: A Matter of Shared Values . The Case 
of Bulgaria’, in Twenty Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and 
Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany, ed . by E Bakke and I Peters (Berlin: DWB, 
 2011),  89 .
55 Dawson, Cultures of Democracy,  163 .
56 Kamusella, Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War,  73 .
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S colonialism .57 Relatedly, hierarchic relationships in the liberated Bulgaria and Turkish/
Muslim communities have to be systematically understood through the role of ethno-
nationalist parties58 since minority communities themselves began to be culturally 
targeted and politically discarded in their daring attempts to raise their heads 
against brutal exploitation and enormous poverty .59 In fact, the ‘Great Revival’ was 
only the darkest chapter of a cultural patronisation that Turkish minority members 
began to be affected by much earlier . Either imprisoned or forced to migrate60 or 
accused of stoking enmity toward Bulgarians and Bulgaria’s statehood, all of these 
have historically been nothing else than a  veiled machinery of colonising Other’s 
being, which is nowadays salient in the hostile sentiment against Muslims, Roma and 
Turks,61 upon whom an anti-Islam discourse is continuing to be discursively ascribed 
in order to fuel the wider public and point out the ‘demonic’ essence of such religious 
belief system and peoplehood . In this regard, despite the fact that Bulgaria’s Muslim 
or Turkish communities have never played a critical role throughout the Bulgarian 
society, it seems obvious that the transnational essence of Islam emphasises how 
the issue of Bulgarian Muslims is no longer different from those present in Western 
Europe, which, for a matter of fact, are post-colonial nations . Epistemologically, there 
is no much distinction between how the communist regime presented the Great 
Revival, namely as ‘a completely safe process’ that occurred ‘speedily, spontaneously, 
and calmly’ as result of ‘a historical maturity’,62 and how Boyko Borrisov openly 
declared in  2008 that the same Great Revival ‘had the right aims, but was implemented 
badly’ .63 To a  certain extent, today’s political rhetoric in Bulgaria wins the ground 
under slogans of ‘Roma Crime’ as well as ‘No More Gypsyness’, looking upon the 
Turkish-dominated MFR party as the main agent malignantly devoted to increase 
disloyal attitudes toward Bulgaria .
In Bulgaria, however, a  ‘minority perspective’ sheds light on how violence and 
power-oriented mechanism of cultural patronisation across different locally-nuanced 
areas have been carried out similarly to other (semi-)colonial countries . The  latter 
took place through (a) dispossession of land, which brings, above all, dignity,64 (b) the 
instrumentally created dependence on ethnicist institutions that impose a  socio-
cultural direction in social life, and a  type of (c) oppression that does not clearly 
57 Snyder and Younger, The Balkans,  2 .
58 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans . by Constance Farrington (London: Penguin Books, 
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59 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism. Lessons from Kosovo (London: Pluto Press,  1999), 
 50 .
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Hafez (Istanbul: SETA,  2018),  127 .
62 Janice Broun, Conscience and Captivity. Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington, D .C .: Ethics and 
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go along ethnic lines but functions through a subtler process of control firstly, and 
human marginalisation secondly .
Granted so, the post-colonial paradigm is simply a scholarly attempt to disentangle 
post-socialist trajectory of power that CEE nations are still experiencing while 
barely masking strife for shaping a realm of coexistence . Underneath, the colonially 
imposing identity-manoeuvring and behaviour-forming process upon certain 
segments of peoples65 veil a much subtler category of thinking (people’s mentality) 
that has been left at work in the region . Although ‘communist colonialism’ formally 
ceased to exist in CEE since  1989, hierarchic methods of doing politics have been 
embedded into a certain political thinking and cultural knowing that have historically 
emerged within already-made externally constructed boundaries based on interests 
of hegemons .66 To put it simply, the post-colonial paradigm in CEE in general, and 
Bulgaria in particular, discovers how certain minority groups have gone through 
a process of ‘colonialisation of being’, of their collective identities, on a cultural level . 
It  is not a manifesto-like ‘liberation struggle’ that on a political level was visible in 
Global South . It is, once again, a power-organised machinery of cultural patronisation 
that has come throughout changes of power structures to be simply reversed against 
those who had used it before against the ones who now possess it . Therefore, if applied 
over minority groups, post-colonial paradigm is nothing but a  vector to discover 
a way of thinking shaping a sense of ‘inferiority’ upon a certain segment of the society, 
where, paradoxically, those who are affected by, tend to interiorise such an externally 
imposed mechanism of othering .
To conclude, while a  ‘communist Bulgarian colonialism’ has never existed, the 
post-colonial paradigm shows how certain forms of living and knowing in relation to 
‘ethnic’, ‘gender’, ‘radical’, and, to a certain extent, ‘political’ features of minority groups 
have been colonised . What the ‘former’ Bulgarians as minority suffered from Ottoman 
and Communist rules  –  namely, being colonised by an overwhelming ideology of 
kumshu firstly and socialism secondly, began to be suffered by those minorities in 
the post-Ottoman and post-Communist period . This form of colonisation may be 
understood as a mechanism of politics to discard human conditions of certain non-
aligned groups in society, whose marginalisation and exclusion cannot exclusively 
represent political issues, but, above all, systematical policies that set apart and 
suppress different lifestyles, religious systems, process of knowing and so forth .
65 Ágnes Daróczi, ‘Shouldn’t We Have a History?’ in Populism, Memory, and Minority Rights. Central 
and Eastern European Issues in Global Perspective, ed . by Anna-Mária Bíró (Leiden: Brill,  2018), 
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S Unending Wars: Is Nationalism the Snag?
COLLINS NKAPNWO FORMELLA1
Nationalism has been the major cause of wars since time immemorial 
and the most pronounced of it was World War I. Although the rhetoric of 
nationalism is seemingly less used after the major wars, because it adopted 
a new name, ‘self-determination’ – as enshrined in the UN Charter, Chapter 
I article  1 –, it remains in the background of many political discussions today 
and we continually see a  global rise in collectivism, marked by religious 
fundamentalists of ethnic nationalist ideologies, which have resulted in 
nothing but fierce conflicts in almost every part of the world. Having noticed 
this increasing phenomenon, this paper tries to establish the relationship 
that exists between the world’s agenda to globalise and national interests, 
which have left the world in a rather saddened situation of protracted wars 
between and within states, and its main thesis is that nationalism has played 
and continues to play a major role in the violent conflicts that sparkle around 
the world today, in the guise of ethno-religious conflicts.
Keywords: nationalism, globalisation, ethnicity, war, political instability, 
religion
Introduction
Mankind has behaved more barbaric than any other living thing on earth and 
one would wonder why we just cannot stop fighting each other . Our human 
self has been betrayed on several occasions and the fraternity that binds us 
together as human beings holds no meaning again . This political upheaval 
marks the growing divisiveness in a  world where no one is listening to the 
other . Globalists would rather say the world is becoming more than ever 
united, especially with growing technology . The  two great wars and recent 
ones have presented us with a  rather different view of nationalism, which 
no longer points to the identification of people with a common destiny and 
history, nor the desire for nation states to be independent from others and to 
be driven towards a common end . The First World War would be remembered 
to have erupted due to the desire of Slavic people to establish a unified Greater 
Serbia . This Pan-Slavic nationalism led to the assassination of Archduke Franz 
1 Collins Nkapnwo Formella, PhD candidate, University of Public Service, e-mail: 
formella2014@gmail .com
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S Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June  1914, thus WWI broke out, leaving behind the events 
that happened in former Yugoslavia . Nationalism today presents a  great challenge 
to the global agenda that the world has set out to achieve, depressing all hopes that 
Fukuyama had envisaged in his  1992 book,2 in which he hoped the world after the 
end of the Cold War would spiral into peace as liberal democratic ideals continue to 
spread, marking an end to violent conflicts that characterised the century .
This paper tries to establish the relationship that exists between the world’s 
agenda to globalise and growing scenes of self-determination, which have left the 
world in rather a saddened situation of protracted wars between and within states, 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the connection amid the globalisation scheme 
and increasing instances of self-determination in the world, which on the other hand 
is the sparkle behind the so many protracted conflicts in all corners of the globe, 
a situation described by Mary Kaldor3 as ‘new wars’, wars of identity politics based 
on ethnic, religious or tribal affiliations, with the primary aim to gain control of the 
state by a particular group over the other either locally or internationally . The main 
thesis suggests that nationalism has played and continues to play a major role the 
violent conflicts that characterize our today’s world . The focal point of this paper is 
to highlight the fact that nationalism as in the past, still contributes greatly to the 
violent conflicts we face today . We face so many challenges in these present times and 
these challenges show no trace of lessening its grip on us, yet nationalism has stood 
as a major drawback to mankind’s unified action to such challenges . Recent debates 
on technological disruptions and climate change have proven this thesis even more 
fruitful . Growth in nationalistic feelings in a  globalising world has seen common 
problems even more complicated to be solved in unity and nationalistic winged 
parties around the world have proven to be even more violently opposed to common 
and unified solutions to challenges such as artificial intelligence, bio-engineering and 
climate change .
1. Nationalism and the nation-state
National interests have always been behind every country’s agenda despite involve-
ments in international affairs, and even globally, nation-states often do disagree to 
which approaches are the best to respond to major issues such as climate change 
and terrorism . Virtues of egalitarianism, which are resourceful in the resolution of 
common problems that more often than not transcend borders and that necessitate 
common and united solutions, have been largely impeded, because nations of the 
2 See F Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Perennial,  1992) . Responding to 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent breakdown of the Soviet Union, the book is still 
highly recognised for its efforts, but recent years have seen the erection of more walls and greater 
restrictions around the walls, moving away from the ideology wars of the past to more ancestral 
delineations .
3 M Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, 
no  1 (2013),  2 .
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world remain divided along nationalistic lines, which have become more and more 
pronounced these days . Refugee crisis, climate change, and even disease pandemics 
which increasingly require a concerted effort of all nations of the world, have persisted 
because nations continue to pursue their narrow interest at the expense of collective 
efforts, which always yield better results for all . President Trump’s policy of ‘America 
First’ has been the center of several disputes when settling issues that concern the 
globe . All this is rooted in the belief that what is in the best interest of my country 
should not necessarily be that which is best for yours, so national interests come first . 
This drive for nationalism has propelled every country’s agenda on top of every other’s, 
thus creating situations of conflict that have put globalisation on a sinking hole . Joseph 
E . Stiglitz in his writings talks of the ‘debates on how to restructure the institutions 
running the world… thus globalisation a major concern being’ which must be vigilantly 
controlled .4 To better understand nationalism, it will be wise to know what this rather 
controversial term means .
First, it is the immediate derivative of the term nation, which stands for the 
sentiments of attachment to each other shared by members of a nation possessing 
a  feeling of pride belonging to that . Many reasons contribute to this feeling 
of nationalism, and throughout the eighteenth, the twentieth and the twenty-
first centuries, this desire of members of a  community to govern themselves as 
a  state within the boundaries of  a particular territorial jurisdiction have driven all 
humankind’s activities . This fusion gives birth to the ‘nation state’ and nationalism 
has been the driving force behind nation-states agendas . Care however must be 
given while trying to define nationalism especially when linking it to faithfulness to 
the state and not the nation, because a nation could be a tribal grouping, or other 
subnational groupings clinging on their identity . This is because nationalism may 
adopt several guises out of the original idea of the state itself . This point is important 
because there exist some groups of nations who are propagating their nationalism 
in the hopes of creating a homeland state or, on the other hand, pursuing to fashion 
a nation for a state that is not existing yet, for example, the ‘Biafrans’ in Nigeria, or 
the Palestinians, who have, however, been recognised by a  few established nation-
states, and also the ‘Ambazonians’ in Cameroon . Nationalism may not be a  major 
variable in the realist paradigm, but it remains a powerful weapon in global power 
politics . Not focusing very much on the differences between these two theories, 
converging, however, the attributes of these two isms permits me to discuss these 
two concepts as if they were a single theory, though they are not . Nationalism has 
been known to be the everyday life tool and real-world phenomenon shaping global 
politics between nation-states, but the fact that calculated actions of states end up 
securing their national interests has plagued the world which, though seemingly 
globalising in respect to technology and other aspects, remains highly divided and in 
a state of chaos . García-García investigates the relationship between nationalism and 
4 JE Stiglitz, Making Globalisation Work (New York – London: W .W . Norton & Company,  2006),  3–4 .
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S mass psychological degradation and recounts that earlier studies and researchers had 
linked nationalism to ‘the harmful effects of prejudice, mental narrowness, ignorance, 
the painful and deplorable effects of fanaticism, intolerance and a  strong drive to 
war’ .5 Looking at nationalism from another perspective than the conventional political 
science explanations, García-García brings in the voices of researchers in medicine 
and psychology to expose the ills of nationalism in the post war era .
Nationalists have in recent years been gaining popularity around the world and it 
is no coincidence that it is happening at the same time when natural disasters ranging 
from wild fires and droughts, to flooding and wars have become so unprecedented . 
Responses to these phenomena have yielded rather unspeculated results, making 
nationalists leaders who are ‘us’ focused, while many wish to see leaders with the larger 
thought of the betterment of the globe; their actions have been rather conservative 
and protective, especially when they are members of the safer zones and very hostile 
towards the external world . These nationalistic tendencies have stood as a very strong 
blockade to the realisation of unified global actions towards the resolution of global 
problems, and at worst it is even giving rise to class-based societies .
2. Globalisation, yet a dream
The rhetoric of the ‘new world order’ that marked the end of the Cold War and opened 
the way to globalisation has come with a lot of confusion, raising several questions as 
to the true meaning of globalisation . One would even think it to be a myth at some 
time in life, based on the way the human race behaves, in this age of ever increasing 
interconnectedness, as clearly visible in the cluster of activities in economics, with the 
production chain internationalising, technology going across national boundaries, 
and a large inter-change of ideologies and cultures .
Emphasising the growing geographical extensions between activities people carry 
out between national boundaries, Holm delineates globalisation to be ‘the strengthening 
of political, social, cultural and economic relations across national boundaries’,6 
stressing the importance of conscious and increasing global connectedness . This view, 
on the other hand, can be examined in terms of self-interested goals of states, which 
have seen a  less cooperative, less productive society, defined more in terms of self-
survival, leading to uneven growth and globalisation in a world where a common law 
is drafted in the form of the universal declaration of human rights .
The benefits of globalisation in the world can never be undermined . It has come 
through with many consequences both positive and negative, yet it is still believed to 
be more needed by the world than isolation . Looking at the world today, one would say 
globalisation may have failed to achieve its desired goals, that is, free world, a ‘global 
5 J García-García, ‘After the Great War: Nationalism, Degenerationism and Mass Psychology’, Journal 
of Social and Political Psychology  3, no  1 (2015),  103 .
6 HH Holm, ‘Introduction: What has Changed?’ in Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and 
the End of the Cold War, ed . by HH Holm and G Sørensen (London: Routledge,  1995),  1–7 .
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village’ . Stiglitz7 blames it for poor management . As earlier advanced, power politics 
has been put in front of its goals, and Stiglitz further describes the situation that 
‘the rules of the governing has been largely altered by powerful and technologically 
advanced countries . . . driven by their national interests . . . and they denied creating 
faire rules, even just a set of rules that would promulgate well-being of those in the 
less developed world’ .8 National interests have, however, diverted the true intentions 
of globalisation, which in essence entails the creation and consolidation of a global 
market-place instead of autonomous national economies .
3. The Snag!
With improvements in technology and communication, people have over the years 
migrated and settled in different parts of the world and formed families, thus creating 
a mixture of races, cultures, religions and ethnicities . The need for coexistence had 
brought people of varied origins to live together in various parts of the globe for 
centuries and even millennia through the establishment of a social contract, as Hobbes 
writes .9 He further adds in his understanding of human nature that the human race 
is at some point unavoidably, utterly narcissistic and often derails from the general 
good to pursue only that which they identify to be individually beneficial to them; so 
has been the nature of global politics, as leaders react perfunctorily, being drawn to 
that which they see their immediate interests and behave repugnant to all which is of 
no benefit to their desires, but which could be for others; this leads to the break-down 
of the social contract, according to which man in his rational being had chosen to 
submit to the authority of a sovereign so as to be able to live in a harmonious society . 
The  increase in globalisation has led to a  recent resurge of nationalistic feelings 
across the globe that has driven nationalism again as the major agenda for states-
men . Expectations have failed, promises broken, cooperation and the human ability 
to work with one another – though seemingly increasing – remain pulled-back by 
nationalistic desires and pride of men . Nationalistic feelings have led to the rise of 
left-wing and far-right political parties, increase in secessionist movements, and even 
led to increase in terrorist activities since the September  2011 attacks . One would 
ponder why all this is happening now! Donald Trump, while accepting his nomination 
as the Republican candidate, in his statement stressed his plan to ‘put America First’, 
not the world, proclaiming ‘Americanism, not globalism as their credo’ .10 Since his 
nomination and eventual election as president of the United States, Trump’s policy of 
‘America First’ has created mixed feelings and reactions in the world . Protectionism 
7 Stiglitz, Making Globalisation, 4 .
8 Ibid .
9 See T Hobbes, Leviathan. Longman Library of Primary Sources in Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge,  2016) .
10 Donald Trump’s nomination speech in Cleveland, Ohio,  21 July  2016 .
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S in pursuing American agenda has distorted and created several conflicts within and 
without America and the world at large and nationalism has seemingly become one 
of the main snags of our era, from Trump’s pronouncement to uprisings in Catalan, 
Ireland and even leading to Britain voting to leave the European Union, and many 
others .
Very much akin to the nationalism constants are the myths of capitalism, which 
all base their foundations on stories; they have greatly influenced the way the human 
being behaves . Yuval Noah Harari in his  2014 book elaborates greatly on these myths 
surrounding the human reasoning: what nationalism is currently doing is just like 
what religion before the age of enlightenment and during the jihadist periods did 
to humankind, no good but the unnecessary waste of human lives, for a course of 
which no one has actually proven to have seen the end . Flag bearers of nationalism 
today are bent ready to edify anyone who appears promising enough to bring to light 
their beliefs and the supposed destinies which they hold, while scapegoating11 anyone 
who tries to defy their sense of superiority . According to Van Evera, the genesis of 
many civil wars, have been the result of ‘impartial treatment especially of a minority, 
ethnic or tribal group by the central government, who after years of disgruntledness 
gradually nurture their nationalistic feelings and resolve to violence as the sole means 
of liberating themselves to accomplish their political ambitions’ .12 In the same vein, 
the desire of a  particular group of people with nationalistic feelings for what they 
distinguish to be their ancestral base may tilt such a group towards adopting force as 
the sole means towards attaining their objectives, especially when they have judged 
that they are liable to enough backing from an exterior elite that is ready to sponsor 
their activities . These have been the case with so many post-war conflicts, especially 
in the developing nations of the world . A most recent example has been the conflict 
that broke out in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon in  2016,13 which busted 
out after years of unanswered questions as to the true position of the Anglophone 
identity; it has been on a  table of cards between the dominant Francophone 
government and the international community, notably the United Nations, which has 
ignored addressing the status of the two regions since the plebiscite that ceded the 
two regions as part of a federal Cameroon, and that was later manipulated to form 
a unitary state .
Nationalism is the direct offshoot of the concept of nation, which encompasses 
people with feelings of attachment to each other, with a common sense of pride, belief 
in a  common destiny and desire to stand tall above all others . Since the Peace of 
Westphalia, nationalism took a different form, often manifesting itself as the urge of 
these peoples with a common identity as a nation to rule over and control a particular 
territory which they believe is theirs, and even to a certain extent to occupy more 
through expansion and conquest . The  claim and conquest of the Israelites over 
11 YN Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Random House India,  2014) .
12 S Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on nationalism and war’, International Security 18, no  4 (1994),  8 .
13 Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads, International Crisis Group Report No .  250,  2017 . 
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the territory which they presently occupy just further emphasises the strength of 
nationalism and to which extent it may go to form a state of their own; this culminates 
in the formation of the concept of a ‘nation-state’ due to their believe in a common 
destiny within a particular geographic demarcation . This view of nationalism based 
on nation-states has been the source of several conflicts the world witnesses today, 
because today’s states, being legally geographically bounded, have within themselves 
several groupings of people, who, though bounded under the same legal boundaries, 
are of different origins and as such see themselves as different nations, with different 
historical beliefs . Calling today’s countries nation-states will thus be very much 
misleading, especially if well investigated . A  good example to mention will be the 
Turkish minority in Western Thrace, Greece – as Evelin Verhás noted –, who are of 
Turkish origin and have constantly struggled for rights and recognition in Greece .14 
The  formation of some of today’s nation-states especially African states, were the 
result of the decisions of their former colonial masters, who carved out their territories 
according to their desires; these have remained the boundaries of these states, which 
in themselves are made up of people from several nations . These countries have 
in most cases been at the mercy of civil wars due to political differences between 
the various nations . Nations, as is commonly known, are in the third world known 
as tribes, and tribalism and nepotism has thriven and gained grounds especially in 
the poor state from which they were granted independence . The situation in post-
colonial sub-Saharan Africa, as remarked Franck, shows a trend where people with 
different histories, culture and language desire – for the sake of moving forward to 
nationalism – to create a nation within the territorial boundaries that define them as 
a state, where originally there is no nation-state .15
Looking at Nationalism from this standpoint will present a  rather passionate 
investment in binding together human beings with a  common sense of purpose, 
contained by given territorial boundaries eparating them from others . The fact that 
nationalism is used in a globalising world to achieve some purposes which on the 
other hand hampers the interests of other peoples makes it dangerous, and this is 
a possible cause of some wars we have today . So it may turn to be a curse, especially 
when the end results are cross country wars due to propaganda of the superiority 
of some nations over others instead of viewing nationality as a  shared identity 
within the same territory . Nationalism turned out to have rather confusing political 
consequences, because the more we turn our reflections towards one country, the 
more we ignore issues concerning the planet, as leaders of super powers have denied 
to become denizens of our planet to whom we all belong, but have pushed forward 
their respective country agendas ahead in all international organisations, choosing 
to walk out of anything that does not favour them . Trump’s announcement to walk 
14 E Verhás, ‘The Turkish Minority in Western Thrace: The Long Struggle for Rights and Recognition’, 
Report, Minority Rights Group Europe,  2019 . 3–11 . 
15 TM Franck, ‘Tribe, Nation, World: Self-Identification in the Evolving International System’, Ethics & 
International Affairs 11 (1997),  164 .
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S America out of the Paris Peace Accord came as a result of his desires to maintain the 
American economy on top .16 This nationalistic pronouncement has spurred a lot of 
debates around the globe . The truth remains that nationalism is a fiction, because no 
country or people can prove that they all come from the same bloodline, instead, they 
are just an assembly of people from different parts of the world who come together 
and settle for their mutual benefits is some territorial delimitation .
Scholarly views on nationalism as a major trigger for global conflicts have not been 
unnoticeable . Political advances such as the American invasion of Iraq as a means 
of fostering US national interests subsequent to September  11,  2001 have been 
exemplified by many researchers such as McCartney17 or Warren, Cederman and 
Sornette;18 also, Walt19 proposed that ‘nationalism weakens global cooperation’, and 
according to Schrock-Jacobson, it ‘escalates hostility between nation-states’ .20 Wars of 
interest incited and sponsored by great powers due to their nationalistic interests have 
plagued the Middle East and other parts of the world into conflict and this have had 
severe consequences that stand as a backdrop to globalisation and its quest to unite 
the world . The last two decades have seen the movement of no less than  272 million21 
people, with an increase of  14 million people since  2017 . At least  64 per cent of these 
international migrants tend to move to the most industrialised nations of the world, 
and these increases in migration have led to upsurges of right-wing movements in 
these countries due to the rise of nationalistic feelings there . These have not been 
well received by many groups, and this has brought severe consequences for many of 
these nations such as the increase in terrorist activities . The Charlie Hebdo attacks, 
the bombings in London and many others have all been linked to Islamic uprisings 
and the rapid encroachment of Islam into the European culture . The ‘Islamification’ 
of Europe has created a chain of conflicts and internally broken many countries by 
sparking off new nationalistic sentiments against all followers of Islam in Europe, 
who are usually commonly referred to as ‘uncivilised’ and an ideological enemy, as 
described by Marine Le Pen representing France’s far right political wing, who even 
goes as far as comparing Islamic migrants moving to France to ‘wolves in a henhouse’ .22 
Islamic nations have viewed such allegations not just as mere campaign speeches, but 
as a direct attack of their values; these have led to tensions between these nations and 
extremist Muslims continue to use these exclusions as a basis to launch attacks on 
16 See ‘Our Disgraceful Exit From the Paris Accord’, Opinion by the Editorial Board, The New York 
Times, June  1,  2017 . 
17 P McCartney, ‘American Nationalism and U .S . Foreign Policy from September  11 to the Iraq War’, 
Political Science Quarterly  119, no  3 (2004),  400 .
18 LE Cederman, TC Warren and D Sornette, ‘Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, 
and the Severity of War’, International Organization 65, no  4 (2011),  606 .
19 SM Walt, ‘Nationalism rules’, Foreign Policy, July  15,  2011 . 
20 GU Schrock-Jacobson, Fighting and Dying for One’s Country: Nationalism, International Conflict, 
and Globalization, PhD Dissertation (State College: Pennsylvania,  2010),  25–28 .
21 World Migration Report  2020, IOM .  2 . 
22 C Farand, ‘Marine Le Pen Launches Presidential Campaign hardline speech’, The Independent, 
February  5,  2017 . 
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these nations . Today’s wars have been known to spin mostly around communities and 
how they relate to each other, as explained by Lake and Rothschild; the emergence 
of a power vacuum can quickly start up a violent conflict among communities, due 
to ‘fears of what the future may bring as a result of issues of credibility and security 
dilemma’ .23 Mansfield and Snyder, in theorising nationalism and war, advanced 
that nationalistic revolutions are likely to result in war .24 The more the number of 
individuals holding nationalistic affiliations in a  country, having lost the feeling 
of belonging and seeking to be part of their own state, the more is the likelihood of 
war erupting in such countries, as they would always transmit these feelings down to 
their generations, and these people will build up a violent confrontation whenever 
they feel ready to challenge their oppressors . Africa’s youngest country, South Sudan, 
gained its independence from the Republic of Sudan on July  9,  2011, as a result of 
such pattern of nationalism, which eventually led to violent confrontation, despite the 
independence from the Republic of Sudan; the country has barely known peace as it 
plunged into another civil war just two years after jubilating independence as a nation . 
This broke out as a result of the disgruntledness of Riek Machar (Vice President), his 
Nuer tribesmen and other ethnic groups over their allegedly marginalised position by 
Salva Kiir and his Dinka tribesmen . The Darfur region in Sudan since the mid-2000s 
has not known peace either, due to ethno-religious conflicts, which, like the others 
mentioned in this study, was the first genocide of the  21st century . The Rohingya’s in 
Myanmar saw the dark moon since  2015, and the Central African Republic since  2017 
had its own turn on the blood bath list, with rising tensions between the Christians and 
the Muslims . Similar was the earlier case during the Croatian war of independence, 
which saw the independence of Croatia from the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia on 
June  25,  1991, after years of violent confrontations .
In January  2015, a  Washington Post article by Brian Catlos brought to light 
a different line of thinking regarding the often religiously inclined sectarian conflict 
in the Middle East . It takes a rather different line of reasoning in which nationalism 
predates even the coming of Christianity and Islam and modern Judaism in the region 
to expose the common cultures and practices amongst the people . He links this to the 
European idea of nationalism, which traces nations as with ‘one language, one people, 
and one religion .’25 This ties the explanations of the wars in this region to the same 
pattern that happened in Europe, where peoples with different ethnicity and religion 
were being targeted and eliminated . He concluded insisting that: ‘The collapse of 
religious tolerance and plurality in today’s Middle East is not, then, a manifestation 
of some particularly Islamic barbarism or evidence of a return to the Middle Ages . 
23 DA Lake and D Rothschild, ‘Containing fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict,’ International Security 21, no  2 (1996),  41–42 .
24 E Mansfield and J Snyder, ‘Democratization and the Danger of War’, International Security  20, no  1 
(1995),  19–20 .
25 BA Catlos, ‘Religious nationalism finds a footing in the Middle East’, The Washington Post, January 
 2,  2015 .
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S Nor is it religious in motivation, although it may be in expression . It is a symptom of 
what we call modernization, and its political framework: nationalism .’26 He further 
predicts that the future may even experience worse than what we see today . Although 
we presume nationalism to be loosening its grip on the affairs of the world as a result 
of globalisation and improvement in technology, it is, however, returning and always 
will be part of the world in some way or the other . Now we see it playing a major role 
in ethno-religious conflicts .
It is impossible to separate or disconnect the linkages between war and genocide, 
which have been the child borne out of excessive stiff nationalism witnessed in many 
communities around the world, especially during inter-state wars . Jones even goes 
ahead to describe both as the ‘Siamese twins of history’ .27 Extreme nationalism often 
leads to the outbreak of total war when the tutelage pressures to achieve cultural and 
ethnic homogenisation attain their uttermost level of forbearance .
Nationalism and populism which can be understood as the rebellion of ordinary 
citizens against the political elites, the culture and the business elite are sides of the 
same coin, and this comes as a result of the disintegration of the social contract that 
holds our societies together . The institutions of the state fail to deliver the desires of 
people, history and current events shows that the leaders are prone to always turn to 
populism and nationalism to defend themselves, and this is unhealthy to coexistence . 
The ideas of patriotism and nationalism that continue to gain grounds today in our 
societies are results of the economic models that we have, which, while restricting the 
growth and distribution of people, their free movements across geographic borders, 
is first and foremost bent on increasing the growth of capital, its distribution and 
also transfer, making the relations of globalisation almost entirely fiscal . This has left 
people practically abandoned and disconnected, in a world where the problems are 
transnational, requesting full international cooperation to deal with them . The moral 
purpose of nationalism is increasingly faded with increasing income inequality 
that the world is faced with . We need to understand that the essence of liberalism 
is to encourage and level up people in terms of income and resource distribution, 
but unfortunately this is not what is going on, as failure to deliver has fuelled up the 
populist impulse across the trans-Atlantic world . The end result of these have been 
nothing less but the elections of populist leaders in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Hungary and have increasingly gained grounds in many other 
countries around the globe .
The rhetoric of nationalism as a surge of contemporary and past conflicts remains 
a debate widely followed and it becomes even more ‘difficult to determine whether 
nationalism is actually the cause or just an accompanying factor into the world’s 
unending wars’ as Posen explains .28 The  connectivity between these two variables 
26 Ibid .
27 A Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge,  2010),  48 .
28 BR Posen, ‘Nationalism, the mass army, and military power’, International Security 18, no  2 (1993), 
 122 .
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have, though, received very little attention, as even scholars often neglect nationalism 
as a war causing factor, says Van Evera .29 Global and national leaders have made the 
problem of nationalism more noticeable, the original belief of people being that they 
are under an exclusive or single gigantic identity; having exclusive loyalty to the leaders 
has been slowly wrecked because others want to breakdown this gigantic identity into 
several smaller groups because they do not see it as meeting their needs . The reality 
remains that nationalistic feelings have been hardly unnoticeable in any conflicts the 
world has ever known . The underlying ideal political philosophy around nationalism 
has changed, as it is fractured due to the fact that it neither empowers nor cares much 
about the ordinary person anymore; and diagnosing the recent surges of nationalistic 
feelings from this assertion cannot be misleading . The immediate human reaction has 
retrograded and despite the cooperation in the world, countries, nationals will always 
want to put themselves first due to patriotism .
Conclusion
This piece has provided from a  variety of sources some evidence to identify 
nationalism’s role in the study of International Relations and judged the activities of 
global international institutions . In doing so, it adds to the already available knowledge 
and contributes a little bit to understanding how fluctuations in nationalistic feelings 
across the globe has provoked violent conflicts sparking either from religious, race 
and even during sporting activities, as explored by Bertoli .30 Nationalism remains 
a vital tool for national, social and political development and cohesion, but common 
grounds have often been largely ignored while translating them to global politics, 
thus nationalism can be seen as both a curse and boon, depending on the situations 
to which they are applied, and it is neither a  universal virtue nor some absolute 
wickedness . The outbreak of global pandemics such as the aged long Ebola disease 
and the more recent recurrent corona virus, which have in their respective times 
kept the world as a whole in total panic –because they have no respect for geographic 
or man-made boundaries, nor do they require any visas to get into any country, or 
choose whom to affect –, have simply proven that the real problem of the world is 
the idea of us versus them, in-built in unhealthy nationalism . Countries of the world 
under the guise of nationalism have portrayed the most barbaric behaviour in human 
history and the empathy we face during global pandemics is that the guns become 
silent, as have been the case in the protracted conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya, 
which for years drew the world’s attention with the inability to arrive at a ceasefire 
by all parties involved . With the results of these calamities ranging from natural ones 
such climate change to violent conflicts, which have literally touched every part of 
the world, not really in essence affecting the spear-headers of nationalism, who in 
29 Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses’,  5 .
30 AD Bertoli, ‘Nationalism and Conflict: Lessons from International Sports’, International Studies 
Quarterly 61, no  4 (2017),  835–849 .
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S the more profound understanding are the upper classes of the society, the bourgeois, 
the rich, the world lacks yet in globally concerted efforts at curbing this devastation, 
because of course some groups of people still benefit from the activities causing 
the devastation and again these groups in the worst-case scenario can afford to at 
least protect themselves to some extent in an event of total disaster . Nationalism 
today equates ethno-religiosity and is a maggot that is eating deep into the already 
worsening wound of the ills of human civilisation .
Without equally denying the possibility of correlation of biological warfare 
associated with the outbreak of these global pandemics and wars – as multiple sources 
have claimed already, claiming them to be politically created diseases and wars to 
weaken economies and gain economic pre-eminence above others –,  the reality of 
things on ground remains that their actions are all based around nationalism and 
geared at achieving the good of a particular group or country over the other . From all 
these, nationalism’s role in contemporary and past wars cannot be ignored .
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S The Right to Seek Asylum of ‘Climate Refugees’
VALÉRIA HORVÁTH1
Although the issue of climate change mitigation and adaptation is fortunately 
evermore widely discussed, the problems facing ‘climate refugees’ only appears 
sporadically in the discussions adding to the current confusion. Taking recent 
and forecasted trends into account, the UN declares that states have serious 
moral obligations to provide humanitarian protection to all those displaced. 
The question which the international community and international lawyers 
face is whether states have more than just a  moral obligation to provide 
protection. In this paper I will assess whether or not there are any roots in the 
various sources of international law – such as conventional law, customary 
international law, or the fundamental principles of international law – for 
the legal definition of ‘climate refugees’.
Keywords: climate refugees, climate displacement, migration, climate 
change
As the public and political discourse on climate change gains momentum, and 
slowly but surely creates consensus to act among the members of the international 
community, the issue of ‘climate refugees’ only appears sporadically, causing 
more confusion than resolution .
According to UNHCR and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 
(IDMC), only in  2017, altogether  30 .6  million people were newly displaced 
globally . Interestingly, almost half of these people were displaced due to conflict 
and over half were ‘internally displaced due to natural disasters’ . Overall, 
between  2008–2018 there were around  265 million people ‘displaced due to 
natural disasters’ 2 According to the International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies,3 there are  210 million people ‘affected by natural 
hazards’, and according to the World Bank, considering a global warming of an 
average  2–3 degrees (Celsius), by  2050, there may be as many as  200 million 
people ‘forced to migrate due to environmental causes’ . Consequently, the 
position of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is that by  2050, 
1 Valéria Horváth, Assistant Lecturer, PhD candidate, UPS, Faculty of Public Governance 
and International Studies, Department of International Law, e-mail: hovalesz@gmail .com
2 Global Report on Internal Displacement, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center,  2019 . 
3 World Disaster Report: Focus on Recovery, International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies,  2001 . Available: www .ifrc .org/Global/Publications/disasters/
WDR/21400_WDR2001 .pdf (05 . 05 . 2020 .)
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S the number of ‘climate migrants’ may range from  25 million people to as many as 
 1 billion .
Taking these trends into account, the UN declares that states have serious moral 
obligations to provide humanitarian protection to all those displaced .4 The question 
facing the international community and international legal experts on migration and 
displacement, is whether states have more than just a moral obligation to provide 
protection and whether international law obliges them in any way to provide these 
people with some kind of protection . In  this paper I will assess whether the legal 
definition or a legal definition of “climate refugees” can be derived from the various 
sources of international law – such as conventional law, customary international law, 
or the fundamental principles of international law .
According to the World Bank, the international community lacks the legal 
institutions and processes to address the needs of the affected populations and ‘to cope 
with the resulting migration from the affected areas’ .5 Without an appropriate legal 
definition, the phenomenon to be defined cannot be implanted into an appropriate 
branch of law, which can leave states impotent and unable to act legally . Moreover, an 
inappropriate definition cannot fulfil its purpose and function effectively within a given 
legal framework, leaving vulnerable people without protection . In order to be able to 
come up with a relevant and practically applicable definition, we must assess those 
systems of norms within international law that could potentially accommodate the 
regularisation of ‘climate change induced migration’ or ‘environmental displacement’ .
In this article I aim to present some of the concurrent non-legal definitions for 
‘climate refugees’ in order to assess whether this phenomenon could be regularised 
under international law . When assessing international refugee law, one must start 
by assessing the historical context within which this branch of international law was 
born . This is essential in order for us to understand why displaced persons are under 
– or at least should enjoy – international protection . After this contextual analysis, 
one must establish those fundamental definitions which construct the current 
system of norms and identify points of distinction . Finally, it is into this theoretical 
framework that I will attempt to embed the term “environmentally displaced person” 
and test their compatibility .
1. Fleeing from climate – the right to seek asylum
The term ‘climate refugees’ was first used in  2011, in a report commissioned by the 
U .K . government, which defines them as ‘people who have to leave their habitats, 
immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their 
natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-
4 Global Report on Internal Displacement  2018, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
 2019 . Available: www .internal-displacement .org/global-report/grid2018/ (01 . 07 . 2020 .)
5 Migration and Remittances. Recent Developments and Outlook, World Bank Group, KNOMAD . 
Migration and Development Brief,  26 April  2016, iii . 
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level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity .’6 Although this 
definition seems fairly comprehensible at first, its practical application would prove 
difficult . It is unclear what ‘having to leave’ means, to what extent ‘alterations in their 
natural environment’ are acceptable, and how the adverse effects of climate change 
may be distinguished legally from anthropogenic environmental deterioration .
Within the United Nations and its associated organisations, the term ‘climate 
refugees’ as such has never been used or referred to due to the nature of refugee law – as 
described later . However, in a  1985 United Nations Environment Programme policy 
paper titled Environmental Refugees, the author El-Hinnawi defines ‘environmental 
refugees’ as ‘those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, 
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural 
and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected 
the quality of their life . By »environmental disruption« in this definition any physical, 
chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) is meant 
that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life .’7 This 
very wide definition encompasses both internal and international migration, as 
well as temporary and permanent migration . The  definition, however, focuses on 
forced displacement, and does not address mobility as such . It addresses all types of 
environmental changes, and not only those induced by climate change . The definition 
was vividly criticised because of its large scope: amongst others, Bates notes that this 
definition makes no distinction between refugees who flee volcanic eruptions and 
those who gradually leave their homes as soil quality declines .8
At this point it must be highlighted that ‘climate refugees’ are not the same as 
‘environmental refugees’ . Our climate system is just one of the major components 
of our natural environment,9 therefore the adverse effects of climate change are 
6 Migration and Global Environmental Change, Foresight, Final Project Report . London, 
The Government Office for Science,  2011,  151 . 
7 E El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, Nairobi, United Nations Environment Programme, 
 1985 . ‘Environmental refugees’ have alternative definitions as well, making the whole problem 
of legally defining this phenomenon even more complex . According to Myers: ‘Environmental 
refugees are persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands 
because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, 
soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural disaster such as cyclones, storm 
surges and floods . In face of these environmental threats, people feel they have no alternative 
but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and whether on 
a semi-permanent or permanent basis .’ Betsy Hartmann, ‘Rethinking climate refugees and climate 
conflict: rhetoric, reality and the politics of policy discourse’, Journal of International Development 
 22 (2010),  235 .
8 F Gemenne, ‘Why the numbers don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people 
displaced by environmental changes’, in Migration and Global Environmental Change – Review of 
Drivers of Migration, ed . by R Black, N Arnell and S Dercon . Special issue of Global Environmental 
Change  21, Supplement  1 (2011),  42 .
9 See Encylopedia Britannica: ‘Environment: the complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors 
that act upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately determine its form and 
survival . Some of its major components are the atmosphere, the climate, the soil, the hydrosphere 
and the oceans .’ Available: www .britannica .com/science/environment (29 . 06 . 2020 .)
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S examples of environmental degradation; however, the latter encompasses a  much 
wider variety of biophysical alterations in our natural environment .10 Therefore, the 
distinction between ‘climate refugees’ and ‘environmental refugees’ is intentional, as 
climate refugees are just a sub-group of displaced persons within the broader group 
of environmental refugees . Additionally, according to the Climate And Migration 
Coalition,11 environmental degradation can manifest itself in rapid on-set events such 
as natural disasters (earthquakes, extreme weather events, and so on) and slow on-set 
events that involve a gradual deterioration of the environment (such as salinisation, 
land degradation, and so on) . As part of the broader environmental system, the adverse 
effects of climate change can manifest themselves in rapid on-set events (such as 
forest fires, cyclones, floods) and slow on-set events (such as sea-level rise, droughts, 
melting ice) . It  is essential to make these distinctions, since the occurring event 
will determine the type of ‘displacement’ it causes . The consequences of rapid on-
set events are displacement – internal displacement in particular, since people tend 
to move towards the nearest safe place –, permanent or temporary migration flows 
with a bigger probability of return and participation in rebuilding . Slow on-set events 
result in displacement as well as voluntary migration – as migrants have more time 
to deliberate on where to move –, international migration is characteristic – since the 
displaced have more time to plan –, and their move may be permanent, temporary 
or even circular .
For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term ‘environmental refugees’ in order 
to assess the legal context, as it is a broader definition, including climate refugees, 
and it seems to be easier to manoeuver within the current heated political climate 
surrounding climate change and migration .
International refugee law derives from a range of – universal and regional – treaties, 
rules of customary international law, general principles of law, and national laws and 
standards . Examples are the  1951 (Geneva) Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its  1967 (New York) Protocol, subsequent regional instruments such 
as the  1969 OAU Convention on Refugees, the  1984 Cartagena Declaration, the 
EU Qualification Directive and other relevant instruments of the EU asylum acquis 
communautaire building on universal foundations, as well as the statutes of the 
UNRWA, the UNHCR and IOM, and the  1966 Bangkok Principles .
The Geneva Convention was drawn up after the horrific events of the Second 
World War, with an aim to prevent its repetition by prohibiting the events that led 
to it, namely persecution .12 As  such, a  ‘refugee’ is ‘a person who, owing to a  well-
10 Environmental degradation can be natural or caused by disproportionate human intervention . 
Environmental degradation can be slow and rapid on-set, for instance, salinisation of land or 
the devastation of a natural disaster, such as an earthquake . Within the scope of environmental 
degradation the adverse effects of climate change may also be rapid or slow on-set, for instance, the 
huge devastation of a tidal wave or gradual sea-level rise .
11 See Climate and Migration . Available: http://climatemigration .org .uk/ (07 . 05 . 2020 .)
12 Angela Williams, ‘Turning the tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law’, 
Law & Policy  30, no  4 (2008),  502–529 .
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founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of 
that country, or a  stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former 
habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned before, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, unwilling to return to it’ . Furthermore, analysing the legal text, it must 
be established that the list of definitive elements of a  ‘refugee’ is exhaustive and as 
such – as mentioned above – the most difficult prerequisite to fulfil to be qualified as 
a refugee would be the ‘fear of persecution’ . Since the term ‘persecution’ implies an 
‘element of intent to harm or failure to prevent harm from occurring’,13 we must accept 
that the term refugee is unsuitable for describing those displaced by environmental 
factors – under universal conventional law . Consequently, the authors of the above 
cited policy papers use the term ‘refugees’ casually, since the Geneva Convention 
provides an uncontestable definition .
Looking at the regional contexts, while there is no regional convention on refugees 
in Europe  –  and even the EU applies the same refugee definition as the Geneva 
Convention in its acquis –, the refugee definition in Africa and America is broader 
than the universal definition . According to Article  1 and Paragraph  2 of the African 
Refugee Convention (signed in  1969): ‘The term »refugee« shall also apply to every 
person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge 
in another place outside his country of origin or nationality .’14 Moreover, according to 
the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees: ‘the definition or concept of a refugee to be 
recommended for use in the region is one which, in addition to containing the elements 
of the  1951 Convention and the  1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who 
have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened 
by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of 
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order .’15 
It can easily be argued that an ‘event seriously disturbing public order’ may include 
natural hazards, whether these be rapid or slow on-set, since public order can easily 
be disrupted by environmental disasters and slow-on set biophysical degradation .16 
Although this reasoning has not yet been put forward as legal argument, and has not 
yet provided a legal basis for a case, these documents – at least – provide a model for 
13 F Renaud et al ., ‘Environmental Degradation and Migration’ (Berlin: Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung 
und Entwicklung,  2016) .  2 . 
14 OAU Convention, Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa . UNHCR . 
15 Ibid; R Zetter, Protecting environmentally displaced people. Developing the capacity of legal 
and normative frameworks, Research Report (Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department of 
International Development: University of Oxford,  2011) . 
16 OAU Convention; Zetter, Protecting,  19 .
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S legalising the term ‘environmental refugees’ .17 Meanwhile in Europe, as Zetter pointed 
it out,18 EU member states have implemented the practice of restricting the application 
of the refugee status . Moreover, although the number of irregular migrants entering 
the EU has plummeted since the  2015 Refugee Crisis, the securitisation of migration 
continues .19 This recent trend therefore substantiates that the legal interpretation of 
the definitions of the Geneva Convention will continue to be restrictive in the region .
Nevertheless, it must also be established that just because the members of the 
affected population do not qualify as refugees according to the strict application of 
the definition, and therefore their right to asylum is restricted, this does not mean 
that these people do not enjoy the right to seek asylum, and could enjoy international 
protection – based on customary international law, rather than conventional law .
Some experts suggest that ‘environmental refugees’ should be dealt with within 
the international human rights regime, rather than refugee law, which proves to 
be more strict and less flexible .20 International law as a  whole is based on the so-
called Human Rights Based Approach,21 enshrined in the UN Charter . This means 
that the international human rights regime is a  legal framework that cannot be 
superseded . As stated by the UNHCR, for example, this conventional refugee law is 
complemented by international human rights law, which makes up the international 
refugee protection regime, collectively .22 More specifically, it is evident that a state 
must not only protect its constituents, but also non-citizens, that is, migrants or those 
displaced . First, the UN Charter and the concept of state sovereignty oblige a state to 
refrain from harming the citizens of another state, even if these people are within their 
territory . Secondly, the essence of human rights is that they are inalienable from any 
person, therefore these must be granted and respected by all states regardless of the 
person’s citizenship, or even the lack thereof . Consequently, the international human 
rights regime, as a framework, provides the legal foundations for the protection of 
‘environmental refugees’ and prescribes an international legal obligation on states – at 
least in principle .
At this point, it must also be established that the international human rights regime 
provides for the protection of the human rights of ‘environmental refugees’ but not for 
17 It must be noted that only the OAU Refugee Convention is legally binding upon its member 
states, the Cartagena Declaration is merely a political statement made by the member states of the 
OAS, without any legal obligations . See Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the 
International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama . 
18 R Zetter, ‘More labels, fewer refugees: remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization’, Journal 
of Refugee Studies  20, no  2 (2007),  172–192 .
19 Tamirace Fakhoury, ‘Tangled Connections between Migration and Security in the Wake of the 
Arab Uprisings: A European Perspective’, IAI Working Papers,  16 .06 .2016 . 6 . 
20 Hartmann, ‘Rethinking climate refugees,  238 .
21 TA Aleinikoff, ‘International legal norms on migration: substance without architecture’, in 
International Migration Law, ed . by R Cholewinski, R Perruchoud and E MacDonald (The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press,  2007),  469 .
22 The refugee concept under international law (Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular 
migration), UNHCR Statement, New York,  12–15 March,  2018 . 
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that of their right to seek asylum, in particular . Article  14 of the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights specifically declares that ‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy 
in other countries asylum from persecution’ . Building on this, regional human rights 
conventions and declarations also apply this specification when defining the right 
to seek asylum . Article  12 of the African Human Rights Charter states that: ‘every 
individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other 
countries in accordance with laws of those countries and international conventions .’ 
Article  22 of the American Charter of Human Rights states that: ‘every person has 
the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the 
legislation of the state and international conventions, in the event he is being pursued 
for political offenses or related common crimes .’ Article  28 of the Arab Charter of 
Human Rights proclaims that: ‘Everyone shall have the right to seek political asylum 
in other countries to escape persecution . This right shall not be enjoyed by persons 
facing prosecution for an offense under ordinary criminal law . Political refugees shall 
not be extraditable .’ Article  16 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration states that: 
‘Every person has the right to seek and receive asylum in another State in accordance 
with the laws of such State and applicable international agreements .’ Interestingly, 
neither the European Convention on Human Rights, nor the EU Fundamental 
Rights Charter include particular provisions on the right to seek asylum . This clearly 
demonstrates that when the Geneva Convention was drawn up, it was tailored to the 
specifics of the European context at the time so that there was no further need to 
elaborate on the right to seek asylum in the subsequent regional conventions .
It may thus be concluded that under current international conventions or under 
customary international law, it is impossible to qualify ‘environmental refugees’ as 
‘refugees’ . However, as demonstrated above, this does not mean that the vulnerable 
are left without (international) protection .
Besides the international human rights regime, some experts suggest that the 
UNFCCC23 could accommodate this novel need for a completely new legal instrument 
that addresses climate change induced migration . Such protection of the rights of 
vulnerable people could thus be granted even to certain groups of people – such as 
the populations inhabiting the affected areas  –,  rather than to individual persons 
as per the Geneva Convention .24 Dealing with the issues of ‘climate refugees’ and 
viewing it as a single complex phenomenon, as suggested by migration theories such 
as the migrant trajectory or migrant life-cycle approach,25 may render long-term 
solutions . Assessing human mobility as a  process enables regulations that address 
23 The Cancun Adaptation Framework (adopted at the  2010 UNFCCC Conference in Cancun) ‘calls 
upon states to enhance their action on adaptation by pursuing a range of measures, including to 
enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced 
displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and 
international levels’ .
24 Migration and Global Environmental Change,  151 .
25 Anne-Grethe Nielsen, ‘Cooperation Mechanisms’, in International Migration Law, ed . by R 
Cholewinski, R Perruchoud and E MacDonald (The Hague: TMC Asser Press,  2007),  407 .
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S the double needs of the stakeholders; namely the process of moving away from a place 
and arriving – and integrating – in a new place .26
2. Displacement – the point of intersection of international migration law 
and environmental law
Although at this point in time, it would be an overstatement to call the loose 
bundle of international legal norms related to the status or refugees, migrants 
workers, and displaced persons a  regime of international migration law, according 
to Aleinikoff,27 undoubtedly there is a budding new field of international law in the 
form of international conventions on certain forms of migration (such as the Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the Palermo protocol on trafficking, 
the international Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and their Families), other relevant conventions (such as the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations), regional conventions (such as the right to free movement 
in certain economic areas superseding state borders, as well as regional refugee 
conventions), customary international law (such as the right to leave and return to the 
country of origin in the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and 
fundamental and other principles of international law (such as the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement and the ILO multilateral framework on labour migration) .28 
Additionally, the international community is on the road to a global governance of 
migration via a wide range of cooperative multi-state processes, which I will present 
in more detail and with a focus on the topic of ‘environmental refugees’ .
International cooperation in the field of migration law thus far took various 
forms ranging from dialogue and sharing information, experiences and practices, 
to cooperation in policy development and operational implementation, since the 
management of human mobility is a sovereign right and responsibility of states, and 
consequently, migration policies have traditionally been developed at the national 
level,29 with a  focus on national (state) security, rather than operating within the 
human security paradigm . At this stage of development of international migration 
law, the relevance to ‘environmental refugees’ within these mechanisms is not 
emphasised much – neither in politics, nor in research –, although Fischer describes 
a definitely noticeable spill-over effect, whereby humanitarian activism spilled over 
to other issues such as environmental deterioration30 ever since the international 
community realised that environmental pollution is borderless . Coupled by now 
with the slow acknowledgement of the adverse effects of anthropogenic climate 
26 Zoltán Hautzinger, ‘A magyar idegenjog rendszere és az idegenjogi (szak)igazgatás’, Pro publico 
bono – Magyar Közigazgatás no  2 (2014),  69 .
27 Aleinikoff, ‘International legal norms’,  474 .
28 Ibid .  472–473 . 
29 Nielsen, ‘Cooperation Mechanisms’,  405 .
30 PB Fisher, ‘Climate change and human security in Tuvalu’, Global Change, Peace & Security  23, no  3 
(2011),  295 .
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change, this culminated in the current, mainstream global environmental and climate 
movements . Moreover, with the introduction of the Sustainable Development 
agenda, first proclaimed by the Limits of Growth report commissioned by the Club 
of Rome in  1972, the international community started to pay more attention to the 
social, economic, political and interstate implications environmental deterioration 
may have, which require international cooperation for a resolution .
As mentioned above, although the principal subjects are still sovereign states, 
there has been a noticeable shift in the focus of international legal instruments to 
the human security paradigm away from the traditional state (or national) security 
approach .31 The United Nations Development Program acknowledged, for the first 
time in  1994, that environmental deterioration causes human insecurity which may 
lead to ‘migration’ .32 Contesting – to some extent – the reigning security paradigm, the 
UNDP identified seven categories of threats to human security and proclaimed that 
disruptions in the economic lives of individuals and their families, food insecurity, 
dislocation due to environmental disasters, political conflict  –  related to climate 
change and changes in the natural environment – all contribute to human insecurity 
that drive ‘migration on a mass scale’ .33 Moreover, the World Bank has stated multiple 
times that apart from persecution, armed conflict, generalised violence or human 
rights violations, ‘forced migrants’ are displaced also by natural or environmental 
disasters, human-made chemical or nuclear disasters, and famine . And while forced 
displacement is typically viewed as a humanitarian issue, it also has – among other 
economic, social, political implications –  important environmental impacts on the 
places of origin and destination .34 Finally, the IPCC then went on as far as to report 
that ‘migration and resettlement may be the most threatening short-term effects of 
climate change on human settlements’ .35 To sum up, it is the effects of natural hazards, 
including the adverse impacts of climate change, that may overwhelm the resilience 
or adaptive capacity of an affected community or society, thus leading to a disaster 
that potentially results in ‘displacement’ .36
In  2001, the Swiss government initiated an intergovernmental cooperation 
for managing international migration on a  national, regional and global level . 
The Berne Initiative not only started building regional capacity but also allowed for 
31 Aramide Odutayo, ‘Human security and the international refugee crisis’, Journal of Global Ethics  12 
no  3 (2016),  375 .
32 Human Development Report  1994, UNDP . 
33 With that said, Hammerstad states that although (forced) migration can have serious implications 
on state security, migration has become so ‘over-securitised’ that it procreates novel security 
threats that have not existed before, and undermines the fundamentals of our international regimes 
on migration, such as refugee protection . Odutayo, ‘Human security’,  366 .
34 Migration and Remittances,  15 .
35 Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group II, ed . by 
WJMcG Tegart, GW Sheldon and DC Griffiths (Canberra, Australia: Australian Government 
Publishing Service,  1991),  294 .
36 Agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate 
change, Vol .  1, The Nansen Initiative, 2015, 16 . 
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S the  assessment of the regional migration situation . In the initiative’s final document 
titled International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM), natural hazrads, 
man-made disasters and ecological degradation are identified as causes for ‘population 
displacement’ .37 Without any legal obligations, the participating states agreed on the 
following: Consider ‘the link between natural and man-made disasters, man-made 
catastrophes and ecological degradation on one side and population displacement 
on the other in national migration policies’; promote ‘the need to reduce the causes 
and consequences of natural disasters and environmental degradation’; intensify 
‘international cooperation and efforts among States, international organizations and 
other interested stakeholders to protect and improve the environment’; implement 
‘measures to reduce the incidence and scope of natural disasters and the displacements 
associated with them’; promote ‘activities to avoid serious environmental impacts 
of population displacement, in particular the impacts of prolonged stay’; sensitise 
‘migrants to the importance of environmental preservation’ . The IAMM also stated 
that: ‘Irregular migration results from the voluntary choices of individuals seeking 
better opportunities for themselves and their families as well as compulsion resulting 
from armed conflicts, human rights violations, environmental degradation, or severe 
lack of economic opportunity .’38
The acquis of the IAMM has also been incorporated into the International 
Dialogue on Migration launched by the IOM . The Dialogue has run for about  20 years 
now as an informal, legally non-binding consultational mechanism with a  pre-set 
topic . The IDM has put ‘environmental migration’ on its agenda in  2007, and ‘climate 
change induced migration’ in particular in  2011 .
Meanwhile in  2013, as the result of High-Level Dialogue on International Migration 
and Development, the UN General Assembly issued a declaration39 which stated that 
states should: ‘recognize that international migration is a multidimensional reality of 
major relevance for the development of origin, transit and destination countries, and 
in this regard recognize that international migration is a crosscutting phenomenon 
37 At the same time, the document also establishes that migratory processes also have an impact on 
our natural environment, especially in urban areas .
38 In  2003, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN at the time, initiated a core group – with Brazil, 
Morocco, The Philippines, Sweden and Switzerland – and established the Global Commission 
on International Migration . The mandate of the global commission of  19 independent migration 
experts was to provide recommendations for a comprehensive and coherent, global response 
to international migration . After  18 months of research and reporting building on regionalism 
and multistakeholder approach, the Global Commission submitted its final report to the UN 
General Assembly . Interestingly enough the only mention of the topic discussed in the present 
article was the following . As the report states: ‘The states of the former Soviet Union have 
experienced a particularly complex pattern of human mobility’, where, among other types of 
migration patterns, ‘ecological migrants’ are defined as ‘people who have been forced to move 
by environmental disaster’ . The report also mentions that ‘a growing number of small farmers [in 
developing countries] must also cope with the problem of environmental degradation, as well as the 
appropriation of agricultural land by the state and private enterprise’ . GCIM Report  2005 .
39 Migration, human rights and governance, Handbook for Parliamentarians No .  24 . Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 2015, 189,  191 . 
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that should be addressed in a  coherent, comprehensive and balanced manner, 
integrating development with due regard for social, economic and environmental 
dimensions and respecting human rights’; and ‘recognize the need to consider 
the role that environmental factors may play in migration’ . Following this in  2016, 
 193 states declared at the UN General Assembly that it is absolutely necessary for the 
international community to regulate human mobility globally and comprehensively, 
and so in Annex  2 of the New York Declaration on Migrants and Refugees a new 
intergovernmental consultation process was recommended . The  process ended on 
December  10,  2018, and the UN General Assembly approved the Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration on December  19 . The Global Compact identified 
 23 objectives, two of which specifically deals with the topic of the present paper . These 
are Objective  2:40 minimise the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel 
people to leave their country of origin: Natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate 
change, and environmental degradation; and Objective  5:41 enhance availability and 
flexibility of pathways for regular migration .
In the process described above, climate change, environmental degradation, 
natural disasters are all mentioned to some extent, and usually this is why a specific 
document raises one specific issue but not the other . Nevertheless, there are processes 
40 ‘Strengthen joint analysis and sharing of information to better map, understand, predict and 
address migration movements, such as those that may result from sudden-onset and slow-onset 
natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, environmental degradation, as well as other 
precarious situations, while ensuring effective respect for and protection and fulfilment of the 
human rights of all migrants; Develop adaptation and resilience strategies to sudden-onset and 
slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation, 
such as desertification, land degradation, drought and sea level rise, taking into account the 
potential implications for migration, while recognizing that adaptation in the country of origin 
is a priority; Integrate displacement considerations into disaster preparedness strategies and 
promote cooperation with neighbouring and other relevant countries to prepare for early warning, 
contingency planning, stockpiling, coordination mechanisms, evacuation planning, reception 
and assistance arrangements, and public information; Harmonize and develop approaches and 
mechanisms at the subregional and regional levels to address the vulnerabilities of persons 
affected by sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters, by ensuring that they have access to 
humanitarian assistance that meets their essential needs with full respect for their rights wherever 
they are, and by promoting sustainable outcomes that increase resilience and self-reliance, taking 
into account the capacities of all countries involved; Develop coherent approaches to address 
the challenges of migration movements in the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural 
disasters, including by taking into consideration relevant recommendations from consultative 
processes, such as the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context 
of Disasters and Climate Change, and the Platform on Disaster Displacement .’ Intergovernmental 
Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech, 
Morocco,  10 and  11 December  2018 – Draft outcome document of the Conference . Global 
Compact for Migration .  8 . Available: https://undocs .org/A/CONF .231/3 (30 . 07 . 2020 .)
41 ‘Cooperate to identify, develop and strengthen solutions for migrants compelled to leave their 
countries of origin owing to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and 
environmental degradation, such as desertification, land degradation, drought and sea level rise, 
including by devising planned relocation and visa options, in cases where adaptation in or return to 
their country of origin is not possible’ . Global Compact for Migration,  11 .
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S which focus on the climate change – migration nexus specifically . By now, both the 
UN and the World Bank recognise ‘migration’ as a means of adaptation to climate 
change .42 According to the IPCC, ‘people may decide to migrate in any of the following 
cases:
 • loss of housing (because of river or sea flooding or mudslides);
 • loss of living resources (like water, energy and food supply or employment 
affected by climate change);
 • loss of social and cultural resources (loss of cultural properties, neighbourhood 
or community networks, particularly in the case of a devastating flood) .’43
Climate change could translate into migration of impoverished people from rural to 
urban areas (developing countries), from coastal lowlands (particularly densely inhabited 
delta areas) to inland areas, and possibly across national boundaries . The most vulnerable 
populations are those exposed to natural hazards .44 The  Cancun Climate Change 
Adaptation Framework (within the UNFCCC) identified three forms of movement: 
a) displacement, understood as primarily forced movement of persons; b) migration, 
understood as the primarily voluntary movement of persons; and c) planned relocation, 
understood as planned process of settling persons or groups of persons to a  new 
location .45 Such displacement can occur a) within a country (internal displacement), or 
b) across international borders (cross-border displacement) .46
Building on the Cancun Framework, the Nansen Initiative was launched as a state-
led, bottom-up consultative process intended to identify effective practices and build 
consensus on fundamental principles to address the protection and assistance needs 
of persons displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including climate 
change . The  Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the 
Context of Disasters and Climate Change (the Protection Agenda) consolidated the 
outcomes of a  series of regional intergovernmental consultations and civil society 
meetings .47 The Protection Agenda introduced a new definition . The term ‘disaster 
displacement’ refers to situations where people are forced or obliged to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence as a  result of a disaster or in order to avoid 
the impact of an immediate and foreseeable natural hazard . Disaster displacement 
is a multi-causal phenomenon, where population growth, underdevelopment, weak 
governance, armed conflict, violence, poor urban planning in rapidly expanding cities 
as well as climate change, natural hazards and environmental degradation, all come 
into play . Such displacement results from the fact that affected persons are exposed to 
natural hazards in a situation where they are too vulnerable and lack the resilience to 
42 Kayly Ober, ‘Migration as adaptation – exploring mobility as a coping strategy for climate change’, 
The UK Climate Change and Migration Coalition, 2014, 4 . 
43 Report prepared for IPCC,  5–9 .
44 Report prepared for IPCC,  5–11 .
45 Protection Agenda,  17 .
46 Ibid .
47 Ibid .  15 .
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withstand the impacts of that hazard .48 Most of the disaster displacement takes place 
within the borders of a country, however, some displaced persons do cross borders to 
seek safety, protection and assistance (hence refuge) . The Nansen Initiative identified 
around  50 countries which have received or refrained from returning people in the 
aftermath of disasters, in particular those caused by natural hazards . 49
According to the Protection Agenda, persons who have moved across international 
borders in disaster contexts are protected by human rights law, and where applicable, 
refugee law . However, the Protection Agenda reaffirms that international law does 
not address admission, access to basic services during temporary or permanent 
stay, and conditions for return . Only a few states have national, bilateral or (sub-)
regional agreements that address these issues, the vast majority of countries lack 
any such normative framework50 and states not only act individually – without any 
international coordination in practice  –  but relevant institutions and operational 
responses revealed a  general lack of preparedness leading to ad hoc responses in 
most cases .51 As cited above, the World Bank has stated before that the international 
community still lacks the legal institutions and processes to address the needs of 
the affected populations . Nonetheless, disaster displacement law conceptualises 
a  comprehensive approach to cross-border disaster displacement, which covers 
(a) the protection of cross-border disaster-displaced persons, as well as internally 
displaced persons, (b) measures to manage disaster displacement risks in the country 
of origin, such as preventing displacement, and (c) helping people to stay, or when 
movement is unavoidable, to allow people to move away from the danger from areas 
facing high levels of disaster risk .52
In an attempt to summarise the outcomes and the legal acquis of these 
processes, the IOM distilled two working definitions and referred to these people 
as “environmentally displaced persons” and “environmental migrants” . Building on 
the definition of “internally displaced person” formulated in the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement by the UNHCR and the IDMC, an environmentally 
displaced person is a  person who is displaced within their country of habitual 
residence or who has crossed an international border and for whom environmental 
degradation, deterioration or destruction is a  major cause of their displacement, 
although not necessarily the sole one .53 This term must be distinguished from the 
European Migration Network’s definition of ‘environmentally displaced person’, 
which simply refers to ‘a person subject to  forced migration as a  result of sudden, 
drastic environmental changes’ .54 The other term defined by IOM is ‘environmental 
migrant’ referring to ‘persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons 
48 Ibid .  16 .
49 Ibid .  16 .
50 Ibid .  18 .
51 Ibid .
52 Ibid .  19 .
53 MECLEP Glossary, International Organisation for Migration, 2014, 13 . 
54 Asylum and Migration Glossary  6 .0 . European Migration Network (EMN),  2018 .
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S of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives 
or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, 
either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or 
abroad’ . According to IOM this term is used as a  less controversial alternative to 
‘environmental refugee’ or ‘climate refugee’ that have no legal basis in international 
law, to refer to a category of environmental migrants whose movement is of a clearly 
forced nature .55
It can be established from all of the processes introduced above, that there is no 
single definition or description even for the phenomenon that is currently referred 
to as the issue of climate or environmental refugees . The definitions put forward by 
the UNHCR, IDMC and IOM are just as broad as El-Hinnawi’s definition submitted 
to UNEP back in the  1970s, which may prove to be difficult to apply for states within 
their national immigration policy, but which at least gave the mandate for UNHCR 
and other relevant international organisations to provide protection to people in un-
regularised, vulnerable situations . Moreover, international cooperation will most 
certainly contribute to more effective national policy development, avoiding overlap 
and duplication and facilitating a more efficient use of resources at national, regional 
and international levels .56
3. State practice(s)
International legal developments are necessary but insufficient on their own to 
serve as sources of international law . Cooperation mechanisms, guidelines and 
directives must be backed up by state practice . As mentioned above, state practice 
is ad hoc, inconsistent and totally autonomous . As  it was also pointed out above, 
precisely defined legal definitions are necessary for national immigration and asylum 
authorities to fulfil their (international) legal obligations and provide the protection 
needed .
According to the Protection Agenda, providing protection abroad to cross-
border disaster-displaced person can take two forms: a) states can either admit such 
persons to their territory and allow them to stay at least temporarily, or b) states 
can refrain from returning these foreigners to a disaster affected country who were 
already present in the receiving state when the disaster occurred . Either way, such 
humanitarian protection measures are usually provided temporarily, giving rise to 
the need to find lasting solutions for them .57 In  the event of a devastating disaster 
that induces the cross-border movement of the affected people, the receiving states 
use ad hoc measures, such as humanitarian visas issued to individuals, or temporary 
protection measures applied to a group of people in case of mass migratory flows . 
Recently though, acknowledging that adapting to the adverse of climate change and 
55 MECLEP Glossary,  13 .
56 Nielsen, ‘Cooperation Mechanisms’,  405 .
57 Protection Agenda,  7 .
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their social consequences is inevitable, and needs a more institutionalised form of 
management, New Zealand introduced the so-called Pacific Access Category Resident 
visa in  2018, which is issued to citizens of Tuvalu (75 visas per year), Kiribati (75 visas 
per year), Tonga (250 visas per year), and Fiji (250 visas per year) . In this way, New 
Zealand identified highly vulnerable geographical areas within its vicinity, where 
people will be affected the most and which may serve as countries of origin vis-a-vis 
the state of New Zealand, a country of destination . Not going into any further detail 
on their personal contexts though, perhaps ignoring the emergency of the situation 
for now, the government decided to issue these visas in a lottery system .58 This new 
visa regime is based on the sovereign decision of New Zealand to act and provide 
(national) protection to vulnerable people arriving to their country, regardless of their 
international legal obligations to provide protection .
A more practical point of view on whether or not ‘environmental refugees’, ‘climate 
refugees’, ‘environmentally displaced persons‘ or ‘environmental migrants‘ must be 
provided international protection (complementary protection), is the simple fact 
that these people cannot return home . Complementary protection is a form of legal 
protection accorded to a person who is not entitled to protection under the Geneva 
Convention, but cannot be returned to their country of origin based on expanded non-
refoulement obligations under international human rights law . As has been suggested 
before by both Zetter and Nagy,59 among others, the principle of non-refoulement 
may also apply to these novel categories of displaced persons . Most recently this 
theory has been confirmed by the decision of the UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) pursuant to  the Teitiota v . New Zealand case offers, which recognises 
that climate change impacts affecting migrants in their State of origin can trigger 
obligations of non-refoulement binding on the States they enter,60 not leaving anyone 
in vulnerable position without protection . Considering the trends in international 
law, this case offers a possible solution on how the international community with its 
international legal system is going to address climate change displacement .
Conclusions
The Geneva Convention in its current form is unsuitable to provide international 
protection to ‘climate refugees’ however, there is nothing prohibiting the international 
community from amending the Convention in order to accommodate new historic 
needs, and as I have presented it above, there are model regional initiatives in force 
already which could serve as examples for the international community . In the past 
two decades international environmental law has gained momentum, and especially 
58 See www .immigration .govt .nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/about-visa/pacific-access-
category-resident-visa (31 . 07 . 2018 .)
59 Zetter, Protecting,  20; Boldizsár Nagy, A magyar menekültjog és menekültügy a rendszerváltozástól 
az Európai Unióba lépésig (Budapest: Gondolat,  2012),  59 .
60 UN Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted on Teitiota Communication,  2015 .
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S in the past decade the call for global governance on international migration has also 
strengthened launching numerous international, regional, bilateral intergovernmental 
cooperation mechanisms complemented by consultations with international and 
other relevant civil society organisations . Although for the time being the definitions 
of ‘climate refugees’, ‘environmental refugees’, ‘environmental displacement’, ‘environ-
mental migration’, as well as ‘disaster displacement’ are broad or too vague, are 
applied interchangeably, inconsistently or in consistence with the political agendas 
of the negotiation platforms, there is definite consensus regarding the environmental 
deterioration (and climate change in particular) – migration nexus . And although at 
first international lawyers may urge for a single, uniform definition, since that would 
be the most legally sound response, there are some institutional and international 
legal means of providing protection to vulnerable people, without having to engage in 
uncomfortable political debates .
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Summary
In his report, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Fernand de 
Varennes, provides a  clear working definition of the concept of a  minority 
in order to guide his activities and those of the United Nations. He describes 
a series of initiatives, including three regional forums that complement the 
Forum on Minority Issues. In the thematic section of his report, he sets out 
the often misunderstood language dimension of education for minorities, 
which emanates from the proper understanding and implementation of 
international human rights obligations. He describes the parameters of the 
application of human rights, and in particular the principles of equality 
without discrimination, as of primary importance for the achievement of 
Sustainable Development Goal  4 on quality education for all, including 
linguistic minorities such as users of sign languages.
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1 . The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues was established 
by the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution  2005/79 of  21 April 
 2005 . It was subsequently extended by the Human Rights Council in successive 
resolutions, the most recent being resolution  34/6, which extended the mandate 
under the same terms as provided for in resolution  25/5 .
2 . The Special Rapporteur, Fernand de Varennes, was appointed by the 
Human Rights Council on  26 June  2017 and assumed his functions on  1 August 
 2017 . His term in office may be renewed for one three-year period .
3 . The Special Rapporteur is honoured to be entrusted with the mandate 
and thanks the Human Rights Council for its trust in him . He also wishes to 
thank the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) for its support in the implementation of the mandate .
4 . The present report is the third submitted by the Special Rapporteur to the 
Human Rights Council . Section II provides an overview of the activities of the 
Special Rapporteur in  2019, including an update on the Forum on Minority 
Issues . In section III, the Special Rapporteur reports on education, language 
and the human rights of minorities . In section IV, the significance of raising 
awareness and increasing the visibility of minority issues is highlighted . Section 
V refers to the recommendations and other documentation emanating from 
the Forum on Minority Issues and those of three regional forums, which for the 
first time were organized under the mandate of the Special Rapporteur in order 
to provide more accessible and context-relevant consultations and exchanges 
in different parts of the world . The final section of the report contains the main 
recommendations of the Special Rapporteur .
II. Activities of the Special Rapporteur
5 . The Special Rapporteur wishes to draw the attention of the Human 
Rights Council to the information published on the web page of the Special 
Rapporteur, which provides general information on the activities associated 
with the Special Rapporteur, including communications, press statements, 
public appearances, country visits and thematic reports .1
6 . The second year of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate has been focused 
on raising awareness and increasing the visibility of minority issues, both 
1 www .ohchr .org/EN/Issues/Minorities/SRMinorities/Pages/SRminorityissuesIndex .aspx .
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within United Nations institutions and more generally with other regional and 
international organizations and members of the public, and on exploring new 
approaches in order to improve the accessibility of the Special Rapporteur’s 
activities, such as the Forum on Minority Issues . This has included two main 
initiatives:
(a) Developing, in cooperation with the Tom Lantos Institute and 
numerous regional minority and human rights organizations, a series of three 
regional forums (Africa and the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe) 
on the same theme as that of the  2019 Forum on Minority Issues;
(b) Clarifying, for the purposes of the mandate, a working definition of 
the concept of a minority .
A. Country visits
7 . In pursuance of his mandate to promote the implementation of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and to identify best practices in every 
region, the Special Rapporteur looks forward to continuing a  dialogue with 
Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Paraguay, South Africa, South Sudan, 
the Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu, to whom he has made 
requests to visit .
8 . The Special Rapporteur wishes to thank the States that had accepted visits 
by previous special rapporteurs on minority issues for their cooperation and 
encourages other States, including those to which requests for visits have 
been made, to engage positively with the Special Rapporteur . Country visits 
have helped in addressing fundamental issues pertaining to minorities and 
in creating effective communication channels to bring together the means 
to improve technical cooperation and to respond to the need to capitalize 
on existing and evolving positive practices . In addition to country visits, the 
Special Rapporteur will ensure continuous and consistent exchanges with 
Member States on all matters relevant to his mandate .
9 . In all of his country visits, the Special Rapporteur focuses on the 
importance of addressing discrimination, exclusion and other violations of 
human rights involving particularly vulnerable minorities such as the Roma, 
of doubly or triply marginalized minority women, and issues pertaining to deaf 
and hearing-impaired persons who, as users of sign languages, are members 
of linguistic minorities . During his country visits, the Special Rapporteur 
emphasizes the need to have consultations with members of those and other 
marginalized groups and communities .
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T 10 . The Special Rapporteur undertook an official visit to Spain from  14 to  25 
January  2019 . He also conducted a visit to Kyrgyzstan from  6 to  17 December 
 2019, and the report will be presented to the Human Rights Council in March 
 2021 .
B. Communications
11 . The Special Rapporteur sent letters of allegation and urgent action letters 
to the Member States concerned based on information received from diverse 
sources about human rights violations perpetrated against national, ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities . Those communications and the responses 
thereto are publicly available .2
12 . A total of  52 communications have been sent to Governments since 
January  2019 .  All of those were sent jointly with other special procedure 
mandate holders . Of those,  13 were urgent appeals,  32 were letters of allegation, 
and  7 were other letters expressing legislation and policy concerns .
13 . The largest number of communications were sent to States in Europe and 
Central Asia (17), followed by the Asia and the Pacific (16), the Middle East and 
North Africa (14) and sub-Saharan Africa (3) . Two communications were sent 
to States in the Americas region .
C. Conferences and awareness-raising activities
14 . Raising awareness and increasing the visibility of the human rights of 
minorities has been repeatedly highlighted as an important dimension of the 
Special Rapporteur’s mandate since his election by the Human Rights Council 
in June  2017 .  This has, among other things, taken the form of frequently 
speaking and contributing to numerous conferences, seminars and meetings 
internationally, regionally and nationally, throughout the world . He has in 
particular, whenever the opportunity has presented itself, continuously referred 
to the minority issues that have been identified as the thematic priorities of his 
mandate, such as statelessness, education and the language of minorities, hate 
speech and social media, and the prevention of ethnic conflict . Cross-cutting 
issues have also frequently been highlighted, including the double or even 
triple marginalization of minority women, and particularly vulnerable groups 
such as the Roma and the Dalit . The  Special Rapporteur has additionally 
emphasized on many occasions in his activities the status of users of sign 
languages as members of a linguistic minority . The present report contains the 
2 See www .ohchr .org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/CommunicationsreportsSP .aspx .
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main activities from July to December  2019 . The activities prior to this period 
are identified in his  2019 annual report to the General Assembly (A/74/160) .
15 . On  23 July  2019, the Special Rapporteur was the keynote presenter at 
the opening of the  18th World Congress of the World Federation of the Deaf, 
held in Paris . The  overarching theme of the Congress was sign language 
rights for all, and in his presentation at the opening session, before more than 
 2,000 participants from  137 countries, the Special Rapporteur referred to his 
confirmation at the Forum on Minority Issues, held in Geneva in December 
 2017, that users of sign languages were members of linguistic minorities 
because sign languages were fully fledged languages .
16 . On  1 August  2019 in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, at the  9th National 
Conference on Non-discrimination, with the theme of achieving unity in a plural 
society, the Special Rapporteur gave the keynote address, entitled “Minorities 
and non-discrimination in international human rights law: unity, respect and 
inclusion” . His address described, among other things, his mandate and raised 
a number of topical human rights concerns involving minorities, including the 
potential for millions of members of religious minorities to become stateless in 
Assam, India . The previous day, on  31 July, the Special Rapporteur visited the 
offices of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) and had 
an exchange with a number of commissioners on his role and mandate and on 
the significance of minority rights and issues in Malaysia . He also held courtesy 
meetings on the same day with high ranking Malaysian officials, including the 
Minister for National Unity and Social Well-being, Y .B . Waytha Moorthy, and 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs .
17 . On  2 August  2019, the Special Rapporteur held a seminar entitled “United 
Nations special procedures and the role of the United Nations in the protection 
of human rights” at the University of Malaysia Sabah in Kota Kinabalu .
18 . On  20 and  21 September  2019, the Special Rapporteur was a speaker at the 
Asia-Pacific Regional Forum on Education, Language and the Human Rights 
of Minorities, which was held at Mahidol University in Bangkok . There were 
some  70 registered participants, including representatives from eight States, 
who met to develop a recommendation aimed at reflecting the conditions and 
challenges relating to the teaching of and education in minority languages .
19 . On  30 September  2019, the Special Rapporteur gave the opening 
statement at the round table on the International Year of Indigenous Languages, 
entitled “Writing the future in indigenous languages”, held at the  85th PEN 
International Congress in Manila . The annual congress, whose theme for  2019 
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T was “Speaking in tongues: literary freedom and indigenous languages”, brought 
together some  250 writers, essayists, playwrights and poets from around the 
world . In addition, on  1 October  2019, the Special Rapporteur participated in 
a panel discussion on the human rights of minorities in South-East Asia .
20 . On  7 October  2019, the Special Rapporteur was the keynote speaker at 
the  26th Annual International Law and Religion Symposium, convened by the 
International Center for Law and Religion Studies at Brigham Young University 
in Provo, Utah, United States . The theme was “Human dignity and freedom 
of religion or belief: preventing and addressing persecution”, and the Special 
Rapporteur spoke on the challenge of confronting hate speech worldwide, 
particularly in social media, which appears to increasingly target religious 
and other minorities . He also emphasized the importance of strengthening 
international human rights mechanisms .
21 . On  25 October  2019, the Special Rapporteur gave the keynote address, 
on the United Nations main principles and actions on language rights, at 
the European Forum on Language Rights, organized by the Conseil régional 
de Bretagne, the European Language Equality Network and Kevre Breizh . 
The next day he spoke on the strategic use of United Nations and other human 
rights mechanisms to protect and implement the rights of minorities during 
the annual European Language Equality Network General Assembly . Both 
events were held in Rennes, France .
22 . On  28 and  29 October  2019, the Special Rapporteur participated in the 
Africa-Middle East Regional Forum on Education, Language and the Human 
Rights of Minorities, held in Tunis . Some  50 participants met to develop 
recommendations aimed at reflecting the regional conditions and challenges 
relating to the teaching of and education in minority languages in Africa and 
the Middle East .
23 . On  4 November  2019, the Special Rapporteur made an opening statement 
at the  19th Informal Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Seminar on Human 
Rights: Human Rights Education and Training, held in Tromsø, Norway . He 
highlighted the need to give minority issues greater visibility by international 
organizations and in human rights discourse .
24 . On  6 November  2019, the Special Rapporteur gave a  presentation 
entitled “Hate speech and incitement to hatred against minorities: how can 
the challenges be met?” and discussed potential collaboration with staff and 
researchers at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies, 
University of Oslo .
Education, language and the human rights of minorities
ACTA HUMANA • 1 (2021) 143
25 . On  11 November  2019, the Special Rapporteur participated in an 
academic workshop on confronting inequality and social exclusion in Hong 
Kong, China, organized by the Justice Centre Hong Kong and the Department 
of Asian and Policy Studies at the Education University of Hong Kong, China .
26 . On  14 November  2019, the Special Rapporteur gave the closing remarks at 
the high-level conference of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities to commemorate 
the  20th anniversary of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life . The  conference, entitled 
“From Lund to Ljubljana: promoting the participation of national minorities 
as a pathway to the integration of diverse societies”, was held in Lund, Sweden .
27 . On  18 and  19 November  2019, the Special Rapporteur participated in the 
United for Intercultural Action conference UNITED #WithoutHate: Building 
Partnerships towards a Hate-free Society, held in Poprad, Slovakia . During the 
initial panel discussion of the conference, he addressed the theme “Protecting 
minorities, resisting hate”, highlighting how a  human rights approach was 
essential to tackle the upsurge of hate speech and hate crimes, which mainly 
targeted minorities around the world .
28 . On  4 December  2019 in Paris, the Special Rapporteur addressed the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Equality 
and Non-Discrimination hearing on preserving Europe’s linguistic, ethnic, 
cultural and national diversity . In his presentation, he discussed the differences 
between international norms protecting minorities and the experiences of 
persons belonging to minorities in Europe .
29 . Between  6 and  17 December  2019, the Special Rapporteur was on 
a  country visit to assess the situation of minorities and the protection and 
promotion of their human rights in Kyrgyzstan .
30 . On  18 and  19 December  2019, the Special Rapporteur participated in an 
expert workshop on a human rights training toolkit for faith actors, held in 
Collonges-sous-Salève, France . The  workshop was organized by OHCHR to 
strengthen the implementation of minority rights and the freedom of religion 
or belief and to prevent violent extremism by designing a human rights training 
toolkit for faith actors .
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T III. Education, language and the human rights of minorities
A. Introduction
31 . Language is undeniably central to the identity of linguistic minorities . 
Language also refers to all of the world’s  6,000 or so recognized languages, 
including sign languages . Language issues are at times among the main 
grievances that may contribute to toxic environments of exclusion and claims 
of discrimination in education that can lead to tensions and even conflicts 
between minorities and authorities, as shown unfortunately in different parts 
of the world .
32 . The centrality of language for individuals and communities alike is 
acknowledged in article  1 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which solemnly 
affirms in paragraph  1 that “States shall protect the existence and the . . . linguistic 
identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage 
conditions for the promotion of that identity”, adding in the next paragraph 
that they “shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve 
those ends” . One could therefore expect that this would entail significant 
measures for the use of minority languages in education, since, to state the 
obvious, as does a quote attributed to French historian Camille Jullian, “une 
langue qu’on n’enseigne pas est une langue qu’on tue” (“you kill a language if 
you do not teach it”) .
33 . The central importance of a  minority’s language in education was 
furthermore left in no doubt both in the large number of responses from various 
States and other interested parties to the questionnaire that was issued with 
the objective of collecting information from the contributors involved in the 
topic of the present report,3 as well as the almost  1,000 participants – including 
States and international and regional organizations – that provided information 
and insights during the three regional forums conducted in  2019 on education, 
language and the human rights of minorities, and during the Forum on Minority 
Issues held in Geneva in November  2019 . The point cannot be understated: 
language is perhaps the central defining characteristic of humanity . “Language 
is the key to inclusion . Language is at the centre of human activity, self-
expression and identity . Recognizing the primary importance that people place 
on their own language fosters the kind of true participation in development 
that achieves lasting results .”4
3 See annex .
4 UNESCO Bangkok, Why Language Matters for the Millennium Development Goals (UNESCO, 
 2012), p .  1 .
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B. The growing visibility of language in education as a human rights issue
34 . After  1945, with the establishment of the United Nations, the emphasis 
was on the universal protection of individual rights and freedoms instead of 
what has at times been perceived as the more “collective” minority approach 
under the League of Nations . This, however, is not quite the full picture: 
some peace treaties concluded immediately following the Second World War 
included general human rights and some specific minority provisions . These 
treaties, just as in the case of their predecessors before the Second World 
War, contained mainly human rights standards and a few specific provisions 
focusing on “resident” minorities . Thus the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 
 1947 contained, in addition to the usual general provisions on human rights, 
provisions guaranteeing citizenship to all those normally residing in Italy who 
did not acquire nationality in a neighbouring State (and in the main targeting 
the largest affected minorities) and, in annex IV, specific sections on minorities, 
in relation to the German-speaking minority, particularly in education:
1 . German-speaking inhabitants of the Bolzano Province and of the 
neighbouring bilingual townships of the Trento Province will be assured 
complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants, within 
the framework of special provisions to safeguard the ethnical character 
and the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking 
element .
In accordance with legislation already enacted or awaiting enactment 
the said German-speaking citizens will be granted in particular:
(a) elementary and secondary teaching in the mother tongue .
35 . Article  6 of the State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent 
and Democratic Austria (Austrian State Treaty) of  1955 includes, among 
other bilateral or peace treaties of this period and like most treaties relating to 
the rights of minorities, known as “minority treaties” of the interwar period, 
a  provision guaranteeing, without discrimination, “all measures necessary 
to secure to all persons under Austrian jurisdiction, without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of 
the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and 
publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting” . 
More to the point, article  7 grants to Austrian nationals who are members 
of the Croat and Slovene minorities in the parts of the country where they 
are concentrated (Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria) “the same rights on 
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T equal terms” as other citizens in their own language, as well as in relation to 
education:
2 . They are entitled to elementary instruction in the Slovene or Croat 
language and to a proportional number of their own secondary schools; 
in this connection school curricula shall be reviewed and a section of 
the Inspectorate of Education shall be established for Slovene and Croat 
schools .
36 . The Treaty of Peace with Italy and the Austrian State Treaty were directly 
inspired by the human rights approach reflected in the content of the minority 
treaties of the interwar period, in that their content appears to be anchored 
to the principle of equality and they recognize general human rights for all . 
Furthermore, the minority language rights they refer to are, in relation to 
education and access to services in minority languages, dependent on what 
is reasonable and justified, that is, in those parts of the country where most 
speakers of these languages reside and according to a proportional approach .
37 . By the end of the  1950s, international law had gradually shifted towards 
a  more straightforward acknowledgement of the rights of minorities or 
language rights, starting with the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention,  1957 (No .  107), which, although 
avoiding the word “minority”,5 provided that indigenous populations had the 
right to be taught in their mother tongue or, where this was not practicable, 
in the language most commonly used by the group to which they belonged . 
A  few years later, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Convention against Discrimination in Education 
of  1960 prohibited, under article  1, “any distinction, exclusion or preference” 
based upon language or other grounds, which “has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education”, while making clear, 
in article  2 (b) that it did not constitute discrimination to establish or maintain, 
for linguistic reasons, separate educational systems or institutions .
38 . For the global human rights system, this UNESCO treaty is significant . 
Article  5 (1) (c) indicates that “it is essential to recognize the right of members 
of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including 
the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each 
State, the use or the teaching of their own language”, provided that “this right 
is not exercised in a manner which prevents the members of these minorities 
5 While indigenous peoples are a distinct legal category, factually indigenous peoples may 
simultaneously constitute a minority in countries where they live . Being a minority does not 
extinguish or diminish any indigenous rights .
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from understanding the culture and language of the community as a whole and 
from participating in its activities, or which prejudices national sovereignty” .
39 . In the  1960s, language continued to be referred to as impermissible 
grounds of discrimination in the two United Nations covenants on human 
rights, namely the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both 
adopted on  16 December  1966 . The latter treaty provided a specific reference to 
some rights for linguistic minorities: “In those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language .”
40 . A few decades later, only one other United Nations treaty, namely the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted on  20 November  1966, would 
entrench an almost identical provision . Article  30 of the Convention states: 
“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons 
of indigenous origin exist, a  child belonging to such a  minority or who is 
indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of 
his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or 
her own religion, or to use his or her own language .” By the  1990s, however, any 
remaining reluctance to address and acknowledge minority language rights 
was gone, with other regional or international treaties incorporating language 
or minority rights standards, such as the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention,  1989 (No .  169), the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities . It  is also at the end of the twentieth century that non-binding 
documents dealing with minority language rights or minority rights generally 
proliferated, including in education, with the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action and the Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, among others, as well as guidance 
documents such as the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights 
of National Minorities, the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education 
Rights of National Minorities, the Lund Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life and Language Rights of 
Linguistic Minorities: A  Practical Guide for Implementation, a  handbook 
developed by the Special Rapporteur on minority issues .
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T C. Interpretation by United Nations treaty bodies
41 . Contemporary jurisprudence has also neither been consistent nor 
comprehensive: different treaties are still relatively “young” and there have 
been different approaches and views in the interpretation of the extent to 
which there is a  “right” to use the language of minorities in education, and 
what this use implies . For example, in one of the most important cases in this 
area, the European Court of Human Rights clearly stated that there was no 
“automatic” right to be educated in one’s language under article  2, Protocol 
 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Belgian Linguistics Case6), even in combination with the prohibition 
of discrimination on the ground of language . However, contrary to what has 
often been written by some experts, it did not exclude the possibility that, 
in appropriate circumstances, it could be discrimination on the ground of 
language not to use one’s mother tongue as a medium of instruction .
42 . Nevertheless, United Nations treaty bodies have at times left little doubt 
that minorities and indigenous peoples do have a right to be educated in their 
own language in some circumstances . In  addition, such a  right where it is 
practical would also seem to be enshrined in treaties such as the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, as interpreted by the advisory 
committee of experts of each of these treaties .7
43 . There are undoubtedly contradictions and inconsistencies . Over a period 
of decades, there may be an evolution as to how international law standards 
are interpreted in their meaning and application, especially in relation to 
indigenous peoples or minorities . Additionally, certain concepts, such as an 
individual’s right to identity  –  even though not actually recognized in most 
treaties  –  have had an influence on how various bodies interpret and apply 
legal obligations in areas such as education, of which language is an important 
component .
44 . Most reports tend to confirm an acceptance of the right to education in 
a minority’s or indigenous people’s mother tongue . At times this acceptance 
includes higher education in public institutions without restrictions, while 
6 See European Court of Human Rights, Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use 
of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium (Merits), (application Nos .  1474/62,  1677/62, 
 1691/62,  1994/63 and  2126/64), judgment of  23 July  1968 .
7 See Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
“Thematic commentary No .  3: the language rights of persons belonging to national minorities 
under the Framework Convention”, ACFC/44DOC(2012)001 rev, Strasbourg,  5 July  2012, part VI .
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at others it means that there should be “multilingual” schools that include 
children from the majority linguistic community . It is not always clear whether, 
in practical terms, this means that single-medium education in a State’s official 
language should itself be avoided . This would seem to be impractical, especially 
in countries with a large number of minority languages .
45 . What has therefore emerged more recently is that differences of treatment 
between two languages, including where the privileged language is an official 
language and in the area of public education, may be discriminatory in 
international human rights law if they are not demonstrated to be reasonable 
and justified preferences . In Diergaardt v. Namibia (CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997), 
the majority of the members of the Human Rights Committee concluded that 
non-discrimination might permit the use of other languages in addition to 
an official one where it was unreasonable and unjustified for administrative 
authorities not to use another language in addition to that country’s only official 
language at the time, namely English . Similarly, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights concluded in  2009 that the almost exclusive use of 
one official language, French, in banking matters regulated by the Government 
of Cameroon so disadvantaged English-speaking citizens as to be unjustified, 
and therefore in violation of a  substantive approach to equality and non-
discrimination on the ground of language,8 suggesting therefore that the 
anglophone minority in that country was entitled to language rights anchored 
in this general human rights standard .
46 . The above human rights conclusions suggest that a  State language 
preference can constitute discrimination if it is unreasonable or unjustified, 
or not based on what is proportionate, practical and justified . It would seem 
therefore that public education not provided in a  child’s language could be 
a breach of the right to education if students are imposed with an unrealistic 
burden through the language choice of authorities,9 or excluded from the 
opportunity of learning the national language .10 The implications are that the 
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of language can lead to situations 
where State authorities have an obligation to communicate with members of 
the public in a non-official language, often a minority language, where this is 
reasonable and justified . In  relation to the right to education, there can, for 
example, be situations of a denial of the substance of the right if the language 
8 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, 
Communication No .  266/2003,  27 May  2009 . 
9 European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey (application No .  25781/94), judgment of  10 
May  2001 .
10 European Court of Human Rights, Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application Nos . 
 43370/04,  18454/06 and  8252/05, judgment,  19 October  2012 .
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T used as a medium of instruction is not a child’s mother tongue for as long and 
as extensively as is reasonably practicable .
47 . Whereas for language rights in private activities the defining principle 
would be a  laissez-faire approach, the use of minority languages by State 
authorities would seem to call for the use of a proportionality principle – based 
on what is reasonable or justified after consideration of all the relevant 
circumstances in order to comply with the prohibition of discrimination . This 
is essentially also the principle enshrined in treaties and documents specifically 
dealing with the human rights of minorities, such as the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities . This tends to take the shape of 
a  provision indicating, among others, an obligation for State authorities to 
use proportionally a  minority language where the numbers, demand and 
geographic concentration of its speakers make it a reasonable or justified use 
of a minority language . Beyond the legal principle itself at the supranational 
level, there is a fairly widespread understanding that a proportionate response 
is highly desirable for a number of very practical reasons:
Access to public services, particularly in areas such as health and 
social services, is most effective when offered in a minority’s language, 
particularly indigenous or traditional minorities . This includes public 
education generally .
Education in a  minority’s own language generally results in better 
student retention and academic results, including in learning the 
official language, particularly for vulnerable segments of society such as 
indigenous peoples and women .11
48 . What this describes is at the same time an essential aspect of Sustainable 
Development Goal  4 on ensuring inclusive and quality education for all and 
promoting lifelong learning . Inclusive and quality education for members of 
linguistic minorities means, as far as is practicable, education in their own 
language . Not using a  minority language as a  medium of instruction where 
this is possible is to provide education but not which is of equal value or effect . 
As demonstrated in numerous studies, teaching children in a language other 
than their own is not education of the same quality as that of children who are 
taught in their mother tongue .
49 . Studies and practices in many countries demonstrate that an appropriate 
and proportionate use of minority languages can increase inclusion, 
11 Carol Benson, Girls, Educational Equity and Mother Tongue-Based Teaching (Bangkok, UNESCO 
Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education,  2005) .
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communication and trust between members of minorities and authorities . 
This is not simply a  matter of authorities using a  minority language once 
a  minority has reached a  numerical or percentage threshold, since every 
country and situation is unique . Factors that may be considered in determining 
the appropriate scale of use of a minority language by public authorities, or as 
to what is a sufficient number or is justified in a particular case, will depend 
on the circumstances . Prominent among these would be the already existing 
use of a  minority language by State authorities, the number of speakers of 
a minority language, the level of demand for the use of a minority language, 
the territorial concentration of the minority, a  State’s available resources in 
light of any additional costs in training or materials, the type of service being 
requested in the minority language and the relative ease or level of difficulty in 
responding to the demand .
50 . Studies around the world, including some published by the World Bank, 
UNESCO and the United Nations Children’s Fund, arrive at broadly similar 
results on the effects of education in a minority’s mother tongue,12 combined 
with quality teaching of the official language, which are that it:
(a) Is more cost-effective in the long term;
(b) Reduces dropout and repetition rates;
(c) Leads to noticeably better academic results, particularly for girls;
(d) Improves levels of literacy and fluency in both the mother tongue and 
the official or majority language;
(e) Leads to greater family and community involvement and support .
51 . The use of minority languages in a State’s administrative and other public 
activities thus involves fundamental issues of inclusiveness, participation, 
access, quality and effectiveness .13
52 . Children thus stay in school longer, obtain on average better grades, 
and obtain on average a higher degree of fluency in both the official language 
and their own language .14 Put differently, minority students taught only in the 
12 See generally, UNESCO, Improving the Quality of Mother Tongue-based Literacy and Learning: 
Case Studies from Asia, Africa and South America (Bangkok, UNESCO,  2008) .
13 For a list of some of these studies, see United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority issues, 
Language Rights of Linguistic Minorities.
14 For example, in one ranking of high schools in France (lycées) for  2013, the top educational 
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T official language will on average repeat grades more often, drop out of school 
more frequently, receive worse results, end up later in life with the lowest paying 
jobs and highest unemployment rates, and learn the official language less well 
than students who were taught in their own language . If persons belonging to 
linguistic minorities have a responsibility to integrate into the wider society, 
then it would seem that this can be best achieved through effectively teaching 
them in their own language because of generally better outcomes from 
education in one’s language, even in acquiring fluency in the official language .15
D. Human rights obligations and the use of minority languages in education
53 . Although there is no unanimity, there are trends in the numerous views 
of United Nations treaty bodies .16 While some treaty bodies link the choice of 
the language of instruction to the right to education by itself, or to the right of 
minorities to use their own language among themselves, a perusal of the views 
of various treaty bodies also shows that it is often referred to in association 
with the prohibition of discrimination . For example, it is the only possible basis 
for the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to comment 
on the issue of language and education in its concluding observations where 
it has formed the view that in some cases minorities are entitled to education 
in their own language . The possibility of using non-discrimination to support 
the use of a  particular language in public education was also admitted 
by the European Court of Human Rights in the Belgian Linguistics Case, 
where a  refusal to do so by authorities could in some situations be deemed 
to be arbitrary, unreasonable or unjustified, and therefore discriminatory . 
As explained previously, the disadvantages that children may encounter when 
not taught in their own language, and this includes the use of sign languages, 
could under certain conditions constitute direct discrimination on the ground 
of language, or indirect ethnic or racial discrimination . Simply put, children 
from indigenous or minority backgrounds will have better academic results 
(they learn better) and will stay in school longer (lower dropout rates) when 
they are taught in a language with which they are the most familiar – usually 
their own . When this happens, especially when they stay in school longer, they 
facility for the whole country was the Lycée Diwan, where teaching is done in the minority Breton 
language rather than the country’s only official language . This school also had a higher average 
fluency in the French language than schools that taught in French, even though most of the 
instruction was in Breton .
15 Nadine Dutcher, in collaboration with G . Richard Tucker, “The use of first and second languages 
in education: a review of educational experience”, Pacific Islands Discussion Paper Series, No .  1 
(Washington, D .C ., World Bank,  1997) .
16 Excerpts of international and regional documents on education, language and the human rights of 
minorities are available at www .ohchr .org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/SR/documentsexcerpts .
docx .
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will not only acquire a stronger basis and literacy in their own language, they 
will also be able to gain greater fluency in the official/majority language .
54 . It is also important to emphasize that the use of a  minority language 
includes the use of sign languages: sign languages are fully fledged languages, 
and their users can therefore be considered as members of linguistic minorities 
where they represent less than half of the entire population of a State, as set 
forth in the working concept the Special Rapporteur submitted in October  2019 
in his report to the General Assembly . As members of linguistic minorities, 
users of sign languages can experience the same disadvantages or exclusion as 
other minorities if their languages are not used as languages for instruction . 
In fact, the obstacles to effective, quality education can be said to be even more 
pronounced .
55 . Despite the uncertain references at times to an unqualified “right to 
education in the mother tongue” – and on other occasions to something as 
vague as simply “bilingual education” or “multilingual education”  –  and no 
clear guidance of the exact extent to education in a particular language, there 
are still a few indications as to the extent a minority or indigenous people could 
claim the use of its language as a medium of education .
1. “Where reasonable and justified”: the degree and use of a minority language 
in education
56 . All United Nations treaty bodies are sensitive to what is realistically 
feasible . This explains the wording used in treaties such as the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages: the degree a minority language is used in 
education must be appropriate or “according to the situation of each language” . 
In terms of the prohibition of discrimination, it is obviously not unreasonable 
and unjustified not to use a minority or indigenous language as a language of 
instruction where this would be nearly impossible, as where the language is 
only spoken by a small number of individuals .
57 . Most treaty bodies appear to be less hesitant to recognize the right to 
be educated in the mother tongue when dealing with a large, well-established 
minority . This is particularly true when education in a minority language has 
been used as a  medium of instruction or has a  long  literary tradition with 
educational material already available in that language . In such situations where 
there is no reasonable justification to refuse or restrict the use of a minority 
language as a medium of instruction in public schools, various treaty bodies 
have been more willing to recognize the right to education in a  minority 
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T language . In this type of situation, what is “reasonable and justified” would be 
for the minority language to be used as the main language of instruction to the 
final years of public education, up to and even including general instruction in 
the minority language in public university programmes . The European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages recognizes this possibility when it refers 
to the obligation of Governments “to make available university and other 
higher education in regional or minority languages” where appropriate for the 
situation of a particular language .
58 . When dealing with much smaller groups of students or where there is 
not a  well-established educational tradition, particularly with indigenous 
populations, many of the treaty bodies tend to lean towards what is called 
a  “bilingual, multicultural” form of education, though what this means in 
practice is of course vague and will depend on the circumstances in place . At 
a minimum, some teaching of the mother tongue during the primary years of 
education would seem to be required, if at all possible . Beyond that, the degree 
to which a minority language should be used in upper grades would be to the 
degree possible, in a type of sliding scale based on local conditions, such as the 
number of students, if education is already provided in a minority language, 
and the availability of teachers and educational material in a minority language .
59 . The easiest way to describe what would be “reasonable and justified” in the 
use of a minority language in education could be as much teaching as possible, 
at the highest level possible: for pedagogical and other reasons a mother tongue 
should be the language of instruction, where practical, and at the very least be 
taught as a subject where this is not really feasible . While no treaty body has 
yet commented directly on the use of sign languages in education based on 
the prohibition of discrimination, the Special Rapporteur is aware of a number 
of national judgments that have made such a  linkage . In his view, it is clear 
that users of sign languages can face barriers that are discriminatory in some 
contexts if their languages are not used as a medium of instruction where it 
would be reasonable to do so .17
17 Article  24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities makes the linkage between 
equality and the use of sign language, stating in paragraph  3, among others, that States parties shall 
take appropriate measures, such as facilitating the learning of sign language and the promotion of 
the linguistic identity of the deaf community, and ensuring that the education of children who are 
deaf is delivered in the most appropriate languages, and employ teachers who are qualified in sign 
language .
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2. Public and private education
60 . A few treaties, such as the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination 
in Education and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, make it clear that minorities have the right to establish and 
operate private schools and educational institutions that use their language 
as a medium of instruction . General human rights treaties do not clarify this, 
nor do such provisions as article  27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights on the right of linguistic minorities to use their own language 
among themselves, or article  28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the right to education .
61 . The concluding observations from different United Nations treaty bodies 
seem, however, to take it for granted that minorities are entitled to such 
private schools, and have been willing to recognize it in their responses – even 
though at times it is not always clear if they are referring to public or private 
schools, or what a national Government’s legal obligations are under the right 
to education, or article  27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, in relation to public as opposed to private schools using a  minority 
language . For example, article  27 refers only to the use of a minority language 
among members of a minority themselves, not between members of a minority 
and a public institution (such as a State school) .
62 . None of the general human rights treaties refer to an obligation to 
financially support private schools for minorities, although there is one case 
where the Human Rights Committee concluded that it could be discriminatory 
to fund some private religious schools and not the private schools of other 
(minority) religious groups (CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996) .
63 . This is therefore an area where there is a  great deal of uncertainty . 
The  following interpretations appear to be fairly well supported, at least for 
private education activities:
(a) Private schools for minorities and educational activities using 
a minority language seem to be guaranteed under article  27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and similar provisions) . It is less clear if 
the right to education in general includes this aspect;
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T (b) The prohibition of discrimination suggests that minorities may be able 
to claim the right to establish private schools, even if private schools in general 
are prohibited in a country (Minority Schools in Albania Case18);
(c) It could also be discriminatory to allow private schools to operate in 
some languages, but not others;
(d) Financial support for private minority schools is less well defined in 
the observations of various treaty bodies: while it is clear that Governments 
cannot discriminate if they provide funding to some private schools, this does 
not mean that there is an automatic entitlement to financial support for private 
minority schools;
(e) There are comments that seem to suggest that, to truly respect the 
identity of minorities, some degree of support must be provided to their private 
institutions;
(f ) States are entitled to require that the curriculum in private minority 
schools conform to national quality and content standards in different subject 
matters, although this cannot be used to affect the use of a minority language 
as a medium of instruction in these schools;
(g) Students in private minority schools must always have the opportunity 
to learn the official, national or majority language .
64 . There is another issue concerning the interaction between public and 
private schools that is not yet clear in the interpretation of various committees 
and the right to education in general . While individuals have a  right to 
education, it appears that States may comply with this right through private or 
public education measures . What counts is not a particular model of education, 
but that the right to education of individuals is respected in practice . If State 
authorities have an obligation to provide instruction in a  mother tongue 
(whether it is on the basis of article  27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the right to education or the prohibition of discrimination 
in education), and this is done completely or in part with private education 
measures, then these same authorities would need to provide the necessary 
support, financial and material, to ensure that this is done on the basis of equality 
with similar measures or institutions in the official or majority language .
18 Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Opinion No .  26,  6 April  1935 .
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3. Teaching and the official/majority language
65 . One aspect that is absolutely clear from an international legal point of 
view is that whatever the degree of use of a minority language as a medium 
of instruction, in private or public schools, students must always be afforded 
the opportunity of learning the official or majority language . Article  14 (3) of 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities refers to 
implementation (of education in a minority language) “without prejudice to 
the learning of the official language or the teaching in this language” .
66 . Put differently, whatever model or approach is in place in relation to the 
use of a minority language as a medium of instruction, children must always 
have an opportunity to effectively learn the official or majority language where 
they live .
IV. Focus on awareness-raising and the visibility of minorities and 
their human rights
A working definition of the concept of a minority for the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur
67 . The Special Rapporteur’s  2019 annual report to the General Assembly in 
October  2019 (A/74/160) addressed the need for a working definition of the 
concept of a minority in order to:
(a) Comply with the Special Rapporteur’s mandate;
(b) Clarify the meaning of the concept in order to avoid controversies and 
contradictions, within and outside the United Nations, which weaken the full 
and effective realization of the rights of minorities;
(c) Clarify the concept according to international law, including the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the applicable principles 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .
68 . As part of his mandate, the Special Rapporteur must raise awareness and 
work for the full and effective realization of the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities . This includes clarifying key concepts such as who can claim to 
be a minority under the United Nations system . The absence of consistency 
in understanding who is a minority is a recurring stumbling block to the full 
and effective realization of the rights of minorities . Different United Nations 
entities may contradict one another because they consider different groups 
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T of persons as constituting a minority and diverge from the practices in other 
entities . Some States Members of the United Nations hesitate to engage on 
matters relating to minorities since they do not know who is a minority and 
what that entails . In other States, there may even be the assumption that the 
absence of a definition means it is left to each State to determine freely who is or 
is not a minority . In most of these situations, the uncertainty leads to restrictive 
approaches: in many situations, persons are deemed to be “undeserving” 
because they are not “traditional” minorities, not citizens or not sufficiently 
“dominated” . The end result is that some minorities are excluded because they 
are not the “right kind” of minority according to different parties .
69 . It is for this reason the Special Rapporteur has opted for a  working 
definition that conforms with the general rule of treaty interpretation and the 
ordinary meaning of the word “minority” in its “context and in the light of its 
object and purpose” in the absence of a  clearly intended special meaning,19 
as well as a  working definition that is consistent with the Human Rights 
Committee’s own views and interpretation of article  27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .20
70 . The Special Rapporteur, as part of his mandate to promote the full and 
effective realization of the human rights of minorities, will therefore be using 
and promoting the following concept of a  minority, both within the United 
Nations and in carrying out his activities: an ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority is any group of persons that constitutes less than half of the population 
in the entire territory of a State whose members share common characteristics 
of culture, religion or language, or a  combination of any of these . A  person 
can freely belong to an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority without any 
requirement of citizenship, residence, official recognition or any other status .
V. Update on the  2019 Forum on Minority Issues
71 . The Forum on Minority Issues was established in  2007 by the Human Rights 
Council by its resolution  6/15 and reaffirmed in  2012 by its resolution  19/23 . 
It is mandated to provide a platform for promoting dialogue and cooperation 
on issues pertaining to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
and to provide thematic contributions and expertise to the work of the Special 
Rapporteur on minority issues . The Special Rapporteur is tasked with guiding 
the work of the Forum, preparing its annual meetings and reporting to the 
Human Rights Council on its thematic recommendations . The Forum meets 
annually in Geneva for two working days allocated to thematic discussions . 
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art .  31 . 
20 General comment No .  23 (1994) on the rights of minorities . 
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It brings together an average of  500 participants, including minorities, Member 
States, United Nations mechanisms, regional intergovernmental bodies and 
non-governmental organizations .
72 . The twelfth session of the Forum was held on  29 and  30 November  2019, 
with the theme “Education, language and the human rights of minorities” . As in 
 2018, the number of participants far exceeded the average level of previous 
years, with more than  600 participants counted .
73 . Exceptionally, two co-chairs were appointed for the twelfth session by 
the President of the Human Rights Council, namely Anastasia Crickley, former 
chair of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
and Astrid Thors, former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities . 
A  total of  12 experts and members of minorities from different parts of the 
world took part in the four main panel discussions, on the topics of: human 
rights and minority language education; public policy objectives for education 
in, and the teaching of, minority languages; effective practices for education 
in, and the teaching of, minority languages; and language, education and 
the empowerment of minority women and girls . The Forum was opened on 
 28 November  2019 by the President of the Human Rights Council, followed 
by statements by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lamberto Zannier, and 
the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, as well as remarks by the co-chairs .
74 . The Special Rapporteur reiterated the crucial importance of the Forum 
on Minority Issues, which represents the only avenue for a number of minority 
rights activists to advocate for change at the international level . It is a positive and 
unique platform for promoting dialogue and cooperation on issues pertaining 
to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities . He noted the high 
levels of participation in the Forum in  2019, with more than  200 declarations 
being made over the two days, as evidence of the timeliness and relevance of 
the theme of the  2019 Forum for many minorities around the world, and the 
vital role the Forum continued to play as a unique focal point of discussions 
and exchanges at the United Nations for minorities, civil society organizations 
and Member States . A total of  140 recommendations emanated from the three 
regional forums21 and more than  100 from the Forum on Minority Issues itself .
21 The recommendations of the three regional forums are available at www .ohchr .org/Documents/
Issues/Minorities/IntegratedAfricaRecommendations .pdf, www .ohchr .org/Documents/Issues/
Minorities/IntegratedAsiaPacificRecommendations .pdf and www .ohchr .org/Documents/Issues/
Minorities/IntegratedEuropeRecommendations .pdf .
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T 75 . The Special Rapporteur notes that, among the many recommendations 
made at the Forum, the emphasis was on the importance of ensuring the 
implementation of Sustainable Development Goal  4 on ensuring inclusive and 
equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for 
all . Many minorities from around the world who had participated in the Forum 
emphasized the importance of equal treatment and non-discrimination based 
on the language they spoke or chose to learn . The  Special Rapporteur also 
notes that, for the first time, international sign language interpretation was 
provided during the Forum, and that it was recommended that sign languages 
be recognized as languages instituted in law and that legally deaf children have 
the right to access bilingual education within a sign language environment .
76 . The Special Rapporteur notes in particular a  call made for regional 
forums to be held each year before the Forum on Minority Issues in order 
to provide more accessible and flexible platforms that would enable more 
contextualized discussions on regional realities . Regional forums would lead 
to greater regional insights and suggestions that would subsequently be taken 
into account at the Forum in Geneva and be part of a larger debate . The final 
report on the  2019 Forum had not yet been finalized at the time of writing of 
the Special Rapporteur’s report .
77 . Although a number of objectives were achieved through the Forum, the 
Special Rapporteur reiterates his view that there remains the need to consolidate 
the Forum as a space for interactive dialogue and to increase the engagement of 
States, United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other stakeholders . 
Additionally, from a procedural viewpoint, the increasingly large number of 
participants continues to create frustration as not everyone is able to take the 
floor under the desired agenda item and to delve into specific thematic issues 
or concerns, particularly when they are limited to two or three minutes to do 
so . While a more regional approach may make an interactive dialogue more 
accessible to minorities in different parts of the world and more receptive to 
regional concerns and contexts, other possible improvements should also be 
examined in  2020 .
Regional forums
78 . In his first report to the Human Rights Council, dated  16 January  2018, the 
Special Rapporteur raised the possibility of taking a more regional approach to 
the Forum on Minority Issues in order to make the Forum more accessible to 
minorities in different parts of the world and more receptive to regional concerns 
and contexts (A/HRC/37/66, para .  64) . The first steps towards implementing 
such an approach were undertaken in  2019, with the organization of three 
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regional forums . The  first forum for Europe, with the theme of “Education, 
language and the human rights of minorities”, was held at the European 
Parliament in Brussels on  6 and  7 May  2019 . The success of this first regional 
forum created favourable momentum for the subsequent Asia-Pacific regional 
forum, held at Mahidol University in Bangkok on  20 and  21 September  2019, 
and the Africa-Middle East regional forum, held in Tunis on  28 and  29 October 
 2019 . It is hoped that four regional forums might be possible in  2020, which 
would be on the Special Rapporteur’s third thematic priority, that is, tackling 
through social media hate speech and incitement to hatred against persons 
belonging to minorities . For the organization and coordination of the three 
regional forums in  2019, the Special Rapporteur had received the support of 
numerous regional civil society partners, as well as material and other support 
from States such as Austria, Canada, Hungary and Slovenia . All three regional 
forums were coordinated thanks to the Tom Lantos Institute in Budapest . 
Nearly  300 participants  –  including from non-governmental and minority 
organizations, States, and regional and international organizations (such as 
UNESCO, OSCE, the European Union and the Council of Europe) – attended 
this initial round of regional forums .
VI. Recommendations
A. Recommendations relating to the working definition of the concept 
of a minority
79 . The Special Rapporteur invites United Nations entities to take note 
of the working definition of the concept of a  minority under article  27 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and comment on who is 
a  member of a  minority in order to adopt and apply more consistently 
a  common approach and understanding and therefore more effectively 
ensure the full and effective realization of the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities.
80 . He recommends in particular that OHCHR, other United Nations 
entities, and the treaty bodies and special procedures review how they 
publicly describe who is considered a minority so as to avoid confusion 
and contradiction within the United Nations. The  Special Rapporteur 
urges avoidance of the use of definitions that had previously been rejected 
by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
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T B. Recommendations relating to education, language and the human rights of 
minorities
81 . The Special Rapporteur recommends that, as part of his mandate 
on minority issues, a series of practical guidelines be drafted to provide 
concrete guidance on the content and implementation of the human rights 
of minorities and the use of their languages in the field of education. These 
are to be more focused than, but built upon, the basic principles already 
identified in the Language Rights of Linguistic Minorities: A Practical Guide 
for Implementation.
82 . Given the prominence and importance of language for the identity 
of linguistic minorities and the numerous examples of good practices 
shared with the Special Rapporteur by States and other stakeholders in 
response to the questionnaire on this topic,22 he further recommends that 
the guidance document be made available in all six official languages of 
the United Nations, and be widely circulated to interested parties both 
within the United Nations and with other international and regional 
organizations and civil society organizations.
C. Recommendations relating to the Forum on Minority Issues and the 
regional forums
83 . The Special Rapporteur reiterates the call made by numerous 
participants at the Forum on Minority Issues and in the three regional 
forums, and recommends the consolidation and institutionalization of 
a regional approach to the constructive dialogue between all stakeholders 
on minority issues. He recommends specifically that OHCHR and other 
interested parties consider practical means to ensure and support, under 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, the annual 
organization of four regional forums to ensure that regional voices and 
contexts are more fully presented and can complement more effectively 
the Forum on Minority Issues as a  platform for promoting dialogue 
and cooperation on issues pertaining to national or ethnic, religious 
and linguistic minorities, and for the further implementation of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
22 See the annex for a sample questionnaire and a list of contributors .
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D. Other recommendations
84 . The Special Rapporteur noted the recommendation that was often 
raised during the regional forums and other activities, that the human 
rights of minorities be highlighted more frequently and that a  more 
detailed approach be considered in their recognition and protection within 
the United Nations system. He recommends in particular that OHCHR, in 
collaboration with the Special Rapporteur, consider setting up a working 
group to examine the possibility of establishing a  future instrument on 
the human rights of minorities, along the same lines as those for other 
marginalized or vulnerable segments of society, such as migrants, persons 
with disabilities and women.
Annex
Education, language and the human rights of minorities: sample question-
naire and list of contributors
A. Sample questionnaire
Call for Submissions by  30 September  2019
Education, Language and the Human Rights of Minorities
In accordance with his mandate pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 
 34/6, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Dr . Fernand de Varennes, 
intends to present a  thematic report at the  43rd Session of the UN Human 
Rights Council, which will provide a detailed analysis and highlight the issue 
of “Education, Language and the Human Rights of minorities” . The  report 
will address areas pertaining to the recognition, protection and promotion 
of minority language in education, including the teaching of and in minority 
languages, and the adoption of inclusive pedagogical and educational 
approaches, with the view to ensuring equal access to quality education by 
persons belonging to minorities, in line with the international commitments 
under the post-2015 development agenda (SDG  4) .
The report will also provide suggestions and recommendations addressed to 
all relevant stakeholders at the local, national, regional and international levels, 
and identify examples of good practices and initiatives that recognize and 
support the linguistic rights of minorities and promote inter-culturalism and 
multilingualism in the educational systems .
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The issue of education as a  human right and its contours and impact for 
minorities constitutes one of the thematic priorities of the Special Rapporteur . 
It  is also a  topical issue, given the persisting significant challenges faced by 
minorities around the world today in accessing quality education and in 
particular education that contributes to the preservation of their language and 
identity .
Laws and policies which provide for a monolingual approach to education and 
to the provision of services, and which also impose restrictions on the use of 
minority languages in the public sphere, especially as medium of instruction, 
are often based on the misconception that investing in minority languages and 
creating an environment for their use and further development would alienate 
minorities from the learning of the national/official language, create linguistic 
segregation that would undermine minority integration and threaten national 
unity, societal cohesion and harmony .
Research has shown that inclusion of minority languages in education, both 
as separate subjects and as mediums of instruction, and the adoption of 
inter-cultural and multi-lingual approaches and methods in educational 
and vocational training programmes, have a  direct positive impact on 
the educational performance of minority students, their self-esteem and 
development, and their integration in society in general .
In addition, protection of minority languages and the recognition, respect and 
promotion of the educational needs of minorities, is a crucial component of the 
protection and preservation of minorities’ cultural heritage and promotion of 
society’s diversity and development, and thus an important factor in reducing 
inter-ethnic tension and preventing conflicts .
In  2009, the inaugural session of the Forum on Minority Issues focused on 
minorities and the right to education and recommended that States provide 
adequate opportunities to persons belonging to minorities to learn their 
mother tongue or to learn through the medium of the mother tongue, and such 
opportunities be chosen in consultation with them . It also recommended that 
teachers and appropriate teaching and reading materials, including textbooks, 
should be available in the mother tongues of minorities .
Furthermore, in its section on education, the  2017 publication by the mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues entitled “Language Rights of 
Linguistic Minorities: a  practical guide for implementation” highlights the 
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importance of designing and implementing educational programmes in minority 
languages along with the teaching of the official language(s), and advocates for 
the preservation of minority languages, because as stated “a language that is 
not taught is a language that will ultimately vanish” . Furthermore, the Practical 
Guide emphasizes that “the rights of linguistic minorities are human rights”, 
and that education “deals with what is perhaps the central linguistic right of 
minorities, and is also fundamental to the maintenance of linguistic diversity .” 
It also indicates that “quality public education in the mother tongue should ‘be 
extended to as late a stage in education as possible’, up to and including public 
university education where practicable .”
The thematic report will address existing challenges with regard to such 
access to quality education by persons belonging to minorities, and will 
highlight good practices with regard to the inclusion of minority languages in 
national curricula, the effective involvement of minorities in the design and 
implementation of educational programmes, as well as other positive legal and 
policy developments that recognize and guarantee the right of minorities to 
learn and study in their own language .
In his analysis on minority language integration in the educational systems, 
the Special Rapporteur will pay particular attention to the educational needs 
of deaf people, as members of a  linguistic minority, the recognition of sign 
languages as minority languages and their inclusion as a medium of instruction 
at all educational levels .
Call for submissions
In accordance with the established practice of thematic mandate holders, the 
Special Rapporteur welcomes inputs by States, UN agencies, regional and 
international organizations, national human rights institutions, civil society, 
scholars and research institutions, and others who may wish to submit for 
this purpose . Such submissions may include, for instance, recommendations, 
evidence and case studies, as well as analyses relevant to
1 . Please provide information on the specific legislative, institutional and 
policy framework at the national and local level that address minority education, 
and education of and in minority languages, including sign languages . Please 
provide examples of key laws, policies and practices, including good practices, 
as well as gaps .
2 . Please provide examples of programmes of linguistic diversity, learning 
materials, multi-lingual and multi-cultural approaches to and methods 
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T of teaching and learning, involving the teaching and learning of minority 
languages and cultures .
3 . Please provide information on initiatives and programmes that effectively 
address challenges faced by minorities in accessing quality education, including 
the issue of direct and indirect costs of education .
4 . Please provide examples of training programmes for teaching staff and 
 educational administrators, including inter-cultural training, aiming at prepar-
ing them to respond to the educational needs of minority students .
5 . Please provide examples of programmes and initiatives to strengthen the 
availability of teaching staff who speak minority languages, including teaching 
staff from minority communities .
6 . What are the identified challenges in the design and implementation 
of programmes and initiatives to facilitate access to education, including 
vocational education and training, by persons belonging to minorities and to 
integrate minority languages in the national curricula as separate subjects and 
as mediums of instruction?
7 . Please describe to what extend and how are persons belonging to minorities 
and their representative organizations involved in the design, implementation 
and evaluation of educational programmes and curricula .
8 . Please provide any other relevant information and statistics on access to 
education by persons belonging to minorities, covering all educational levels . 
Such information may include:
(a) the number of educational institutions (public and private) at each 
education level, in which minority languages, including sign languages, are 
either taught as a separate subject or are used as mediums of instruction, and 
their proportion to the total number of educational institutions . Please indicate 
the average weekly frequency of hours of teaching both of and in minority 
languages;
(b) the number of bi-/multi-lingual classes .
Submissions and inputs on the above-mentioned areas can be submitted in 
English, French or Spanish and addressed to the Special Rapporteur by email 
to minorityissues@ohchr .org by  30 September  2019 .
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Submissions and inputs will be considered public records unless otherwise 
expressed by the submitter and will be published on the website of the Special 
Rapporteur .
B. List of contributors
States:
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, 
Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Norway, Russia, Senegal, 
Serbia, Sweden, Ukraine
International and Regional Organizations:
Council of Europe




National Human Rights Institutions:
Australian Human Rights Commission – Australia
Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos – Mexico
Defensor del pueblo de la nación – Argentina
Institucija ombudsmena/ombudsmana za ljudska prava – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Office of the Commissioner for Administration and the Protection of Human 
Rights (Ombudsman) – Cyprus
Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman) – Serbia
Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia – Georgia
Civil society organizations and Academia:
European Union of the Deaf
Human Rights Association – Turkey
International Campaign for Tibet
Minority Rights Group International
Scholars at Risk
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO)
International Human Rights Committee
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T International Association of Library Associations
International Service for Human Rights
Latvian Human Rights Committee
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights – Estonia
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